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‘we must distance ourselves, in order to be.’ – Victor Burgin on Julia Kristeva 
hence 
we must come in direct contact in order to become 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The thesis revolves around the concept of abjection, famously developed in the 1980s by 
philosopher Julia Kristeva. It is interested in abject(ion)’s ability to contribute to the way the 
architectural discipline thinks about bodies, spaces, and the relations within and between these. 
The interest in abject(ion) stems from the observation that when architecture deals with bodies and 
spaces, it still does so to a large degree from within a dualistic framework, where bodies and 
spaces are seen as opposites, as discrete entities, and further that when speaking about the relations 
between the two, a reliance on the phenomenological conception of the body as subject and space 
as object becomes evident. That is, the relations are described from the perspective of the subject, 
from the subject’s experience, and so they are understood subjectively rather than objectively. 
Whilst this thinking is of course useful to a certain degree, it is simultaneously restrictive, and has 
a clear limit point, as it does not allow one to consider the in-between and further to unravel the 
potential of the in-between. What the thesis attempts to do then through working with abject(ion), 
is map out a more volatile and open mode of thinking about bodies, spaces, and their relations.  
And for this, abject(ion) proves as the ideal candidate, given its ability to disrupt boundaries not 
only between inside and outside, but also between body and space, resulting in a moment of 
indiscernibility.  
 
Prior to being able to employ abject(ion) however, one has to extend Kristeva’s definition, as 
Kristeva uses abject(ion) only in the context of the body and also importantly, given her 
psychoanalytic background, she often slips into a dualism which ends up curtailing the full effect 
of abject(ion). On account of Kristeva’s slippage to a dualistic mode of thought, abject(ion) is in 
need of address in its own right: there is the necessity for a productive mobilisation. From this 
perspective the thesis draws on further philosophical work, predominantly that of Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari, whose mode of thinking flows through the length of the thesis and who move 
us away from individually expelling human and spatial bodies to assemblages. More immediately 
within architecture the thesis looks to the theoretical work of Bernard Tschumi, who through his 
discussion of events, and of an architecture constituted by spaces and events, provides the initial 
possibility for exploring the process nature of abject(ion). Through these writings, we develop an 
understanding of abject(ion) as an event that constitutes architecture, and it is at this point that 
abject(ion) manifests a series of potentialities, that it climaxes in excess and leads to affect. To 
borrow (and extend) a quote from Susan Sontag, here abject(ion) becomes “something much more 
profound than the backwash of a sick society’s aversion to the body.”1  
 
 
 
                                                
1 Susan Sontag’s quote above is not about abject(ion), but the same could be said for abject(ion), which is why I 
employ it here. Sontag’s quote is a comment on the work of the Marquis de Sade, the Comte de Lautréamont, 
Georges Bataille and Pauline Réage. In full it reads: “Their work suggests that the “obscene” is a primal notion 
of human consciousness, something much more profound than the backwash of a sick society’s aversion to the 
body.” Susan Sontag, "The Pornographic Imagination," in Styles of Radical Will (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1969), 57.  
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Productive Leakages: Architecture in Abject(ion) 
 
Examining the concrete floor, you see greys, blacks, yellows, smudges of white and reddy-orange 
stains, holes at 15-centimetre intervals, dirt at the peripheries, cracks and construction joints. To 
this you contributed splotches of white when you painted two of the walls. 
  
Your gaze shifts to the nogging of an unpainted wall on the right, where a draft is rocking a dead 
fly suspended on a strand of hair backwards and forwards. Atop the nogging, and in the groove of 
each chamferboard cladding the wall to the outside, films of dust lay seemingly still. Yet when the 
afternoon sun shines through the rusted shut bay of louvers, it reveals millions of particles in flight. 
These particles, like many others that have momentarily come to rest on the numerous horizontal 
surfaces of this studio space: books, tables, windowsills, stir incessantly at your every move, 
passing through and around you. Since moving down here, you have voluntarily subjected yourself 
to the volatile field of matter that is the studio. There is a persistence to this matter. Each morning 
before you begin work, tables must be swept clean and pages of current work shaken out. But even 
then, dandruff, grass seeds and vehicular soot manages to accumulate on the table within a matter 
of hours. Writing from left to right in a repetitive motion allows you to keep a certain area of the 
page and table clean, but it also gradually wears the edge of the table down and rubs dead skin 
cells and sweat into the surfaces. 
 
There are other things too, the vine growing in front of the window, perpetually finding crevices 
through which to come in, the regular drip into a glass from the rusted through water main, which 
with its splashes has sent the wall orange. And then there are the stains that you make from sitting 
the tea bags on the cutting board, the grubby fingerprints that you put on the door for the lack of a 
doorhandle. And these are but the exchanges that are perceptible.  
 
The way one thinks about bodies, spaces and their relations has long been a central concern of 
philosophy and architecture, and has in the past 20 years or so reached yet another critical turning 
point within architecture given the explorations into biology, matter, flows and emergent 
phenomena. Despite these relatively recent shifts, which speak to a certain volatility, a dualistic 
understanding of bodies and spaces seems to a large degree to prevail within the architectural 
discipline in the form of phenomenology and its conceptions of the body as subject, and space as 
object. Given our preoccupation with articulating spaces in order to manifest idiosyncratic 
moments, which are described through our subjective experience, it is perhaps not hard to see why 
such an understanding continues to be of value. But whilst phenomenology provides for a 
sufficient account of our engagement with space, being dualistic, its key shortcoming is that it is a 
static notion of things. It is incapable therefore, of addressing transitions and exchanges between 
not only bodies and spaces, but within the bodies and spaces themselves. To shift the way 
architecture thinks of bodies, spaces and their relations is an immense task that requires not only 
great rigour but also an awareness of and a drawing on disciplines beyond our own. My hope here 
is to contribute to this contemporary thinking in some small way.  
 
A dualistic framework implies the concrete positioning of things on one of two sides of the border, 
it implies that the body and space are opposites, that there is no in-between, no possibility of 
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 overlap, and that space is something outside of ourselves. Within such a framework, the particular 
conception of the body as subject denotes the body then as a whole, unified and discrete entity. 
Being whole, the body is idealised, it is a positive body, a clean and proper body with a clearly 
demarcated boundary. In many ways, it is a classical body as per Vitruvius that substitutes a body 
for all bodies in general. But where is the body of a masochist? A schizophrenic? A body wracked 
by violent spasms? A body in excess? These bodies have managed to escape architecture, for they 
not only violate their own boundary but by extension the boundary of space. They violate 
architecture’s stability, its sense of permanence, and are for this reason often conveniently 
neglected or stylised. In a similar vein, the conception of space as object means that it is still often 
considered as inert, and that it is concerned with notions of exact measure.  
 
Being interested in bodies, spaces and their relations, the thesis begins by mapping how our 
understanding of these has developed over time. It tracks the major shifts in thinking from 
cartesianism: where the body and mind is split, and the body is known as object, with the mind as 
subject; to phenomenology: where the body is reinstated as one and where the body is a subject 
and space an object; to influences of post-structuralist philosophy resulting in deconstructivism, 
where subjectivity is questioned and probed; to contemporary interests in biology, matter, flows, 
and relations (bio-technological paradigm), where the agency of the subject is attempted to be 
overturned, and where an interest seemingly shifts from the building/ object/ end product to 
process. 
 
There is an argument here that since cartesianism, architecture’s thinking has been dualistic, and 
that even though the discipline no longer subscribes to the mind-body split, it still for the most part 
thinks of the body as subject and space as object – as opposites, as per the thinking developed in 
phenomenology. Why this thinking prevails I would argue, is because of the way that architecture 
has questioned this dualism, and also because of how it has employed the philosophy and theory 
that has the potential to rework it. What I mean by this in other words, is that on the one hand most 
attempts focus on taking apart either the body or the space, rather than the distinction between the 
two. For example, in the work of Peter Eisenman in the 1990s, we saw a formal deconstruction of 
the object and a mapping out of an in-between, between components of that object/ space. On the 
other hand, in what is being called the bio-technological paradigm, there is a drawing on volatile 
theory and philosophy that suggests a more fluid conception of the world, but what the 
architectural discipline draws from this for the most part, is new ways of organising space and 
generating form i.e. the philosophy/ theory is employed in the design process. And so the 
application is very specific and geared to a different end. For me, this application is very much a 
simplification of the theory, which harbours the potential to shift the way we think of bodies and 
spaces in architecture, and presents the opportunity to think about the development of our built 
environment and all that is related to it, in a more holistic sense.  
 
In an attempt to mobilise this strict demarcation and extend the way one thinks about the relations 
between bodies and spaces, I turn to abjection, a concept developed by French philosopher Julia 
Kristeva with her publication of Pouvoirs de l’horreur: essai sur l’abjection (1980) (Powers of 
Horror: An Essay on Abjection) (1982). Abject(ion), within which I bracket the (ion), in order to 
point to it as both process and product,2 is a discussion of the transgression of borders. It concerns 
                                                
2 Many have discussed not employing the terms abject or abjection in various texts (for example Kelly 
Pendergrast’s “Flows of Power” (2007)) because this associates it with the negative; it classifies it and brings it 
into language. Abject(ion) is unclassifiable, it works on the basis of not being named and categorised. Labelling 
it therefore means that it has been captured, rendered static, and essentially evaded study. However, in order to 
write, or even think about not only abject(ion) but other concepts that are similarly volatile and in-between, 
forever in flux, one must adopt some sort of terminology. Whether that terminology is what has previously 
been used or is new, it will always enter into language in some form or another and acquire meaning. From this 
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 anything that crosses the symbolic, anything that is expelled either literally or figuratively and that 
is necessary to keep at bay in order for subjectivity to prevail. Issuing from abject(ion) is therefore 
a threat to our subjectivity, a threat to the boundary between subject-object/ body-space. In many 
ways this then becomes an investigation into the process of abject(ion) – the process of a body 
excreting from within itself, a transition between inside and outside, a disruption of physical and 
psychological boundaries, of the still prevalent understanding of body as subject and space as 
object – a moment of indiscernibility, the result of which is the product of repulsion, the abject, and 
where body, space, abject, become an ambiguity.  
 
Given the power of its workings, abject(ion) has held a long fascination not only in philosophy but 
also the arts and architecture. Within the arts one can point to Rembrandt van Rijn’s The 
Slaughtered Ox (1638), Hans Bellmer’s drawings and dolls at the beginning of the 20th century, 
aspects from the work of the surrealists and dada, The Viennese Action Group, and through the 
1980s and 1990s the promotion of the label ‘abject art’ by artists such as; Cindy Sherman, Robert 
Mapplethorp, Mike Kelley, Matthew Barney, John Miller, Gilbert & George, Kiki Smith and Sue 
Williams to name a few. From a more contemporary front one comes across the filmic works of 
Catherine Breillat, select performances of Kira O’Reilly and the live operations of Orlan. The list 
of artists is extensive and moves across an array of media, ranging in intensity from subtle gestures 
to confronting actions immersed in the viscosity of our leaky bodies. 
 
Perhaps the most immediate architectural work that comes to mind is Adolf Loos’ Ornament and 
Crime (1909), in which Loos relates ornament to crime as it requires wasteful labour – wasteful 
labour relating to the erotic – and it is the erotic that extends to the scatological realm through the 
relation of the genital and anal. It is this series of relations that leads Loos to conclude that 
ornament is shit, and to insist on the importance of the plumber as the figure who keeps shit at 
bay.3 From this perspective one can see how “Modernism emerges from the belief that man is 
fundamentally a clean body”4 and the necessity for explicating this cleanliness through the 
presence of hygienic fittings such as the sinks in the foyers of Loos’ Rufer House (1922) and Le 
Corbusier’s Villa Savoye (1929). Ornament is further not only shit or excess but has a strong 
relation to dust, its articulated surfaces becoming dust traps in need of constant watch from the 
housewife. It was “under the continuous disciplinary watch of the housewife” that “the nineteenth-
century interior collapsed into pure surface-white, smooth, flat, non-porous and seamless”5. The 
hygienism of modernism is hence often coupled with abject(ion) as its positive counterpart, and is 
well known for its repression and avoidance of abject(ion), although modernism at times has failed 
to maintain the boundary as depicted in Bernard Tschumi’s advertisement of the ‘rotting’ Villa 
Savoye (1975). In various other approaches abject(ion) may be seen addressed through either: 
constructing buildings/ spaces from bodily or animal remains (Christine McCarthy); investigating 
spaces in states of decomposition (David Leatherbarrow); investigating architecture’s ‘other 
environments’ (David Gissen); and finally being referred to indirectly through concepts with 
                                                
perspective, the following text retains the present terminology despite rethinking abject(ion)’s usage in 
architecture. One alteration it does however make, as noted above, is introduce brackets at the end of 
abject(ion) to emphasise abject(ion) as both process and product. 
3 Mark C. Taylor, Disfiguring: Art, Architecture, Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
126. Also see Adolf Loos’ paper “Plumbers” in: D.S. Friedman and Nadir Lahiji, ed., Plumbing: Sounding 
Modern Architecture (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), 15-20. 
4 Friedman and Lahiji, Plumbing, 41. 
5 Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio, Flesh¹: Architectural Probes (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 1994), 42. See also Eileen Cleere’s article “Victorian Dust Traps” in: Filth: Dirt, Disgust, and Modern 
Life (2005), and John Ruskin’s renowned The Ethics of the Dust: Ten Lectures to Little Housewives on the 
Elements of Crystallisation (1875). In “Unpleasant Matters” Helen Stratford also introduces an interesting 
observation, that of the ‘dust horizon’ which occurs at a datum in a building beyond which one cannot reach/ 
clean.  
5
 parallel processes and concepts that are often understood as occupying the other side of the border, 
namely, Georges Bataille’s dust and informe.  
 
What becomes obvious when one starts to look into abject(ion), and is purposely made explicit 
here through the reference to Loos and modernism, is that historically, abject(ion) is classified as 
the negative – the opposite of the clean and proper body. Such an understanding sits within a 
dualistic framework, which in order to make abject(ion) ‘fit’, dissects process from product. The 
processual component to abject(ion) is conveniently suppressed, as it is precisely the process that is 
impossible to pin down, to categorise into a dualistic system, leaving the opportunity to situate the 
product – the abject, on the other side of the border. Such a framework in effect serves to render 
abject(ion) static rather than allow it to fluctuate in-between and therefore have the agency to 
obscure boundaries. Kristeva herself, as a consequence of her psychoanalytic grounding, often in 
fact slips into this dualism, which has been commented on by American historian and art critic Hal 
Foster, through her designating expulsions as other than ‘I’. Perhaps most fundamentally however, 
Kristeva speaks to this dualism through her association between abject(ion) and the archaic mother, 
as well as the womb. This serves to concretise a relation between abject(ion) and the feminine – 
abject(ion) and the other side of the border. There is therefore a very clear limit condition to 
Kristeva’s Pouvoirs de l’horreur. This understanding, which for the most part is concerned with 
the meaning of abject(ion) (from where the threat to subjectivity issues), has been probed to an 
extent by various disciplines, yet it becomes clear that within architecture, no one adequately 
addresses abject(ion)’s capacity for questioning subjectivity and reworking the relationship 
between the body and space, and that when abject(ion) is dealt with directly, it is always Kristeva’s 
philosophy that is invoked.  
 
On account of Kristeva’s slippage to a dualistic mode of thought, abject(ion) is in need of address 
in its own right – there is a necessity for a productive mobilisation, in order that it can be discussed 
as difference, and that it may be approached critically rather than simply added to the mass of 
negative connotations of the feminine.6 Abject(ion) is productive in one sense, i.e. it produces shit, 
but is un-productive in another, in that, it is still at times associated with the feminine as per 
Kristeva and therefore inherits the whole of this gender’s historical condition. What is sought to be 
mobilised, in order to in part begin to rethink abject(ion) and to be able to approach it as a process 
of change that in fact not only produces shit, but produces bodies, is this second point. The 
shortfall in dealing with abject(ion) would therefore be to adopt without question its attribution to 
the feminine, to discuss it within a dualistic system. Abject(ion) is women’s own historical 
condition and therefore is changeable. To relegate it to the realm of the negative, or reduce it to 
architectural detritus, is to underestimate its complexity. The research presented here is then about 
the ‘literal’ process of abject(ion) – the workings of this process, its materiality, void of its negative 
connotations and void of resorting to abstraction. It is only under such circumstances that 
abject(ion) has the capacity to contribute to our understanding of body-space relations. It is critical 
therefore to state that the thesis is dealing with (and building on) a definition of the Kristevan 
concept.  
 
In an attempt to disrupt a dualistic mode of thought, it is the processual, and leaky, material 
qualities of abject(ion) that the thesis builds upon, as it is these qualities that simultaneously 
implicate multiple bodies, both human and spatial. As abject(ion) occurs, bodily boundaries 
                                                
6 Abject(ion) has not only been associated with the feminine by Kristeva, but throughout history. Kristeva 
explicitly notes for example: “At the limit, if someone personifies abjection without assurance of purification, it 
is a woman, “any woman,” the “woman as a whole”; as far as he is concerned, man exposes abjection by 
knowing it, and through that very act purifies it.” I speak to the association between women, abjection and 
further certain spatial types in the second Chapter. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, 
trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 85. 
6
 rupture, matter passes from one body and is engrained in another. It is the isolation of one body 
that short-circuits the potential of abject(ion), which only reveals the full power of its workings 
within a larger assemblage. What is attempted to be mapped here then is not only abject(ion) that 
pertains to the human body but also what could be called spatial abject(ion), such as buildings 
rotting and decaying, in order to map out a larger field. 
 
Expanding on the processual and material nature of abject(ion) involves drawing on further strands 
of philosophy and architectural theory: firstly to articulate the inner workings of these qualities, 
and further, to understand the implications and usefulness for architecture. From this respect, I turn 
to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, whose mode of 
thinking flows through the length of the thesis, and more immediately in architecture, to the 
theoretical work of Bernard Tschumi (particularly his notion of event, and his definition of 
architecture), who himself refers to not only Deleuze and Guattari but also philosophers of visceral 
experience such as Georges Bataille. Although neither Deleuze and Guattari, nor Tschumi, are 
concerned with abject(ion) directly, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is highly volatile, and it 
must be noted that Deleuze has in fact written on bodies attempting to escape themselves from the 
inside out, in his book Francis Bacon: Logique de la Sensation (1981), the work of Bacon being 
linked to the abject on endless occasions, but most recently, through the publication, Francis 
Bacon: Order, Chance and the Abject Body (2010) by Jennifer Silverman. Tschumi, in his own 
way, was also through his theoretical writings moving amidst relevant subject matter: 
transgression, border crossing, limit points and metaphorical violence. The value of these 
references however above all, emerges from their ability to provide frameworks through which to 
expand on the processual and material nature of abject(ion). Such an undertaking begins with event 
and is rounded off with discussions of affect and matter. Through discussions of affect and matter 
one encounters a line of thinking in terms of relations and processes – of the world as process as 
Deleuze would have it, and therefore of an architecture of process, which brings to the fore 
interrelated areas of relational architecture and emergent phenomena. These are not discussed at 
length as their applications within architecture differ significantly, but are worthy of mention for 
their drawing at times on aspects of the same theory. Importantly, what is also established here, is 
that unlike Kristeva, who is interested in the disruption of psychological boundaries, Deleuze deals 
with both psychological and physical boundaries, and so we are able, through Deleuze, to engage 
with abject(ion) more holistically. This mode of thinking is then what allows one to explore 
abject(ion) from a perspective that has never been explored previously within the architectural 
discipline, and that poses more significant implications than any readings have allowed for to date.  
 
 
 
 
A note on methodology and composition: 
 
In working with abject(ion) in architecture, there are two modes of inquiry that suggest themselves. 
Being guided by the mass of artistic work that has delved into the abject and particularly the work 
that I have had an obsession with for numerous years, from the paintings of Francis Bacon, the 
drawings of Hans Bellmer and the sculptures of Berlinde de Bruyckere or Bill Durgin, to the 
installation work of Stelarc, the performance art of Kira O’Reilly or Orlan, and the films of 
Catherine Breillat or Matthew Barney, one may in fact desire to immerse themself in the physical 
process of making, and in undertaking therefore research by project/ practice. Alternatively, 
looking to Kristeva and philosophy, one may take a more theoretical approach, and instead of 
developing ways of doing, develop ways of thinking. In many ways, the research has always had 
an affinity to the latter, which was directed by the resistance to making an immediate jump from a 
philosophical concept into architecture, or in other words, an attempt at avoiding a simplistic 
resolution. As on the one hand this has inevitable shortcomings, given the complexity of the 
discipline and the interlacing of concepts (particularly when one begins to bring in the work of 
7
 further philosophers), and on the other, as I was not interested in making ‘abject’ architecture. 
Hence the research presented here is the work of a theorist, and what it contributes is ways of 
thinking about bodies, spaces and the relations within and between these through the lens of 
abject(ion). Given the necessity for expanding on abject(ion), and the drawing largely on 
philosophical frameworks, the research then situates itself at the nexus of architecture and 
philosophy, with an attempted contribution to both.  
 
This approach reveals a sensibility that favours theory and textual practice over images and 
objects, and goes toward explaining why illustrations of examples referred to throughout the thesis 
are withheld. Through this approach, I am also able to avoid the sensationalism or ‘shock value’ of 
much artistic production associated with abject(ion), which often relies on a primitive emotive 
reaction to the work by way of the culturally constructed and learned meaning of the abject, and 
obscures the potential that abject(ion) holds. In short, and as per Deleuze, this research is interested 
in what abject(ion) does rather than what it is.  
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TRANSFER PAPER
TRANSFER PAPER
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. A Dualistic Paradigm 
 
The starting point of this thesis has been an observation that the current mode of thought within the 
architectural discipline, as it pertains to experience and body-space relations, is still to a large 
degree dualistic. To speak about dualism perhaps first and foremost brings to mind cartesianism 
and the ancient scopic rēgime of René Descartes, the separation of mind and body and the primacy 
of vision over the other senses. In defining corporeality, feminist philosopher Elizabeth Grosz has 
given an apt summary of this split: 
 
Corporeality (also Bodies) Conventionally conceived within the history of philosophy as the polar 
opposite of mind, corporeality, or the body, is associated with a series of negative terms within pairs 
of binary opposites. Where the mind is traditionally correlated with reason, subject, consciousness, 
interiority, activity and masculinity, the body is implicitly associated with the opposites of these 
terms, passion, object, non-conscious, exteriority, passivity and femininity. Where mind is the 
provenance of philosophy and psychology, the body is regarded as the object of biological and 
medical investigation. Mind is understood as distinctly human, the motor of progress and the cause 
and measure of human achievement. By contrast, the body is assumed to be brute, animalistic, inert, 
outside of history, culture and socio-political life. While it may be the bearer or medium of mind or 
subjectivity, it is also an obstacle to or intervention into the pure operations of the mind.1 
 
Although this dualism has been challenged many times over – particularly through 
phenomenological thought and its attempts to reunite the mind and body – it can be said that this 
mind-body split still persists within contemporary society – as observed by prominent figures who 
are at the forefront of architectural thinking, in terms of experience and our relation to space, such 
as Juhani Pallasmaa. As a result, architecture continues to deal with the issue of reconciling this 
particular dualism. What is of greater interest in the context of the research here however, is the 
emergence of a further dualism, which has resulted from the introduction of phenomenological 
thought: that of the subject-object divide. Phenomenology, whilst it deepens our appreciation of the 
perception of architectural experience and bridges an essential dualism (the mind-body split), relies 
on the conception of the human body as subject and space as object. Subject and object are 
conceived of as opposites, as discrete entities. This thinking has inevitably presented its own 
shortcomings. Despite this, what I seek to argue here is that the dualism of subject-object as laid 
out by phenomenology, prevails in the way we think about experience and the relations between 
bodies and spaces in architecture. There are of course works and writings that have offered 
alternatives, and that have attempted to borrow and employ terminology from external disciplines 
in order to engage with a more open mode of thought. Yet, these equally, although they may 
manage to rethink the divide to an extent, do not manage (for the most part) to sufficiently suggest 
ways of resolving the dualism of body-space/ subject-object, as they do not cross the physical line 
between the two.  
 
                                                
1 Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989), xiv-xv. 
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In order to situate the proposition that abject(ion) is the foundation for this dualistic shift/ change, 
these modes of thought must be mapped. In doing so, there is no intention to provide an all-
encompassing historical account, but merely an intention to track the major shifts in thinking, in 
order to illustrate the persistence of dualistic thought, albeit its morphing from one form to another, 
and importantly to illustrate the persistence of a particular conception of subjectivity as laid out by 
phenomenology. 
 
CARTESIANISM: OCULARCENTRISM 
 
Philosophically, cartesianism is concerned with the ‘I’, the dissociation of the eye from the body (a 
psychical distinction), and the light of reason.2 Pertinent to this dissociation or segregating of the 
eye from the body, is the segregation of the sensory apparatus – of vision from the other senses – a 
state of ocularcentrism, what Maurice Merleau-Ponty termed ‘la folie du voir’ (the madness of 
vision). And it is particularly ocularcentrism, the prioritisation of the visual sense that 
phenomenology has attempted (and still is attempting) to mobilise within the architectural 
discipline, as is evidenced by the following statements of Professor Juhani Pallasmaa (first two 
statements, 2009, 2005 respectively), and Professors Kent C. Bloomer and Charles W. Moore 
(1977):  
 
we may well have philosophically rejected the Cartesian duality of body and mind, but the 
separation continues to rule in cultural, educational and social practices.3  
 
The inhumanity of contemporary architecture and cities can be understood as the consequence of an 
imbalance in our sensory system. The growing experiences of alienation, detachment and solitude in 
the technological world today, for instance, may be related with a certain pathology of the senses. 
The dominance of the eye and the suppression of the other senses tends to push us into isolation, 
detachment and exteriority.4 
 
The historic overemphasis on seeing as the primary sensual activity in architecture necessarily leads 
us away from our bodies. This results in an architectural model which is not only experientially 
imbalanced but in danger of being restrictive and exclusive.5 
 
There are several origins to ocularcentrism. Sigmund Freud spoke of visual primacy as natural, i.e. 
as resultant from humanity’s transition from walking on fours to walking on twos; the ‘foundation 
of human civilization’ he called it. In a similar vein, Merleau-Ponty made the following comment, 
“The whole significance of our life … would be different if we were sightless”6. Despite there 
being some truth in these remarks, the bias is also cultural, as architect and curator Mirko Zardini 
clearly alluded to in the exhibition and subsequent publication Sense of the City (2005-6) 
“…perception is not just a matter of biology, psychology, or personal history, but of cultural 
formation.” “During long periods of history, the mode of human sense perception changes with 
                                                
2 Light was associated with reason by not only Descartes but also Plato. For Plato, the most powerful light 
source - the sun, was often employed as a metaphor for the good. See: John Cottingham, Cartesian Reflections: 
Essays on Descartes’s Philosophy (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 219.  
3 Juhani Pallasmaa, The Thinking Hand: Existential and Embodied Wisdom in Architecture, Ad Primers (West 
Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2009), 13. 
4 Juhani Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and the Senses (West Sussex: Wiley-Academy, 2005), 
17-19. 
5 Kent C. Bloomer and Charles W. Moore, Body, Memory, and Architecture (London: Yale University Press, 
1977), 49. 
6 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Invisible and the Visible, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968), 58. 
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humanity’s entire mode of existence.”7 For Zardini it is a bias that has been spurred by the 19th 
Century introduction of the sewage system, which serves to sanitise and eliminate odours; the 
internal combustion engine and technologies of motion generally, which “insulate our bodies from 
physical stimuli”8; by electricity and its birth of the nocturnal city; skyscrapers and their vertical 
separation; and the advent of air-conditioning, which brings about weatherlessness and 
odourlessness. In brief, Zardini has summarised the suppression of the other senses to a passive 
and secondary state due to society’s elimination of scentscapes (deodorisation), soundscapes 
(engines), touchscapes (technology) and tastescapes (globalisation).  
 
What the ocular bias inevitably leads to is disembodiment. Physical distance between us and a 
space or an object is promoted, hence “allow[ing] the observer to avoid direct engagement with the 
object of his gaze”9. Vision becomes the active sense responsible for the intake of all the sensory 
data, and the body becomes reduced to a sedentary state, a mere bearer of mind to employ Grosz’s 
words. It is such experiences, where everything outside of us is kept at bay and is merely there to 
be looked at, that resulted in Guy Debord labelling our society as one of spectacle: “The whole life 
of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an immense 
accumulation of spectacles. All that once was directly lived has become mere representation.”10 A 
society, then, of voyeurs. Preceding Debord, Martin Heidegger wrote two seminal articles, “The 
Age of the World Picture” (1938) and “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954), in which he 
proclaimed that “the fundamental event of modern age is the conquest of the world as picture”11. In 
both of these, there is evidently an observation of the consequence of the ocular bias for our 
interaction with the world. The world is replaced by imagery, and this imagery is more important/ 
superior to the real. For Heidegger, the task of moving beyond such an interaction with the world 
as a flat sensory image, through re-embodying the cartesian bodily-less observer, is the role of art. 
And to this day, one finds artists such as Olafur Eliasson doing just this, for although cartesianism 
is no longer a viable philosophical model, the dominance of the visual is not hard to map, which is 
precisely Pallasmaa’s argument. 
 
One issue that remains within the architectural discipline in this regard, is its reliance on 
representation and imagery. It is within the design medium that we are cultivating the visual bias. 
For whether in drawing, model making or even computer fly throughs, the eye always assumes a 
dislocated point in space. What exacerbates this condition further is the abstraction of space that 
occurs to varying degrees through, for example, orthographic drawing or diagramming, and the 
distortion of space, made explicit by our continued use of Leon Battista Alberti’s ‘perspectiva 
artificialis’, which in an attempt to optically correct, distorts an object, manifesting artificiality and 
illusion. All of these tactics essentially distance one from the real as they promote engagement on a 
merely intellectual level. In part, the ocular bias has been identified as a result of our inability to 
represent sensory data,12 but what is effectively at the core, is representation itself. Meaning that 
                                                
7 Mirko Zardini, ed., Sense of the City: An Alternate Approach to Urbanism (Canada: Canadian Centre for 
Architecture and Lars Muller Publishers, 2005), 22, 31. 
8 Ibid., 325. 
9 Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: the denigration of vision in twentieth-century French thought (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1993), 25.  
10 Guy Debord, The Society of the Spectacle, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: Zone Books, 1995), 
12. 
11 Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Garland, 1977), 12. 
12 See for example the following comment by Marc Crunelle: “We have trouble representing odours in space, 
essentially because they are invisible. Only the visual data of architecture can be represented. Since space, 
where we live, consists of air, light, humidity, temperature, and smells – all of which are invisible, transparent 
things – it cannot be drawn. In short, we represent only the materiality of things, that which is solid and visible, 
and space is not material. We draw the boundaries of space, the walls, but not space itself, the living 
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even if one successfully captures the invisible and temporal aspects that help constitute space, we 
are still dealing with but a representation. Critically, the paradox that architecture presents is that it 
is as much about representation as it is about the physical building itself. And at times even, as 
Kester Rattenbury notes, the representation “arguably surpasses the architecture itself” to a point 
where “the architecture, you could say, is in the medium”13.  This was particularly exemplified in 
the 1960s and 1970s, a time when the absence of real projects resulted in ‘paper architecture’, that 
is, in representation as architecture.14 The problems of representation however of course do not 
stop here, but continue through to the way that architecture is documented, reproduced and 
publicised. Once a piece of architecture enters the realm of mass media, it becomes accessible to 
everyone, everywhere and at any point. It becomes ‘disposable’ to use the expression of Beatriz 
Colomina, and above all comes to be consumed purely visually.15 In this way, architecture is 
reduced to representation and the physical building is destroyed (or else becomes secondary). The 
world as picture is once again reinforced. Consider the photography of our architectures, the 
representations we set up: the immaculately cleaned building; the precisely arranged furniture; the 
absence of everyday objects that point to inhabitation - dishes left over from last night, strewn toys, 
toothbrushes or that pile of bills which always seems to live in the corner of a bench or table; and 
most importantly, the absence of bodies, which in the rare case that they are included, become 
carefully orchestrated as part of the composition.16 Not only is the actual photograph therefore a 
representation of architecture, but that being photographed is already a representation. 
Unfortunately, given the globalisation of the image (and in this instance, the globalisation of a very 
particular type of image), the consumption of architecture in this fashion seems unavoidable.   
 
Presenting obvious problems and restrictions, the ocular bias has consistently throughout history 
attempted to be addressed not only within architecture but across an array of disciplines, of most 
significance being philosophy and the arts which we borrow from incessantly. The 1920s in the 
arts is a period worth particular mention, given the concentration of work that reacted to the visual 
bias of the spectatorial epistemology. It included the theatrical work of the futurists – Marinetti, 
Prampolini and Fillia, who created immersive sensory environments, the work of the surrealists – 
most well-known perhaps being Salvador Dalí and Luis Buñuel’s film Un Chien Andalou (1929) 
                                                
environment in the centre. If we consider space to be a true living environment and all of its components to be 
important, then we should represent smells and sounds, air temperature and humidity.” Zardini, Sense of the 
City, 303. 
13 Kester Rattenbury, ed., This Is Not Architecture: Media Constructions (London: Routledge, 2002), xxii, xxiv. 
14 I highlight the 1960s and 1970s here for the concentration of paper architecture. Paper architecture of course 
spans a much larger timeframe. A good source in this regard is: Neil Bingham, Clare Carolin and Rob Wilson, 
ed., Fantasy Architecture: 1500 - 2036 (London: Hayward Gallery/Royal Institute of British Architects, 2004). 
15 Beatriz Colomina, ‘L'Esprit Nouveau: Architecture and Publicité’ in Architecture Production, ed. Beatriz 
Colomina (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1988), 60. Along this line, one can put forth as an 
example, the popular Architectural blog ArchDaily, whose subtitle is in fact ‘Broadcasting Architecture 
Worldwide’. www.archdaily.com/ It is also important to refer to Anthony Vidler’s edited volume Architecture 
Between Spectacle and Use (2008) which points to architecture often falling into the trap of consumerism and 
mass media, hence playing into Debord’s notion of the society of spectacle. Vidler defines this ‘spectacle 
architecture’ as one which embraces the ideas of image and iconomy. Anthony Vidler, ed., Architecture 
between Spectacle and Use (New Haven: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2008), 5.    
16 In addition to carefully placing and posing lone figures within architectural photographs, architecture is also 
synonymous with casting idealised bodies. Think of Le Corbusier and the athletic figures that at times appear in 
his photographs, or even his ‘Modulor’ - an ideal, masculine body. In architectural representation more 
generally, think of the bodies available in computer models, in physical models - the little white plastic 
figurines, and think of the bodies we choose to collage into our drawings. These are all ideal figures doing 
proper things. These all add to the representation. There are of course exceptions, such as the inclusion of 
actual inhabitants in Alison and Peter Smithson’s photographs. For comments on this see: 
Mary McLeod, “Everyday and Other Spaces,” in Architecture and Feminism, ed. Deborah Coleman, Elizabeth 
Danze and Carol Henderson (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 20. 
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which explored the termination of vision through slitting an eyeball, and the literary work of 
Bataille – his novella Histoire de l'oeil (1928) which toyed with a physical separation of the eye 
and the body, and presented a mock re-embodiment through thrusting the eye into various bodily 
orifices. From a philosophical front, Martin Jay’s Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in 
Twentieth-Century French Thought (1993) is an indispensable text that summarises the numerous 
20th Century philosophers who questioned and probed the visual bias. Jay summarises the attempts 
thus:   
 
Bergson’s critique of the spatialization of time, Bataille’s celebration of the blinding sun and the 
acephalic body, Breton’s ultimate disenchantment with the savage eye, Sartre’s depiction of the 
sadomasochism of the “look,” Merleau-Ponty’s diminished faith in a new ontology of vision, 
Lacan’s disparagement of the ego produced by the mirror stage, Althusser’s appropriation of Lacan 
for a Marxist theory of ideology, Foucault’s strictures against the medical gaze and panoptic 
surveillance, Debord’s critique of the society of the spectacle, Barthes’s linkage of photography and 
death, Metz’s excoriation of the scopic regime of the cinema, Derrida’s double reading of the 
specular tradition of philosophy and the white mythology, Irigaray’s outrage at the privileging of the 
visual in patriarchy, Levinas’s claim that ethics is thwarted by a visual based ontology, and 
Lyotard’s identification of postmodernism with the sublime foreclosure of the visual…17 
 
Within architecture, the attempts at re-embodying the cartesian bodily-less observer and hence 
reuniting the body and the mind, bring us to phenomenology. It is important to note that where in 
cartesianism the mind is understood as subject and body as object, in phenomenology the notion of 
the subject expands to include the body, and space gains the classification of object. It is these 
definitions that will be taken on from this point forward.  
 
PHENOMENOLOGY: THE SUBJECT, THE OBJECT 
 
In many ways, phenomenology is a mode of thought that has been practiced within architecture 
since the late 1950s, if one considers the work of Steen Eiler Rasmussen, particularly his 
Experiencing Architecture (1959), which is concerned with subjective experience. It was not 
however until the 1970s through the teaching of Dalibor Vesely and Joseph Rykwert that 
phenomenology came to the fore. Out of this school of thought emerged a group of theorists and 
practitioners whose work proved instrumental in the 1980s and 1990s: David Leatherbarrow, 
Daniel Libeskind and Alberto Pérez Gómez.  
 
Of the numerous philosophers that mark the phenomenological mode of thought going back as far 
as Immanuel Kant, it was primarily the work of Martin Heidegger and his explorations into being 
and dwelling that influenced architects given the possibility for a direct application of these 
concepts. For Heidegger, as for architecture, being and dwelling became a way through which to 
re-embody the cartesian spectator and hence a way to re-conceive the human subject, who 
Heidegger referred to as dasein. “‘Dasein’ ha[ving] connotations of being-in-the-world, of having 
been culturally shaped and being in society, being in position, being at home, dwelling.”18 
Heidegger’s claim that “dwelling is the essence of Being-in-the-World”19 was actively adopted by 
theorists such as Christian Norberg-Schulz who invested architecture with the role of facilitating 
places to dwell:  
 
Man dwells when he can orientate himself within and identify himself with an environment, or, in 
short, when he experiences the environment as meaningful. Dwelling therefore implies something 
                                                
17 Jay, Downcast Eyes, 588. 
18 Andrew Ballantyne, ed., What Is Architecture? (London: Routledge, 2002), 17. Brackets mine. 
19 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, 
trans. Frank A. Capuzzi with J. Glenn Gray (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1977), 236. 
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more than “shelter”. It implies that the spaces where life occurs are places, in the true sense of the 
word. A place is a space which has a distinct character.20 
 
Architecture means to visualize the genius loci, and the task of the architect is to create meaningful 
places, whereby he helps man to dwell.21 
 
Twenty-six years later, after the publication of Norberg-Schulz’s Genius Loci: Towards a 
Phenomenology of Architecture (1980) this relation between our body and architecture still stood, 
with Leslie Jaye Kavanaugh writing,  “How are bodies related to architecture? They dwell. 
Specifically, human beings inhabit and dwell in architecture”22. In concerning itself with being and 
dwelling, architecture became a matter of situatedness and territorialisation, propagating a static 
relationship between the body and space, and although the popularity of phenomenology has since 
waned in contemporary architecture, as it has been exploring alternate modes of thought, the 
writings of the above architects remain a continued reference in the area of experience and body-
space relations. Supplemented by the built work of architects such as Steven Holl, Peter Zumthor, 
Caruso St John and the recent publication From the Things Themselves: Architecture and 
Phenomenology (2012), phenomenology continues to prevail in certain areas of the architectural 
discipline as the primary mode of thought.23 Despite more prominent contemporary modes of 
thought which move beyond phenomenology within architecture, such as those drawing on post-
structuralism, and more recently concerns such as emergence, matter, flows etc, the dualistic model 
of subject-object introduced by phenomenology, I would argue, remains the dominant 
philosophical model through which we consider body-space relations and through which we 
understand our experience. 
 
By definition, phenomenology is monist, that is to say, mind and body are not considered as 
distinct entities. Its aim is to produce an embodied, dichotomous subject or lived body through 
rendering the human body whole again. What is hence at the core of subjectivity is the 
understanding of the human body as a discrete entity, but also by extension, the understanding of 
space as a discrete entity. To speak about discrete entities, is to speak about ‘things’, and 
phenomenology, as Christian Norberg-Schulz writes, “was conceived as a “return to things”, as 
opposed to abstractions and mental constructions.”24 Within this mode of thought, bodies and 
spaces have a clearly demarcated boundary, which must remain intact in order for the 
differentiation of one thing from another to be possible. Although this boundary is physical in a 
sense, it is also something that is learnt, that is a necessary step to being able to enter the symbolic, 
and that may be explained psychoanalytically (given psychoanalysis’ complementary account of 
subjectivity) using Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage. In the pre-mirror stage a child identifies that 
which is expelled from the body as well as external objects as part of their space, their own body. 
The mother’s breast, the child’s shit, are all a part of the child. The child does not differentiate 
itself from these. These are all part-objects as child psychoanalyst Melanie Klein famously pointed 
                                                
20 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 5. 
21 Ibid., 5. 
22 Leslie Jaye Kavanaugh, “The Ontology of Dwelling,” in The Body in Architecture, ed. Deborah Hauptmann 
(Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2006), 94. 
23 The key phenomenological texts just mentioned such as: Norberg-Schulz’s Genius Loci: Towards a 
Phenomenology of Architecture; Rasmussen’s Experiencing Architecture; as well as Pallasmaa’s The Eyes of 
the Skin, The Thinking Hand; and the writings of Kenneth Frampton, continue also to a large degree to form the 
basic resource material for universities. There are of course also texts that are providing a reading of the body 
from a more transformative perspective such as those of Greg Lynn, Georges Teyssot and Robert McAnulty, 
that I refer to at a further point.  
24 Norberg-Schulz, Genius Loci, 8. 
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out, that lack firm distinctions, hence blending into one another.25 What this means is that pre-
mirror stage, the child and space from the perspective of the child, function as continuum, a type of 
continuous field. It is only through the mirror stage that the child begins to learn to differentiate 
itself from these. It is through the mirror stage that the child learns its position as subject in relation 
to the object. Given these particular understandings of the body and space as whole and discrete 
entities with clearly definable boundaries, phenomenology inevitably ends up being concerned 
with idealised notions of bodies and spaces that negate a certain level of complexity. 
 
Directly linked into this understanding of body and space as whole and discrete entities is then the 
notion of form in architecture, which has lead to many attempts at reconfiguring the body and 
space formally in an effort to move beyond dualism, as we shall see in the following section. Given 
the link between a discrete/ clearly identifiable entity and form, in more recent conceptions of the 
body, form then ceases to be of central importance. Interestingly however, as is evidenced by the 
note from Andrew Ballantyne below, what architecture does with this new conception of the body 
is to formally translate it into architectural compositions, hence bringing us full circle! For the 
composition of even random scatter is still a composition forming a discrete whole:  
 
It is no longer the carefully measured body of the Renaissance, which was reduced to a series of 
mathematical proportions, which could then inform decisions about the design (Rykwert, 1996); 
(Tavernor, 1998). Rather the body is configured in terms of stimulus and response: luxuriating in 
pleasure, being racked with pain, or being involved in dynamic processes of consumption and expulsion. 
The body is still a microcosm, but whereas in the Renaissance it was made of harmonious numbers, it 
seems now to be made of blood, nerves and mucuous membranes, and there has been a remarkable 
growth in the number of books making connections between architecture, gender and sexuality. If we see 
the body as well as buildings, and cities, in terms of their actions and passions, then the precise 
configuration of the form ceases to seem to be of primary importance. If today we see the body as a 
society of dismembered parts, then this can translate through into an architectural composition involving 
random scatter, or arbitrary placement.26  
 
As well as being concerned with situatedness and discrete entities, what typifies the 
phenomenological mode of thought is the centrality of the human body – the subject, which as K. 
Michael Hays points out, has rightfully led to it being critiqued as a bourgeois ideology.27 French 
Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre lays this out succinctly: “One places oneself at the center, 
designates oneself, measures oneself, and uses oneself as a measure. One is, in short, a ‘subject’”.28 
He continues, writing that space is a projection of oneself or its counterpart, that it is defined 
therefore not in its own right but in relation to the subject: “Space – my space – is not the context 
of which I constitute the ‘textuality’: instead, it is first of all my body, and then it is my body’s 
counterpart or ‘other’, its mirror-image or shadow: it is the shifting intersection between that which 
touches, penetrates, threatens or benefits my body on the one hand, and all other bodies on the 
other.”29 Pallasmaa then clearly places architecture at the servitude of the body. “Architecture is 
not a matter of objects, which are, or settings, which are outside of our selves, architecture is a way 
of framing our own existential experience, and consequently the characteristics of architecture also 
                                                
25 Melanie Klein, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works: 1921-1963, introduced by H. Segal (London: 
Vintage, 1998), 219. 
26 Ballantyne, What Is Architecture?, 45-6. In the last sentence Ballantyne paraphrases Vidler from The 
Uncanny. 
27 K. Michael Hays, Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig 
Hilberseimer (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), 4. Hays continues to employ bourgeois from this 
point on.  
28 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (United Kingdom: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1991), 182. 
29 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 184. 
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condition our experience of the world and of ourselves.”30 In bringing everything back to the 
subject, and being preoccupied with subjective experience, phenomenology renders a certain bias 
that overshadows the ‘actual’ relations between body and space – relations that given a chance to 
surface, have the potential to expand architectural thought. What adds further to this shortcoming is 
the fact that phenomenology concerns itself with ‘subjective’ experience, meaning that it is not 
necessarily about ‘real’ experience, as the subject is a particular construction of an idealised (male) 
body,31 it does not concern itself with the plethora of possible individual experiences, but with 
some singular experience that has come to represent these. Along this line Hays has written “that 
the humanist conceptions of formal rationality and self-creating subjectivity cannot cope with the 
irrationality of actual experience”32 and Pallasmaa has confirmed this through conceding that 
“meaningful architecture is conceived for a ‘glorified’ client, and it aspires to an idealised world, a 
form of life that is at least slightly more cultured, human and understanding than the concurrent 
actuality.”33 Deleuze and Guattari refer to this version of the body as the organism. 
 
Perhaps most instrumental to phenomenology’s attempts at resolving the mind-body dualism and 
re-embodying the subject, was the sensorium. The sensorium was key, as it is the “entire sensory 
system of the body”34 which when stimulated, engages both mind and body. In many ways one can 
speak of a ‘craze’ of the sensorium which spans a breadth of disciplines from the theatrical 
experiments of the futurists (1920s) mentioned previously, to the installation works of Olafur 
Eliasson, Ernesto Neto, Yukio Nakagawa, Sissel Tolaas, and within architecture the work of Peter 
Zumthor, Alvar Aalto, Carlo Scarpa, and from a more deterministic sense, Décosterd and Rahm, 
Diller and Scofidio, R&Sie(n), to name but a few. The list and approaches are numerous, with 
publications such as Breathable (2009), Sensorium (2006), Invisible Architecture (2006), The 
Sensuous Intellect (2006) and Interior Cities (1999), emerging to document the vast number of 
works across art and architecture.  
 
In the middle of all this was a little book by Juhani Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture 
and the Senses (2005), which was (and still is) propagating sensory stimulation within architecture. 
For Pallasmaa, architecture is fundamentally “engaged with metaphysical and existential questions 
concerning man’s being in the world”35 and it is the sensorium that precisely lends itself as the 
ideal candidate for promoting and reinforcing such relations between the body and space. The 
sensorium brings everything back to the body: it is purely about subjective experience, as it is the 
medium through which the body physically connects with its environment. Richard Sennett in fact 
attempted to present a history of the city through bodily experience in his book Flesh and Stone: 
The Body and the City in Western Civilization (1996), mapping “how women and men moved, 
                                                
30 Juhani Pallasmaa, Comfort Zone: Architecture of the Senses (Sydney NSW: Australia Broadcasting 
Corporation, 1999), sound recording. 
31 The notion of the subject as an idealised ‘male’ body has lead many feminist philosophers to point to 
phenomenology’s negation of sexual difference. Elizabeth Grosz’s two books, Volatile Bodies and Space, Time 
and Perversion are useful from this perspective.  
32 Hays, Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject, 192. Hays makes this comment in respect to Kurt 
Schwitters’ Merz-column and Mies van der Rohe’s skyscraper project on Friedrichstrasse. 
33 Pallasmaa, The Thinking Hand, 126. Architecture may therefore be said to have a particular conception of the 
body - the body as subject, and to reaffirm the body as subject. To this end, Diller and Scofidio wrote in the 
1990s, “all too frequently, architecture enters into a simple regulatory role, in collusion with the systems which 
employ it” and that “architecture consistently fails to recognise the body as a political/ economic construct - 
one which it tacitly helps to produce.” Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio, Flesh¹: Architectural Probes 
(New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994), 39.  
34 “Sensorium,” The Free Dictionary, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/sensoriums (accessed September 13, 
2013). 
35 Pallasmaa, The Eyes of the Skin, 45-46. 
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what they saw and heard, the smells that assailed their noses, where they ate, how they dressed, 
when they bathed, how they made love in cities from ancient Athens to modern New York.”36 
 
Although phenomenology is monist in terms of the embodied body or subject, and hence 
transcends the fundamental dualism that marks cartesian thought, its preoccupation with 
developing a notion of the body that is whole, situated at the centre and against which everything is 
measured, gives rise to a clear distinction between it and everything else. In other words, it gives 
rise to the dualism of subject-object i.e. body and space as separate and discrete entities. The 
problems that dualistic thinking holds in its many forms are manifold. But the particular problem it 
presents here in the context of body-space relations, is that it does not allow us to think about 
transitions. Why? Because it is concerned with discrete entities and the categorisation of these into 
two columns. There is no room for the in-between, no way to describe exchanges between entities 
and the effect of those exchanges. All is static in other words, and one cannot as François Jullien 
wrote of Plato “think of the snow in the process of melting – as it becomes water”37 one can only 
think of either snow or water but never the moment of becoming.   
 
Given that subjectivity is a construct, one may transcend such a notion of the body, and 
phenomenology itself has in fact attempted to position the subject beyond a simplified subject-
object dualism, through for example Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh. There are however evident 
shortcomings to Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, it only takes us so far, but not far enough. For a succinct 
summary of this philosophical discussion, it is worth referring to the article “From Flesh to House” 
(2009) by Andrew Conio:  
 
As we have found, phenomenology certainly makes significant advances toward repositioning the 
subject outside the simplistic subject/object dualism, but ultimately fails to provide the resources 
that will enable us to think beyond proprietorial subjectivity.38 
 
In his article, Conio not only illustrates the various shortcomings but as an answer points us 
towards Gilles Deleuze and his concept of sensation, as “sensation is both object (the fact, the 
place, the event) and subject (“nervous system, vital movement, instinct”), both things 
indissolubly.”39 For Deleuze, flesh alone is insufficient to our task at hand, and its productivity is a 
misconception, as it does not account for an active process – an event, unlike abject(ion), it merely 
fulfils the subject part of Deleuze’s sensation definition. “Deleuze argues that flesh on its own is 
insufficient. Flesh “feels” but it is not the sensation itself; flesh cannot account for the movements 
and processes (events) of life.”40 As such, flesh is revealed as lacking the capacity to transgress the 
Oedipal41 boundary  – it lacks productivity. It cannot threaten our subjectivity as it does not 
threaten our bodily boundary. Abject(ion) on the other hand is the sensation itself I would argue, 
and for this reason has the capacity to rethink this dualism. It has agency. Deleuze writes that, “the 
phenomenological hypothesis is perhaps insufficient because it merely invokes the lived body”42 
                                                
36 Richard Sennett, Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization (London: Faber and Faber 
Limited, 1994), 15. 
37 François Jullien, The Silent Transformations, trans. Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski (London: 
Seagull Books, 2011), 32. 
38 Conio, "From Flesh to House," 139. 
39 Ibid., 136. 
40 Ibid., 137. 
41 Deleuze and Guattari discuss the Oedipal as a state that represses desires and imposes complexes and 
constructs on a body, in order for that body to become a part of society, order and an organisational system. 
This suppression and deferring of desire due to exigencies of reality is what Sigmund Freud refers to as the 
reality principle. Tamsin Lorraine, Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), 122, 208. 
42 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 44. 
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and that it therefore always stops at the boundary of the body, which is precisely where abject(ion) 
continues beyond. It is because phenomenology concerns the body rather than bodies that it is a 
discussion of wholes rather than transitions and exchanges, unable to accommodate volatile 
processes.  
 
In architecture similar attempts at mobilising the subject-object dualism have been made with the 
introduction of a volatile post-structuralist body, which Anthony Vidler identifies as “a “body” 
radically different from that at the center of the humanist tradition. As described in architectural 
form, it seems to be a body in pieces, fragmented, if not deliberately torn apart and mutilated 
almost beyond recognition.”43 Although the discourse has probed this dualism and offered 
alternatives, the dominant conception of architectural experience remains phenomenology/ 
subjectivity. In The Body in Architecture (2006) Arie Graafland references Hays’ book Modernism 
and the Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer (1995) 
which maps a distinct shift to the post-structuralist or what Hays terms post-humanist subject (in 
order to emphasise a moving beyond humanism) in the 1920s. He writes:  
 
What Hayes argues is that an analogous perceptual shift, which he calls posthumanism, can be 
detected within modern architecture – in particular the architecture of Meyer and Hilberseimer. It is 
a shift away from the humanist concept of subjectivity to the so-called ‘death’ of the subject that 
refers to the transformation of the romantic ideal of individuality into ‘structurality’ in for example, 
Althusser or Foucault.44  
 
In the same publication Vidler notes however that although such a shift has occurred, humanism 
remains the dominant paradigm:  
 
Peripheral or central, this body was however essentially a version of the ‘humanist’ body invented 
by the late nineteenth century, and whether disseminated as in the modernism of Le Corbusier, or 
much later, fragmented in the modernism of so-called deconstruction, ‘humanism’ remains the 
dominant paradigm.45  
 
As humanism shares an interest with phenomenology (through the subjective experience of the 
individual), one may state that Vidler’s quote extends to phenomenology, and that it thus affirmed 
(in 2006 when the above book was published) that phenomenology and its associated subject were 
still to a large degree prominent and of value. Eight years later, I would maintain that this is still 
the case, and that the boundaries between body and space, subject and object have not been 
sufficiently breached, and that akin to Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, architecture has not as yet succeeded 
in providing us with the resources to fully think beyond subjectivity. Simone Brott who has written 
the book Architecture for a Free Subjectivity: Deleuze and Guattari at the Horizon of the Real 
(2011), drawing on the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, confirms this, writing, “the historical 
failure to retire the humanist subject, from the 1970s to the present, and the failure of the 
contemporary program of substitution, represents the defining problem of architecture’s 
“postmodern caesura””46. With this in mind, what follows, is an account of some of the key 
attempts at reconfiguring subjectivity and hence the relations between bodies and spaces, primarily 
within architecture, but also to an extent the arts and philosophy.  
 
                                                
43 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 1992), 69. 
44 Arie Graafland, “Looking Into the Folds,” in The Body in Architecture, ed. Deborah Hauptmann (Rotterdam: 
010 Publishers, 2006), 139. 
45 Anthony Vidler, “The b-b-b-Body: Block, Blob, Blur,” in The Body in Architecture, 132.  
46 Simone Brott, Architecture for a Free Subjectivity: Deleuze and Guattari at the Horizon of the Real 
(Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 4. 
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THE POST-STRUCTURALIST SUBJECT 
 
The construct of subjectivity is something that has been questioned numerously since the 1920s. 
Artistically, consider some of the references already made in relation to abject(ion): Hans 
Bellmer’s deconstructed and reassembled dolls; Bill Durgin’s incomplete bodies; or Berlinde de 
Bruyckere’s fleshy contorted organisms. From a philosophical front, think of Theodor Adorno, 
who collapsed the subject and object into one, and argued that the object is tied to the subject, as 
each subject has an object and vice versa, or equally the work of Georg Lukács, Walter Benjamin, 
Ernst Bloch, and Siegfried Kracauer, whom as Hays notes, are examples of the most sustained 
accounts of questioning subjectivity in the early 20th century.47 To these one may also add the 
critical writings of Franz Kafka, particularly his short stories The Metamorphosis (1915), The 
Cares of a Family Man (1919), Investigations of a Dog (1931) and The Burrow (1931), within 
which the subject is no longer human but often animal or even a spool for thread, and where in The 
Metamorphosis, subjectivity is presented as not fixed and ideal but rather as shifting through the 
main character Gregor Samsa’s transformation into a giant bug.  
 
Although much of the work that tracks this far seems to be from the philosophical and artistic 
disciplines, one does also come across select instances in architecture such as the work of Meyer 
and Hilberseimer who Hays draws our attention to, and even the Bauhaus performances of Oskar 
Schlemmer.48 It is clear therefore that the very foundations on which the phenomenological subject 
is situated, were already being probed and deconstructed prior to phenomenology coming to the 
fore and gaining any ground within architecture in the 1970s. Despite these earlier attempts, it is 
perhaps the work of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi that is most familiar in this context, as 
well as the work of the post-structuralist philosophers that they referred to, namely, Gilles Deleuze, 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Julia Kristeva. These philosophers outlined a new mode of 
thought that not only formed the basis for Eisenman and Tschumi in the 1980s and 1990s, but that 
still provide a basis for our thought today.  
 
Post-structuralism emerged in France in the 1960s and 1970s, and was characterised by its critique 
of dualistic thought. In addition to the philosophers named above, the movement is synonymous 
with Jean Baudrillard, Roland Barthes, Judith Butler, Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Jean-
François Lyotard, all of who have displaced the subject in various ways: some through language, 
others through history, or society, genealogies of power and even materiality. The subject was 
often displaced therefore through the exact structures that were seen to construct it in the first 
place. Barthes for example attempted to deconstruct the notion of the author as subject – as a writer 
at the centre of the text who instilled a definitive meaning and reading through drawing on their 
identity. He argued in his essay “The Death of the Author” (1967) that the author and work, were 
(or should be) unrelated, in this way, the piece of writing becomes open to interpretation from the 
reader and may assume a multitude of meanings. The singular figure of the author – the subject – is 
hence replaced by individuals. Similarly to Barthes, Derrida and Kristeva became primarily 
occupied with language and the displacement of the subject through language, although Kristeva’s 
concept of the abject, which I employ here, and which is imbued with material possibilities, also 
                                                
47 See particularly Adorno’s “On Subject and Object” in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords 
(1969). Hays, Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject, 8-9. 
48 I am thinking here of the performances where Schlemmer experimented with blurring the body and space 
(scenery) on stage, through formally attempting to make the body a part of the scenery. Most notable in this 
respect are Slat Dance, Treppenwitz and Triadisches Ballett. Maria Luisa Palumbo has written of Schlemmer’s 
work, “The body that appears on stage is a body extended through space, a body where costume and scenery 
merge, where anatomic and spatial geometric forms become a single form of nature and culture.” See Maria 
Luisa Palumbo, New Wombs: Electronic Bodies and Architectural Disorders (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2000), 19. 
Interesting to note here from a contemporary front is also the work of ‘body architect’ Lucy McRae, who works 
in a similar way, attaching various materials or forms to the body in order to dilute its limit - the skin.  
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suggests other approaches of more direct consequence to the architectural discipline. Such 
approaches are inherent in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who not only “situate[s] the subject 
in relation to advancing capitalism”49 to borrow the words of Hays, but who disseminate the 
subject and object to matter. This probes one of the key constitutions of subjectivity or a dualistic 
mode of thought – the understanding of bodies and spaces as discrete entities, which within 
architecture, in spite of references to Deleuze and Guattari, still stands. In this respect, the work of 
Eisenman and Tschumi is a case in point, for though they have much to offer (and I in fact draw on 
Tschumi’s theoretical work), they do not question this distinction. 
 
Eisenman and Tschumi are well known for reading modern French theory and philosophy broadly, 
and therefore of having an understanding of the breadth of approaches to subjectivity. Out of this 
however, Derrida emerges as the key influence, having collaborated with both architects on their 
competition entries for the Parc de la Villette (1982-1998). Of particular significance was 
Derrida’s text De la Grammatologie (1967), which employed deconstruction to question binary 
oppositions, and which in part, along with other influences, lead to deconstructivism in 
architecture. Deconstructivism challenged the notion of wholes, order, rationality and stability of 
space/ object. Hence it questioned much of modernism, which was seen as purist, and attempted to 
map out an in-between. In the late 1980s Eisenman wrote: “traditional oppositions between 
structure and decoration, abstraction and figuration, figure and ground, form and function could be 
dissolved. Architecture could begin an exploration of the ‘between’ within these categories.”50 
Explorations of the in-between can be seen in play in Eisenman’s Wexner Centre (1989) in 
Columbus, a building split in two by a ‘scaffold structure’, which is not temporary but permanent. 
As such, the centre apparently “falls somewhere between process and product, past and present, 
shelter and non-shelter, structure and form, structure and ornament, building and non-building, 
exterior and interior.”51 It physically represents the in-between. In an almost identical sense, 
Tschumi has written in his Manhattan Transcripts (1994):  
 
The architecture of pleasure lies where conceptual and spatial paradoxes merge in the middle of 
delight, where architectural language breaks into a thousand pieces, where the elements of 
architecture are dismantled and its rules transgressed. Typologies, morphologies, spatial 
compressions, logical constructions – all dissolve. Representation then equals abstraction, as they 
collide in a staged and necessary conflict: repetition, discontinuity, clichés and neologisms.52  
 
What emerged from Derrida and his deconstructive form of criticism, was a particular way of 
thinking about and practicing architecture beyond dualism. Yet despite this apparent shift from a 
dualistic mode of thought to one which engaged with the in-between, and despite the complexity 
and promise of thought revealed in the respective theories of Eisenman and Tschumi, if one 
interrogates the built works, what is revealed is that the subject remains very much intact, and so 
too the dualism of subject-object. The main reason for this shortcoming is the funnelling of the 
theory into a formalism, which is pre-occupied with deconstructing platonic solids and the notion 
of the object/ space as a whole and discrete entity. Consider any of Eisenman’s or Tschumi’s 
projects, most explicitly perhaps House I – House IV (1967-71) and the Parc de la Villette 
respectively. These all take the cube as their starting point only to deconstruct it and present a 
series of derivations. Such a pre-occupation overlooks the fact that to reconfigure a dualistic mode 
of thought, is not merely a matter of reconfiguring one side i.e. the object/ space in this instance, 
                                                
49 Hays, Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject, 9. 
50 Eisenman quote in: Jacques Derrida, “Jacques Derrida, in Discussion with Christopher Norris,” Architectural 
Design, 58, no. ½ (1989): 7. 
51 David Goldblatt, “The Dislocation of the Architectural Self,” in What is Architecture?, 156-7. 
52 Bernard Tschumi, The Manhattan Transcripts (London: Academy Editions, 1994), xxviii. 
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but a matter of reconfiguring both. What is necessary in other words, is to reconfigure the dualism 
of subject-object/ body-space, to deconstruct the hierarchy and distinction between the two and to 
map out an in-between between these, rather than within space itself. For the distinction between 
body and space forms the crux of dualistic thought within the architectural discipline, which unless 
probed, allows this mode of thought to prevail.  
 
If one puts the built work aside however, a key contribution that Tschumi’s theory does make in 
this regard, is to introduce the notion of event within the architectural discipline, and therefore to 
introduce a relational conception of the body. To do so is to mobilise the subject and further, to 
shift the focus from a body to the movements of that body. This setting of the body in motion 
(although again we are dealing with but one side of the equation) is a lot more productive in the 
context of questioning dualistic paradigms than formally deconstructing space. As what thinking in 
terms of event allows for, is not only a volatile conception of the body, but a volatile conception of 
architecture, given that for Tschumi, architecture is constituted by spaces and events. The notion of 
event hence is something that works its way through the thesis, the importance of which is further 
pointed to through the work of Sanford Kwinter, Arakawa + Gins, contemporary writings on flows 
within architecture, and philosophically through the work of Brian Massumi and Gilles Deleuze.  
 
Further to Eisenman and Tschumi in the context of the 1990s, duality was also being actively 
questioned in feminist architectural circles. These were at the time bringing gender and sexuality 
into play which although presented the possibility, for a more material and volatile approach to 
subjectivity, often unfortunately served to merely reinforce certain dualistic relations. One such 
example is Beatriz Colomina’s text “The Split-Wall: Domestic Voyeurism”, in her edited volume 
Sexuality and Space (1992). Within this text, binary oppositions such as exterior-interior, public-
private and masculine-feminine are probed in the work of Adolf Loos, who presents perhaps one of 
the clearest dualistic frames of mind, through the concept of the split-wall. The split-wall for 
Colomina is an attempt at spatially working out an in-between, and is argued to be given in Loos’ 
work by the unsettling proximity that is maintained between the feminine intimacy of the interior 
and the masculine mask that is the exterior. Further adding to this in-betweeness as Colomina 
argues, is the complexity of the interior, which is composed of numerous interiors embedded one 
within the other, such that the deepest interior is the one that comes to be gendered the most 
feminine, and the inhabitant finds that their point of view of the interior is folded in over itself as in 
a mise en abyme. And it is the deepest, most feminine volume of the interior, the boudoir/ theatre-
box, that occasionally reveals the closest proximity to an exterior, protruding in the instance of 
Loos’ Moller House (1926), from the external façade of the house. Although the intricate web of 
spatial relationships that Colomina weaves are highly intriguing and do in their own way begin to 
speak to a spatial in-between, what their association with gender serves to do, is reinforce binary 
oppositions i.e. exterior/ public/ masculine, versus, interior/ private/ feminine. We are still in other 
words attributing things to the two sides of a border. This in many ways is also attributed to the 
fact that the analysis becomes trapped in architectural rhetoric – the analogy of the theatre-box, and 
its associated frame, performance, and gaze. Colomina’s analysis then, although feminist, becomes 
framed from the standpoint of a masculine gaze and distance, and it is distance which allows us to 
read things as discrete entities hence reaffirming one of the key attributes of dualism. 
 
Colomina’s text is of course not the only feminist piece of writing that remains trapped within the 
dualistic framework. Jennifer Bloomer’s well-known article “The Matter of the Cutting Edge” 
(1995) falls prey to similar dualisms rooted in gender. Writing on architecture’s relentless drive 
toward the new – the cutting edge – which for Bloomer is always a profoundly nostalgic project, 
she begins with a personal anecdote of watching children play: the boys conquering the world with 
their swords, driven to be the best, to be first; and the girls harvesting locust pods for their fairy 
tree house delicately constructed of moss. Within the body of the article a passage is quoted from 
Camille Paglia’s Sexual Personae (1990), which associates men with progress and the construction 
of civilisation, and women with a lack thereof. “If civilization had been left in female hands, we 
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would still be living in grass huts.”53 This grass hut is then associated by Bloomer with the 
primitive – the natal home – the womb.  
 
This picturesque grass hut suggests a notion of the primitive that the primitive hut, with its lofty 
theoretical accoutrements, does not. The domestic vessel of rotting material, built and rebuilt, is 
nothing new. It is the old, the original home, the mater, the now useless husk cast off back there at 
the beginnings, whenever and wherever they might be.54 
 
The quote and anecdote are used to draw attention to the dualistic thinking that has structured not 
only architecture but philosophy and the artistic and literary disciplines. Bloomer concludes by 
suggesting that if architecture’s drive toward the new is not about discovering new form (which 
she notes as associated with the masculine) but rather about an invention of relations, then both 
sides of the binary opposition must come into play. In order to move forwards in other words, 
architecture must look to the space between the two sides of the dualism rather than dwell on one 
or the other. Again as we saw with Colomina, an attempt is made to suggest a way of moving 
beyond dualism, however again, binary oppositions are still in play, as Bloomer notes that the 
garden (which she puts forward as an example of the in-between) is both a space of “nature and 
culture, form and matter, concrete and abstract, exterior and interior … the feminine and the 
masculine.”55 Binary oppositions are still fixed – the feminine is still associated with nature, 
matter, interior and so on, and the masculine with culture, form, exterior.  
 
CONTEMPORARY: BIO-TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGM 
 
Following the work of the above architects, architecture began to shift increasingly towards a 
processual or relational understanding of bodies and spaces, as opposed to a static notion of things. 
Where much of this thought has culminated over the past 20 years or so is with the adoption of a 
biological paradigm: an interest in matter, flows, and above all emergent phenomena. Affirming 
American theoretical physicist and mathematician Freeman Dyson’s prediction that “the 21st 
century will be biological”56 as cited by Hans Ulrich Obrist. Whilst a processual or relational 
approach to bodies and spaces is precisely what allows one to dissolve a dualistic mode of thought, 
much of the work given its preoccupations with technology, digital modelling and mathematical 
algorithms ends up directing this thinking to different ends, namely, form generation. As a result of 
the specific application of this thinking, there exists now a rather well versed critique of the work, 
which not only points to a captivation with the aesthetics of emergence but often an 
oversimplification of the adopted theory. These shortcomings are useful here, and point to 
precisely why, even within contemporary architecture, which is said to be engaging with a 
processual or relational conception of bodies and spaces, a dualistic paradigm prevails. In order to 
expand on some of these statements, it is worth recapitulating the above critiques.  
One of the first instances of what is now being called a bio-technological paradigm, (given the 
drawing on biology and its implementation through technology) coming to the fore, is through the 
work of Greg Lynn in the 1990s. Lynn’s is a body of work largely influenced by the philosophy of 
Deleuze and Guattari, as well as philosophers central to their work such as Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz, for whom space is not a priori but a matter of relations between objects. These influences 
are explicit in Lynn’s writing, where he can be seen drawing on specific concepts, namely the Body 
without Organs (BwO), assemblages, multiplicities and the fold. There is within this writing much 
                                                
53 Jennifer Bloomer, “The Matter of the Cutting Edge,” in Desiring Practices, ed. Duncan McCorquodale, 
Katerina Rüedi and Sarah Wigglesworth (London: Black Dog Publishing Limited, 1996), 19. 
54 Ibid., 20. 
55 Ibid., 22. 
56 Hans Ulrich Obrist and Olafur Eliasson, Experiment Marathon (London: Koenig Books, 2009), 28. 
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promise in moving beyond a dualistic mode of thought – Lynn’s discussion of multiplicities, for 
example: 
 
There is a two-fold deterritorialisation in becoming a multiplicity: the loss of internal boundaries 
allows both the influence of external events within the organism and the expansion of the interior 
outward. This generates a body that is essentially inorganic. For instance, within a multiplicitous 
assemblage, each individual defers its internal structure to benefit, by alliance, from the fluid 
movements of the pack. As the proper limits of individual elements (multiplicity of, say, wolves) are 
blurred, the pack begins to behave as if it were itself an organism (multiplicity of the pack).57  
 
What Lynn is laying out here as per Deleuze and Guattari, is a relational understanding of the 
world, as opposed to an understanding based on things. For Deleuze and Guattari, relations occur 
not only between things but within the things themselves, such that the world is a vibrating field of 
potential, never in a moment of stasis or being, but always becoming. It is therefore very much 
about the in-between, and it is this in-between, this field of relations that is a multiplicity. In an 
attempt to illustrate the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept, Lynn gives us the behaviour of the wolf pack, 
which we also find in Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie (1980). This example is useful 
as it is easily graspable, but by stopping here, shortcomings unfortunately begin to arise due to an 
oversimplification. The oversimplification lies precisely in the fact that the behaviour of a wolf 
pack represents a specific series of relations – relations between the one type that is, i.e. wolves. 
Lynn then takes such an understanding and applies it architecturally to the one type – a building, 
notably The Stranded Sears Tower (1992). A multiplicity however is much more complex and 
often a matter of various types of relations as Deleuze and Guattari explain:  
 
There must be at least two multiplicities, two types, from the outset. This is not because dualism is 
better than unity but because the multiplicity is precisely what happens between the two. Hence, the 
two types will certainly not be one above the other but rather one beside the other, against the other, 
face to face, or back to back. Functions and concepts, actual states of affairs and virtual events, are 
two types of multiplicities that are not distributed on an errant line but related to two vectors that 
intersect, one according to which states of affairs actualize events and the other according to which 
events absorb (or rather, adsorb) states of affairs.58 
 
A similar simplification occurs when Lynn draws on Deleuze’s Le pli: Leibniz et le baroque 
(1988), for his Folding Architecture (1993). Pia Ednie-Brown summarises this adequately in an 
article which is part of a recent themed Architectural Theory Review (2012) issue critiquing the 
uptake of emergence in architecture: 
 
Leibniz, alongside Newton, is credited with the invention of calculus, becoming important in 
relation to Lynn’s sense that Folding was really about calculus and architecture. But, additionally, 
the concept of the fold is one of immediate affinity with emergentism, relating to the fold of body 
and mind or soul; to the intertwinement of thinking and feeling; of the actual and the virtual as part 
of the real.59 
 
Although Lynn’s reference to and adoption of philosophical concepts has no doubt been productive 
not only for his own practice but for the architectural discipline as a whole, what the simplification 
of that philosophy does is to overlook much further-reaching implications such as the reworking of 
subjectivity.  
                                                
57 Greg Lynn, "Multiplicitous and Inorganic Bodies," Assemblage 19 (1992): 38. 
58 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Graham Burchill and Hugh Tomlinson 
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To push this further, in the same edition of the Architectural Theory Review, Hélène Frichot notes 
that practices engaging with emergence phenomena often forget the ethics of immanence:  
 
… with the rise of the aesthetics of emergence in what can be called the new biotechnological 
paradigm in architecture, which also includes the enduring legacy of Deleuze’s philosophy (both 
explicitly and implicitly), what tends to be forgotten is the importance of framing ethical questions 
and developing an ethical expertise, for instance, in the midst of the design act. The central concern 
of this essay is that, first, while a logic of emergence expresses great explanatory power, and, 
second, while an increasingly recognisable aesthethics of emergence is proving compelling for 
designers, what risks being forgotten is an ethics of immanence.60 
 
Simplification of borrowed thought is then one key criticism in this respect. The other, which 
applies to not only Lynn, but architects engaging with the concept of emergence (such as Biothing, 
Kokkugia, Ruy Klein, Arandah/ Lasch and the Emergence and Design Group) rests in the 
application of that thought as an organisational and form generating strategy.  
 
Influenced by the emergent behaviours within networks, swarms, flocks and so on, the key thing to 
point out with the uptake of a processual or relational mode of thought within architecture, is the 
shift in emphasis from the end product – the building – to the process through which the building is 
conceived i.e. the design process. To put it another way, what is of more importance is how a form 
is generated, and how its parts interact and are organised, rather than the form itself, Stephen Loo 
writes:  
 
The physical material objects, elements, spaces and buildings that result from digital processes are 
incontrovertibly actual in the conventional sense, but their status is one of ‘by-product’, or trace in 
the wake of the design process. What is valorised as design is the abstract diagram or body plan that 
may take the form of mathematical models that express the structure of a space of possibilities, say 
through a calculus (limits) of variations or parametric pathways. These are virtual events in a 
Deleuzian sense, but are nevertheless very real.61  
 
This, within a discipline where the building stands as an image of its maker, is commendable. 
Where the application of emergent behaviour begins to falter, however, is that it attempts to 
harness complex systems, abstract them such that they become “all metaphor, no matter”62 and 
then employ them in generating buildings through the organisation of space, form and program, 
even if this building is a by-product, rather than perhaps using them to think about the development 
of our built environment and all that is related to it in a more holistic sense. The process is 
teleological. In saying this, it must be noted that Stan Allen whose book Points and Lines: 
Diagrams for the City (1999) sits within this area, does in fact begin to venture down this path, 
utilising relations or what Allen calls field conditions to discuss buildings that grow incrementally 
and that therefore have local relations but no cohesive whole, as well as buildings that are flexible 
to accommodate change and buildings that are anticipatory.63 Allen’s utilisation of a processual or 
relational mode of thought however does not venture beyond the building, and so it becomes but a 
partial application.  
 
                                                
60 Hélène Frichot, "The Forgetting of the Plane of Immanence," Architectural Theory Review, 29 
61 Loo further reiterates that it is the interest in biology that guides these approaches, and not just on an aesthetic 
level but also in terms of the form-generating processes, which results in architecture seeing itself as biological. 
Stephen Loo, "Emergent Molarities: Resistances on the Molecular Plane of Biology and Digital Architecture," 
Architectural Theory Review, 61. 
62 Megan Born, Helene Furján and Lily Jencks, ed., Dirt (Philadelphia: PennDesign, 2012), 294. 
63 Stan Allen, Points + Lines: Diagrams and Projects for the City (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 
1999), 92-94.  
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To direct a volatile mode of thought towards spatial organisation or form making, is above all to 
concretise that thought through generating static objects. Further it is to squeeze a processual or 
relational mode of thought into the design process and forget that it is not merely a matter of a 
process but a matter of processes (many of which evolve of their own accord). What of the 
multitude of other processes in and around an architecture – processes of exchange between 
occupants and built fabric; built fabric and site or processes of politics, culture and time? Despite 
the preoccupation with process in the design of these emergent architectures, the enduring image of 
this work is that of the building as object. As more often than not one is presented with aerial views 
of dynamic, amorphous, shiny forms, than evidence of the processes, algorithms and calculus used 
to produce them. Most importantly, the fact that what is arrived at is nevertheless a static object, 
points to the unrelenting prevalence of conventional relations between body-space and the dualism 
of subject-object. 
 
Frichot summarises the blind spots evident in the new bio-technological paradigm most 
adequately, writing that: firstly, despite “defying conventional categorisation as either theory or 
practice” the ultimate aim is “to discover new aesthetics, and new forms”; secondly, that in being a 
new organisational strategy, the organism is left in place and the BwO is forgotten; and thirdly, that 
there is no death and only life and vitalism are stressed.64  
 
As a point of distinction, the recent publication Architecture in the Space of Flows (2012) does 
begin to address the multitude of processes or flows in and around an architecture. In the 
introduction to the book, Andrew Ballantyne and Chris Smith explain that everything can be 
understood as functioning in terms of flows – flows of various kinds and scales make up 
architecture and connect it with the world. Here a volatile mode of thought begins to proliferate 
architecture as a whole, rather than developing the thought in relation to the body or space in 
isolation. Looking once again to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, the notion of event, of 
movement (defined in terms of vectors and field relations), time (or the idea that all things change), 
and scale (an awareness and importance of the similarities in relations across any number of scales) 
become pertinent.65 These can also be seen making their way through the thesis. There are 
therefore notable parallels between the thinking developed here and within Ballantyne and Smith’s 
edited book, and it is exploratory ideas such as these, to which the thesis attempts to contribute 
through its investigation into the relations within and between bodies and spaces. 
 
ARCHITECTURAL BODIES AND CHEMICAL INDISCERNIBILITIES  
 
Further to Architecture in the Space of Flows, the work that is most interesting, in terms of moving 
beyond a dualistic conception of things, is work that questions firstly what both body and space 
are, and secondly and most importantly, the distinction between these. In particular, the work of 
Arakawa + Gins66, who speak about an architectural body, which is a human body coupled with its 
immediate surrounds and who speak about boundaries that are not fixed but suggested. (I link this 
back to Tschumi’s notion of architecture as space + event, but also more broadly to Gregory 
Bateson’s idea that the basic unit of life is constituted by an organism and its environment, which 
                                                
64 Frichot, "The Forgetting of the Plane of Immanence," Architectural Theory Review, 33. The first two quotes 
are from (respectively): Michael Hensel, Achim Menges and Michael Weinstock, “Emergence in Architecture,” 
Emergence: Morphogenetic Design Strategies, Architectural Design Profile, 74, no. 3 (May-June 2004): 6. 
Farshid Moussavi and Alejandro Zaera Polo of Foreign Office Architects, in conversation with the Emergence 
and Design Group, “Types, Style and Phylogenesis,” Emergence: Morphogenetic Design Strategies: 38. 
65 Andrew Ballantyne and Chris L. Smith, ed. Architecture in the Space of Flows (Abingdon, Oxon and New 
York: Routledge, 2012), 1, 12, 28. 
66 I would like to thank Russell Hughes for first introducing me to the work of Arakawa + Gins, and Pia Ednie-
Brown for bringing them to my attention once again and pointing out a crossover between my work and theirs. 
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he discusses in his renowned book Steps to an Ecology of Mind (1972)).67 Further also the work of 
Philippe Rahm (formerly of Décosterd and Rahm), and his explorations into a chemical 
indiscernibility between body and space. These in their own way pin down a volatile conception of 
architecture and prove invaluable precedents. At the level at which these practices operate, a 
distinct shift or a move beyond the architectural discipline to art practice and even science occurs. 
Here there is a digression from a singular discipline, which as Denis Hollier has pointed to, is the 
locus of transgression,68 and which simultaneously gives rise to what Rosalind Krauss has termed 
‘the expanded field’.69 It is within this context, that abject(ion) has something to contribute.  
 
From the work of Arakawa + Gins, which spans several decades, and encompasses both 
publications and built projects, their book Architectural Body (2002) lends itself directly to the 
discussion at hand. Within this book, Arakawa + Gins present three key concepts: the architectural 
body, architectural surround and bioscleave. Beginning with the architectural surround, Arakawa 
+ Gins map out a relational understanding of bodies and spaces, and hence a relational 
understanding of architecture. For them, an architectural surround, which is not necessarily built by 
Man, is defined by a collection of elements, or what they call a set of features, and exists only, in 
relation to a body. As such, a surround is “never read the same way twice”70 and is perpetually 
shifting. Arakawa + Gins give us three examples of architectural surrounds, a small enclosure in a 
wheat field, a kitchen and a city: 
 
In the case of an architectural surround that is nothing more than a small enclosure in a wheat field 
formed by many stalks having been trampled upon, the set includes a floor of trampled-upon wheat 
stalks, walls consisting of wheat stalks, bent stragglers mixed in with intact ones, and sky for a 
ceiling. The set of features for a kitchen will be all that makes it a kitchen, including the woman 
putting a roast in the oven. The set of characteristic features for an immensely large architectural 
surround such as a city will be everything that makes it a city, including all those or ambling 
through it.71 
 
In speaking about an architectural surround as something that exists only in relation to the body, 
and further speaking about “bodily movements that take place within and happen in relation to 
works of architecture, architectural surrounds” and that “are to some extent formative of them,”72 
Arakawa + Gins end up pointing to the inseparability and affect of body and surround. This 
inseparability is what gives rise to the architectural body. They write that “a person [should] never 
be considered apart from her surroundings,” that their hypothesis of the Architectural Body/ Sited 
Awareness “announces the indivisibility of seemingly separate fields of bioscleave: a person and 
an architectural surround,” and that “the two together give procedural architecture its basic unit of 
study the architectural body”.73 In other words, there is no body or space in isolation. The basic 
unit of study is body coupled with architectural surround. What this results in, is a certain 
indeterminacy of boundaries, as body and surround are collapsed into one, and as they are 
constantly shifting in relation to one another. “The architectural body is a body that can and cannot 
be found. Boundaries for an architectural body can only be suggested, never determined.”74 
Similarly to the architectural surround, one gets a very lucid example of an architectural body. 
                                                
67 Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 491. 
68 Denis Hollier, Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1989), 153. 
69 An expanded field is defined by a crossing over of disciplines. This crossing over constructs new fields. 
Anthony Vidler, “Architecture’s Expanded Field”, in Architecture between Spectacle and Use, ed. Anthony 
Vidler (New Haven: Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, 2008), 144. 
70 Madeline Gins and Arakawa, Architectural Body (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 2002), 43. 
71 Ibid., 39. 
72 Ibid., 50. 
73 Ibid., 51. Brackets mine. 
74 Ibid., 68. 
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Here Arakawa + Gins refer to Francis Ponge’s poem “Escargots” and utilise the snail – an 
organism permanently coupled with its surround – to illustrate the notion of an architectural body. 
Excerpts of this poem sit within a chapter which relays a conversation between Arakawa + Gins 
and a client as they explore a house that at first appears as a pile of material on the ground, but that 
upon occupation, expands into a habitable series of rooms whose volume shifts in relation to the 
movement of bodies within them.75 House and body are interconnected and interdependent: one 
giant snail.  
 
The framework within which the architectural body and in fact all bodies occur, is then what 
Arakawa + Gins term bioscleave – a play on and extension of biosphere, in an effort to emphasise 
the dynamic nature and cleaving together of body and surround. A bioscleave is an event-fabric 
within which all exists only tentatively, within which all is perpetually shifting, and within which 
architectural bodies form and collapse. Here, distinctions between body and space, subject and 
object are diluted and the making of such dualistic distinctions is recommended by Arakawa + 
Gins to be avoided.76 They write: “Environment-organism-person is all that is the case. Isolating 
persons from their architectural surrounds leads to a dualism no less pernicious than that of mind 
and body.”77 This dilution of distinctions between body and space is then something that gets taken 
to a material/ chemical level in the work of Philippe Rahm.  
 
To delve down to a chemical level means that one is often dealing with the invisible, and it is the 
invisible that Rahm believes is the material of architecture, “the materiality of architecture is not 
the solid material but the invisible, the void.”78 This approach is one which sits within an area 
concerned with atmospheres and temporal phenomena, and stretches perhaps most famously back 
to Yves Klein’s concept of ‘Air Architecture’ from the 1950s.79 Drawing on such projects, Rahm’s 
work – what he terms ‘physiological’ or more recently ‘meteorological’ architecture – operates 
across fields of art, architecture and science, with his spaces manipulating temperature, oxygen and 
hormone levels. Importantly, as the work straddles this range of fields, it frees up the architecture, 
allowing it to be distilled down to its effects and to experience:  
 
they make art. Yet this is an art that comes out of, has a goal and uses the means of architecture. By 
being art Décosterd and Rahm’s work has a very particular quality. There is almost no building, 
                                                
75 What can be seen in this example is also Arakawa + Gins employing the tactic of disrupting habits or 
predetermined expectations in order to dislocate the subject. Here this occurs through reducing a house to a pile 
of material, in another project, the Bioscleave House (2000-2008), this occurs through the introduction of 
undulating floors. This is a tactic that may be mapped across the work of numerous architects from Eisenman 
and his House VI (1975) in which beds and bedrooms are split in half, thus promoting new forms of 
occupation; to Diller and Scofidio’s Withdrawing Room (1986) in which again a bed is split in half, but this 
time placed on castors and allowed to rotate about a fixed central point through a number of rooms; to Silvan 
Furger’s proposal for a shower on a domestic stair landing, to name a few. Dirk Hebel and Jörg Stollmann, ed., 
Bathroom Unplugged: Architecture and Intimacy (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2005). 
76 Gins and Arakawa, Architectural Body, 48-49. 
77 Ibid., 44. 
78 Philippe Rahm, (paper presented at the Material National Architecture Conference, Melbourne, May 30-June 
1, 2013). 
79 A critical example of architecture working with atmosphere is Diller and Scofidio’s Blur Pavilion (2002), an 
almost duplicate version of which titled Cloudscape appeared at the Venice Architecture Biennale in 2010 by 
Japanese architect Tetsu Kondo. What both examples serve to do is not only to make the inhabitants of the 
floating clouds of mist lose their sense of location through diminishing their sense of sight, but also, to place 
the appearance of bodies as discrete entities into question. More recent work within this area includes Malte 
Wagenfeld’s explorations into the aesthetics of air, and Chris Cottrell’s explorations of breathing as a 
transaction between body and interior and therefore as a moment of ambiguity between the two. For further 
reading on atmosphere, the special issue of AD “Interior Atmospheres” (2008) is a useful reference here.  
33
  
which is usually the measure or ground of architecture. There is nothing left but the ritual, 
experience, code and effect of architecture itself.80 
 
This architecture, which gets distilled down to experience and the chemical exchanges between 
body and space, begins to function within a similar realm to abject(ion). It becomes about a 
visceral assault, an affect that passes through the subject. “The extracorporeal space, especially in 
contemporary man, consists of filling to the point of overflow where the subject is ensnared, a 
condition of the state of stress and an endemic breach of adaptation.”81 In line with this, two 
projects are important, The Hot Death (2006) and Pulmonary Space (2009). 
 
The Hot Death is a choreography piece which investigates the indiscernibility of the body and 
space at a chemical level. A levelling between body and space occurs, where the temperature of the 
space slowly comes to equal that of the living body, stabilising the two and eliminating their 
differences – a play on death, however as Rahm notes a warmer version. This is a contemporary 
addition to Antonin Artaud’s Théâtre de la Cruauté: 
 
The bodies are on stage at the start of the order of individuality, each with its own movements, 
independently of others, as a multitude of energy. Then gradually, the temperature, humidity of the 
room rises to match that of the human body. The movements are slower, heavier, gravity wins put 
up any ground, motionless, without more space between, more movement possible.82  
 
Pulmonary Space looks at the volumetric space of music and poetry and the chemical or biological 
dimension of the voice – hence, at chemical space. Music and poetry, which are made up of breath 
– and which, in turn, is made up of “pollen, micro-organisms, germs hanging in the air, bacteria 
and viruses”83 – is seen not only as transforming our physical and chemical world, but constituting 
it. “The music becomes viscous, fetid, humid, excised from the lungs and in turn inhaled. Space 
assumes an architectural form of breath in which the listener is immersed.”84 Here we literally 
exhale an invisible space. Whether directly through our mouth or an instrument, a space is created 
and released into the air where it has the potential to combine with other exhalations, other 
chemical spaces and which we can come to occupy. In this way, where spaces originate within 
bodies, we come not only to occupy these through ingesting/ inhaling them into our body, but we 
inhale the breath of the musician. Human bodies and spaces flow through one another – a chemical 
indiscernibility that is invisible. Rahm asks:  
 
Can wind quintets carry and spread the flu virus? Can we feel the humidity of the singers’ breaths, 
which rise in the air whilst the choir’s song augments? Do we inhale the breath of the trumpeter 
while he plays? Which part of the music is chemical? Does not music, with its waves, physical 
impressions on the air and distillation of vapour, begin to take on an architectural form? An invisible 
yet perfectly audible form.85 
 
What is instrumental in this work is the shift in scale and the reduction of body and space to base 
materialism – an acknowledgement that body and space are at the most fundamental level merely 
matter, and that because of this, such exchanges are possible. In these two projects, Rahm’s work 
moves away from an architecture that is constituted by body and space, to an architecture that is 
                                                
80 Jean-Gilles Décosterd and Philippe Rahm, Décosterd & Rahm: Physiological Architecture (Berlin: 
Birkhauser Verlag AG, 2002), 50. 
81 Ibid., 45. 
82 Philippe Rahm, “The Hot Death,” http://www.philipperahm.com (accessed May 29, 2011). 
83 Philippe Rahm, “Pulmonary Space,” http://www.philipperahm.com (accessed May 29, 2011). 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid.  
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the active exchange between body and space. It is this understanding – that bodily and spatial 
boundaries are not as clearly demarcated as architecture still generally assumes them to be, and that 
they are regularly transgressed and diluted – that constitutes a move beyond dualistic modes of 
thought. 
 
Two of the most fundamental things that come out of the work of Rahm and Arakawa + Gins for 
architecture, in mapping out a more open-ended and volatile understanding of bodies and spaces, 
are the reduction of these to matter and a thinking in terms of relations or events rather than static 
and discrete entities. These link directly into the area of process and intelligent material philosophy 
which is at the forefront of this thinking, and which is employed within this thesis, namely through 
the work of Deleuze and Guattari in order to approach abject(ion) productively.86 What the 
introduction of abject(ion) and a reading of it through the filter of Deleuze and Guattari allows for 
and contributes on top of its own way of reworking dualities, is a bringing together of the material 
and processual approaches already in play within the work of Rahm and Arakawa + Gins 
respectively. It is with this in mind that we move to the Kristevan concept. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
86 It is worth noting that the thinking presented by Arakawa + Gins, echoes in many ways the writing of 
Deleuze and Guattari, whom I employ throughout the thesis. There are marked parallels between the 
architectural body and assemblage, and bioscleave and the plane of immanence. Despite these parallels 
however, it is the philosophy of Deleuze & Guattari that is adopted in the thesis, as it is not only far more 
encompassing but importantly allows for abject(ion) to be addressed more holistically.  
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2. Abject(ion) 
 
 
We may call it a border; abjection is above all ambiguity. Because, while releasing a hold, it does 
not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it – on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it 
to be in perpetual danger.1 – Kristeva ‘Powers of Horror’  
 
Abjection […] is merely the inability to assume with sufficient strength the imperative act of 
excluding abject things (and that act establishes the foundations of collective existence). […] The 
act of exclusion has the same meaning as social or divine sovereignty, but it is not located on the 
same level; it is precisely located in the domain of things and not, like sovereignty, in the domain of 
persons. It differs from the latter in the same way that anal eroticism differs from sadism.2 – Bataille 
‘Essais de Sociologie’ 
 
Abject(ion), that is, both the process of abjection and its resultant expulsion, the abject, span a vast 
array of literature that Julia Kristeva refers to, from Dostoyevsky to Kafka, Artaud, Céline, 
Lautréamont and Proust, encompassing anything that crosses the symbolic, from women, to bodily 
excretions, to crime. It is a discussion of the transgression of borders, with the abject sitting on the 
‘wrong’ side of that border or considered “matter out of place”3, as anthropologist Mary Douglas 
has noted, and abjection fluctuating somewhere in-between. When considering abject(ion) from an 
architectural perspective, this crossing of the symbolic is immediately thought of on a spatial level, 
hence we come across: dust and dusting; sewerage and sewage; architectural detritus; constructions 
from abject remains and so on. Here we depart from the bodily abject(ion) that is of interest to 
Kristeva as well as artists and writers engaging with the concept, and are essentially dealing with 
space and its expulsions or decompositions.  
 
As abject(ion) is anything that crosses the symbolic, historically, it has been classified as the 
negative. To classify abject(ion) as the negative is to situate it on the wrong side of the border, to 
render it static and therefore to depart from the understanding of it as the in-between – as 
ambiguity. It is to relegate it to the domain of things – of objects, as Georges Bataille has noted – 
and prevent it from having any sense of agency or subversive power. What such a dualistic 
thinking further implies is an association between things located on the same side of the border, 
such that to speak of abject(ion), is to speak of say the feminine. It is in this way that associations 
with Bataille’s dust and informe are often drawn. Although such associations are productive to a 
degree (and I will in fact make such associations at times), what is important to keep in mind is that 
these concepts all overlap to varying degrees, and further that many of these concepts are process-
                                                
1 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 9. 
2 Quoted in part by Julia Kristeva in her Powers of Horror, 65. For the quote as it appears here see: Georges 
Bataille, “L’Abjection et les formes miserable’s”, in Essais de Sociologie, Œuvres Complètes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1970), 2:217ff.  
3 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (England: Penguin 
Books, 1970), 53. 
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based, and that therefore, much like abject(ion), they cannot be categorised neatly into one of 
dualism’s columns.  
 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, architecture’s thinking is still to a degree embedded within a 
dualistic framework. And although the classic distinction of subject-object, which is at the head of 
this framework, has been probed since as early as the 1920s and more emphatically from the 1960s 
onwards (as Victor Burgin clearly pointed out in his article, “Geometry and Abjection” (1987)), 
bodies are for the most part still understood as subjects, and spaces/ buildings as objects. For 
examples of this in contemporary architecture today, we need only to look to the architectural 
rhetoric, where such dualistic relationships across form, materiality, layout and other aspects 
prevail, i.e. rough/ raw versus smooth/ rich; dark versus light; compression versus release; open 
versus enclosed; intimate versus public etc.4 For this reason, one still at times finds simplistic 
associations that merely lay out abject(ion)’s historical position, and that neglect to move beyond 
the dualistic framework within which such a position is rooted. The persistence of this framework 
then often further results in the precedence of the abject over abjection, a precedence of form and 
end product over process, as the abject has the capacity to be accommodated without any 
disruption to architecture’s workings. It is merely situated on the wrong side of the border. The 
abject in isolation is architecturally, a dead end, it speaks in architectural rhetoric. The presence of 
abjection on the other hand disrupts architecture’s coherence. Abjection is un-architectural. 
Investigations into the process of abjection exist, however, are limited, and when they do occur, are 
often treated in isolation and/ or reduced to abstraction, for there is currently no scope to approach 
them in any other way. Consequently, what this Chapter seeks to do, is to outline the concept of 
abject(ion) beginning with Julia Kristeva, and to address the translation of this concept into the 
architectural discipline. It presents key points and current shortfalls across both theory and 
practice, and hence establishes the foundations for a productive enquiry into abject(ion). 
 
THE ABJECT AND ABJECTION 
 
What is the abject? It is neither subject nor object as Kristeva writes,5 body nor space, but a third 
term. The abject is that which has been expelled from a body and therefore transgressed the 
boundary between the interior and exterior. Abjection then, presents an ambiguity, resisting 
classification and allowing for an investigation only into its state of in-betweeness – the ephemeral 
state of the fall.6 Abject(ion) in Kristeva’s Pouvoirs de l’horreur is discussed very broadly, 
becoming somewhat of an umbrella term for all that is impure and linked to the body (subject) by 
the process of being expelled literally and/or figuratively and thus situated beyond I. 
 
For Kristeva, abject(ion) is related to the pre-Oedipal mother and the constitution of subjectivity. 
Influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis, abject(ion) is discussed through the Oedipal triangle. 
Within this framework, it is the mother who is understood as the first object of abject(ion), and 
who must be abjected by her child in order for that child to enter the symbolic. Prior to this 
abject(ion) the child resides in the semiotic, a realm which Kristeva refers to as chora (Plato’s 
‘empty space’), and within which, the child understands their body, the mother’s body, and their 
surroundings, as part of a continuum. For the child, there is no differentiation here. The semiotic is 
                                                
4 Gaston Bachelard’s La Poétique de l’Espace (1958), which is often drawn on by contemporary architecture is 
notable in this regard. Coming from a school with a phenomenological grounding and within which I now often 
run studios, I can further attest to (at least in this context) the persistence of such dualistic relationships.    
5 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 1. 
6 The fall is an expression employed by Deleuze to discuss the in-between – the transition from one level to 
another. This fall is understood as positive and active. It is utilised here in order to emphasise the processual 
nature of abjection. See: Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2003), 77, 81-2. 
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a precondition to the symbolic, and it must be overcome in order for the child to enter society, gain 
language and become a subject. It is this association of abject(ion) with the pre-Oedipal or archaic 
mother that Kristeva sees as setting up woman’s position within society, writing: “one sees 
everywhere the importance, both social and symbolic, of women and particularly the mother.”7 
Abject(ion) is thus intricately tied to the female sex.  
 
Despite the transition to the symbolic, the semiotic and the abject cannot fully be repressed, and the 
abject frequently resurfaces in the form of things that threaten our bodily boundary and our 
identity, in order to remind one of the instability of the subject – an uncanny re-experience of our 
body as fragmented and part of a continuum.8  Abjection is then a process that not only instates and 
reaffirms subjectivity, but also and perhaps more importantly, has the potential to threaten it. 
 
Such wastes drop so that I might live, until from loss to loss nothing remains in me and my entire 
body falls beyond the limit – cadare, cadaver… It is no longer “I” who expel. “I” is expelled.9 
 
To allude to such an instability, despite Kristeva being explicit that the abject is neither subject nor 
object, she maintains a certain ambiguity between the abjecting self (which she terms a deject) and 
the abject non-self. Kristeva continues: “‘I’ expel it. But since it is not an ‘other’ for ‘me’…I expel 
myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself out within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to 
establish myself.”10 What this presents is a very clear slippage between the subject and abject, an 
uncertainty of where one ends and the other begins, I simultaneously expel and am expelled; I 
expel an abject and I am the expelled abject. It speaks to the ‘unbearable nearness’ of abject(ion), 
which as Hanjo Berressem points out, “does not allow for [a] distancing/ separation”, a nearness 
that collapses the distinction between inside and outside.11 Within the Kristeva passage quoted 
above, one witnesses the volatility of abject(ion), its evasion to being placed. It is precisely this 
slippage, this ambiguity, that both threatens and fascinates, for there is at once a risk of the dilution 
of our bodily boundary, of our identity, and a promise of the return to the sensuous sack of the 
semiotic. 
 
                                                
7 Ibid., 70. 
8 The uncanny is a concept that was developed by Sigmund Freud in “The Uncanny” (1919). In architecture, 
Anthony Vidler took up the concept in relation to space in 1992 to discuss the ‘unhomely’ modern condition. In 
terms of abject(ion), the uncanny can be understood as the mental threat that abject(ion) poses. I do not dwell 
on the uncanny here (though I acknowledge its clear association with abject(ion)), as I am less interested in the 
symbolic aspect of abject(ion) (covered adequately by Kristeva) then developing the material and processual 
aspects. 
9 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 3-4. The threat that the process of ejecting waste implies and the potential for it 
to literally ‘bite us on the bum’ received a very trivial reiteration in recent times in the discussion around the 
‘fatberg’ found under London. Fatbergs, which are the build up of greasy food waste in combination with 
sanitary napkins within the sewerage system have the potential to block sewers if left untouched and in effect 
reverse the process of ejecting waste, spewing sewage into expensive homes. What is interesting about the 
fatberg is that it seems to be a concerted manifestation of agents that cause unease i.e. the feminine (sanitary 
napkins) and foreigners with their strange cooking habits and strange manners about the kitchen that are not 
‘correct’ (greasy food waste), and that this concerted manifestation situated itself under the suburbs of Kingston 
and Kensington - two leafy green, ‘well-to-do’ suburbs! But further also that the removed fatberg will be 
reused into products like soap, which we associate with cleanliness. “‘Fatberg’ the size of a double-decker bus 
pulled from London sewer, averting disaster,” ABC News, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-07/fatberg-
removed-from-london-sewer/4869628 (accessed August 28, 2013). 
10 Ibid., 3. 
11 Hanjo Berressem, “On the Matter of Abjection,” in The Abject of Desire: The Aestheticization of the 
Unaesthetic in Contemporary Literature and Culture, ed. Konstance Kutzbach and Monika Mueller (New 
York: Rodopi, 2007), 21. 
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If we dwell on one of the key attributes of abject(ion), its ambiguity, it is interesting to note that 
Kristeva speaks of this ambiguity as only ever pertaining to the abjecting self and the abject non-
self. Nowhere does Kristeva speak of the implication of other entities in this ambiguity, which is 
inevitable, given the un-containment of the leakages. Despite this, she puts forth the following 
observation by Bataille, that abject(ion) is linked to subject-object relations not subject-other 
subject relations.12 This point is critical, as it may be interpreted in two different ways. Kristeva 
understands the object as the mother, and therefore interprets the relation between subject-object, 
as one between subject-mother. Abject(ion) is then linked to subject-mother relations. It is for 
Kristeva, not a matter of the immediate relations present in the event of abjection, but a matter of 
symbolic relations. Generally speaking however, and even for Kristeva, the object is an entity other 
than I. Within the architectural discipline, it is space that has been understood as the object. Thus 
what Bataille’s observation poses, is an implication of objects into this ambiguity generally, but 
also specifically, from an architectural perspective, the implication of space. Imagine for example, 
French artist Orlan’s menstrual leakages dripping onto the Museum Ludwig floor and connecting 
her body together with that of the museum space. Here abject(ion) is undeniably linked to body-
space relations, relations of an immediate and material nature. 
 
Although for Kristeva abject(ion) extends to numerous things that cross the symbolic, it does not 
extend to space. Kristeva does not address spatial abject(ion), despite the fact that it equally crosses 
the symbolic and threatens our subjectivity. Since given the still prevalent phenomenological 
understanding of us as centre, where we situate ourselves in relation to the object, to disrupt that 
object is to disrupt our sense of stability, of centre and therefore to threaten us. There is however 
one instance where she speaks of an abject body in space: her Chapter on Hans Holbein’s life size 
(78¾” x 12”) portrait Der Leichnam Christi im Grabe (The Corpse of Christ in the Tomb) (1521) 
in her book Black Sun (1989). Black Sun concerns depression and melancholia, and although these 
themes take precedence, abject(ion) is nevertheless present in the form of the ultimate abject – the 
corpse, but a corpse as semiologist John Lechte has noted, that still “manifests all the banal signs 
of a cadaver just before the onset of rigor mortis.”13 A body becoming-corpse therefore. Kristeva 
notes various painting and compositional techniques by Holbein which prevent Christ’s body from 
being rendered a spectacle, such as the absence of other figures typical of religious paintings at that 
time, watching the horror and on whose faces one could read emotion. He is utterly alone, Kristeva 
writes.14 He has been “jammed into the recess”15 which only a single body can occupy 
“exclud[ing] all possibility of the presence of another.”16 Holbein’s technique instead places an 
emphasis on the relation between the body of Christ and the space of the tomb, which is precisely 
where abject(ion) has the most effect, where it is visceral and immediate, and where one cannot 
distance themself from it. This is a painting of proximity, intimacy, of Christ being overcome by 
abject(ion), a painting “of [a] man subject to death, man embracing Death, absorbing it into his 
very being”17. Holbein does not negate pain nor glorify “the arrogance of the flesh or the beauty of 
the beyond” he “maintains grief while humanizing it”18 thus he “weaves, as it were, a passage 
between the symbolic and the semiotic dimensions.” 19 Lechte notes: “[Holbein] paints the 
‘scission’ constituted by the tension between the semiotic and the symbolic: turbulence and 
                                                
12 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 64. 
13 John Lechte, "Kristeva and Holbein, Artist of Melancholy," British Journal of Aesthetics 30, no. 4 (October 
1990): 343. 
14 Julia Kristeva, "Holbein's Dead Christ," in Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989), 137. 
15 Ibid., 114. 
16 Lechte, "Kristeva and Holbein," 343. Brackets mine. 
17 Kristeva, "Holbein's Dead Christ," 118. Brackets mine. 
18 Ibid., 117. 
19 Lechte, "Kristeva and Holbein," 347. 
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immobility, life and death, Kristeva writes that this ‘scission’ ‘is the truth of human psychical 
life’.”20 The painting in other words, is of a scission, of the in-between, in short, of abject(ion). 
 
As a drawing type, it is a section, an architectural section cut through the tomb. There is a cut 
through space but not through Christ’s body. There seems to be in the confined space perhaps just 
enough room to take a section in front of his body, unless this is not a true section (and this seems 
more likely) and Holbein intentionally dissected space but not the body of Christ. Sections are 
violent. They dissect space, reorganise space, allowing us to probe the interior. The sectional 
drawing cuts open the whole. It opens up the boundary between the interior and the exterior, 
between public and private, between two spaces situated on either side of the boundary, and hence 
activates the potential for something to escape. Patrick Ffrench notes in the work of Bataille that 
“the cut, the interruption, which destabilizes the fixity and structural coherence of form”21 has as 
its operation transgression. This potential for escape is exactly what we find in Kristeva’s text, 
where Christ’s “hand protrudes slightly from the slab”22 – it spills into the sectional cut, into the 
perimeter walls of the tomb. It comes to occupy that which is unoccupiable. In a sense, it comes to 
occupy the negative space that is a Rachel Whiteread sculpture. 
 
It is interesting that architects (and Holbein in this case) are always all too eager to dismember 
space in their drawings and formal manipulations, but not the human body.23 Despite this, the body 
still manages to find orifices through which to escape: Christ’s head is bent backwards, his mouth 
open, revealing a dark hole that flows into the equally dark space of the tomb; his bodily boundary 
has been penetrated at his hands and feet; and the state of his tortured body reminds one of a scene 
from the 2008 film Hunger where IRA hunger striker Bobby Sands’ body starts to seep into the 
bed through sores on his back. Hence the body is leaking not only out of the section, but from 
inside itself out, it is suspended in the very spasm that Deleuze often discussed in the work of 
Francis Bacon. A certain unboundedness synonymous with abject(ion) is present. The painting can 
be read as beginning with the underlying drawing type of the section, however it is unable to 
subscribe to the rigid system of that drawing type – the body is whole not cut, it leaks outside the 
confines of the section rather than being confined by it, and even portions of the space itself (the 
sheet) begin to leak out over the hard line of the tomb, Kristeva notes: “this hair and this hand that 
extend beyond the base as if they might slide over toward us, as if the frame could not hold back 
the corpse.”24 The section is disintegrating.25 What becomes clear from Kristeva’s writing, through 
her simultaneous discussion of Christ’s body and the tomb, is her awareness of the relation 
between an abjecting body and a space.  
 
                                                
20 Lechte, "Kristeva and Holbein," 347. Brackets mine. 
21 Patrick Ffrench, The Cut/ Reading Bataille's Histoire de l'œil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),129. 
22 Kristeva, "Holbein's Dead Christ," 110. 
23 Space is dismembered in numerous architectural drawings: in sections it is dissected vertically; in plans it is 
dissected horizontally; and in exploded axonometrics it is pulled apart limb by limb. But the human body 
collaged into drawings is always whole. For a formal dismembering of space think back to the architecture of 
Eisenman, Tschumi and deconstructivism generally.   
24 Ibid., 114. 
25 As a point of comparison, Amy Landesberg and Lisa Quatrale in their visual essay “See Angel Touch” 
(1991, 1996) discuss Louis Sullivan’s Bayard Building, specifically focusing on the angel ornamentation. A 
portion of this essay explores taking sectional cuts through ornament (through an angel), concluding that it is 
impossible to take a section through ornament and retain its qualities. Because of this “the section cannot 
contain” and it “becomes an image”. Similarly Kristeva has noted Holbein’s difficultly in painting the non-
representable, which clearly translates to abject(ion)’s disintegration of drawing conventions. Amy Landesberg 
and Lisa Quatrale, “See Angel Touch,” in Architecture and Feminism, ed. Deborah Coleman, Elizabeth Danze 
and Carol Henderson (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 63. 
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What is however most important to note about Kristeva’s notion of the abject and what has a 
profound effect on not only its discussions generally but on its application in disciplines such as 
architecture, is that it is, as American historian and art critic Hal Foster has pointed out, often seen 
as a categorisation of a series of objects other than I, clearly invoking an inside-outside dualistic 
model that is too structural. 26 To this one may also add an observation by Berressem, where he 
notes that what is of significance for Kristeva (although she speaks of the dissolution of boundaries 
resulting in a non-distinctiveness of two things and of becoming unnameable), is when 
differentiations between two opposites become representable, and therefore when they enter 
language.27  Kristeva’s background is psychoanalytic, and this is above all explicit in her 
discussions of subjectivity. This background presents itself as problematic to a degree, as although 
it allows Kristeva to map the various meanings that abject(ion) has attained, it does not allow us to 
move beyond these meanings. Most importantly, tracing abject(ion) back to the pre-Oedipal 
mother, gendering it from the very beginning, serves to promote, rather than question, the 
association between abject(ion) and woman, and hence woman’s position within society. There are 
therefore very clear limits to Kristeva’s writing, which prescribe the direction from which one is 
able to approach abject(ion). In this sense, Kristeva’s notion of abject(ion) is a starting point. A 
point at which one learns of the psychological power of abject(ion), and of its history, and a point 
from which one moves forward very quickly. This does not mean that we should overlook 
Kristeva’s work, but rather that we activate a number of attributes that have been curtailed within 
this framework, that we add to them, extend them, and that we clarify certain assumptions, which 
still proliferate today.  
 
Only then can we approach abject(ion) as pertaining to any body, and only then can it turn from a 
discussion of bodily boundaries, to a discussion of boundaries between body and space. Where we 
may contemplate not only how abject(ion) affirms our subjectivity and therefore our distinction 
from space, but also and more interestingly, how when that system fails, leaving our boundaries 
open, the distinction becomes diluted and we find ourselves not in opposition to space but 
indiscernible from it. It is this indiscernibility that opens up a promising field of study and allows 
us to think differently about the relationship between body and space. What is critical to this then, 
is the processual nature of abject(ion), as it manifests this ambiguity. Specifically in relation to 
architecture, what is of interest is not the plethora of meanings and associations that abject(ion) has 
attained, but the literal process itself, for the subject expelling itself onto the object, begins not only 
to challenge our understanding of the object as something separate from us, (that is, to disrupt the 
mental distinction), but it also physically binds us to the object. It is with this in mind that we move 
to abject(ion)’s association with women. 
 
ABJECT(ION) AS WOMEN’S HISTORICAL CONDITION 
 
If we adopt Kristeva’s direct association of the pre-Oedipal mother with abject(ion), but also 
society’s association of abject(ion) with woman generally, a string of questions that Barbara Creed 
points to as having escaped discussion by Kristeva follow: 
 
Is it possible to intervene in the social construction of woman as abject? Or is the subject’s 
relationship to the processes of abjectivity, as they are constructed within subjectivity and language, 
completely unchangeable? Is the abjection of women a precondition for the continuation of 
sociality?28 
 
                                                
26 Yve-Alain Bois, et al., "The Politics of the Signifier II,” 4, 6. 
27 Berressem, “On the Matter of Abjection,” 26. For the passage that Berressem is referring to see, Kristeva, 
Powers of Horror, 61. 
28 Barbara Creed, "Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection," Screen 27, no. 1 (1986): 54. 
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In her seminal essay “Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection” (1986), 
Creed makes explicit that the classification of woman as abject, is made by the subjective system – 
that it is a construction. Hence she asks whether this name that has been attributed to her is 
changeable, or if it is a precondition for the continuation of sociality. This results in a further 
question: does abject(ion) as attributed to the feminine in fact prevent the female from redefining a 
new form of feminine subjectivity? An identical question to that posed by Luce Irigaray regarding 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, as Rosi Braidotti notes: 
 
[Irigaray] points out that the emphasis on the machinelike, the inorganic, as well as the notions of 
loss of self, dispersion, and fluidity are all too familiar to women; is not the “body without organs” 
women’s own historical condition?29 
 
These questions are notably very broad, and clearly positioned outside the scope of the 
architectural discipline. They are however necessary to ask, as the association between abject(ion) 
and woman or the feminine, affects the concept’s usage in architecture. It is therefore important at 
least to ask Creed’s questions, even if on a basic level. As a preface to these questions, one may 
refer to Alice Jardine, and her book Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (1985). In 
Gynesis, Jardine outlines various connotations of woman, one of which is abject(ion), and she 
writes that “woman and her obligatory connotations are essential to the functioning of 
psychoanalytic theory”30. To illustrate the psychoanalytic/ dualistic framework within which such 
connotations are manifest, she borrows an itemised list from Hélène Cixous’ “Sorties” (1975), a 
list with two columns, one for the male, the other for the female. 
 
Male   Female 
Mind  vs. Body 
Culture  vs. Nature 
Techne  vs. Physis 
Intelligible  vs. Sensible 
Activity  vs. Passivity 
Sun  vs. Moon 
Day  vs. Night 
Father  vs. Mother 
Intellect  vs. Sentiment 
Logos  vs. Pathos 
Form  vs. Matter 
Same  vs. Other31 
 
What such a list implies is not merely an association between the particular gender and each of the 
words within its column, but also an association between each of the words within the column 
themselves. Through this line of thinking, abject(ion) has been related to all that is gendered 
feminine and particularly the feminine-maternal. What this risks is a mass grouping of terms that 
although sharing similarities on some fronts, have simultaneously a vast number of differences that 
must not be overlooked. Within such a dualistic framework however, the differences are 
overlooked, and what is more, concepts such as abject(ion), which are by their nature volatile and 
non-categoriseable, end up being placed, and therefore rendered static. Within such a framework, 
abject(ion) is not excess. It does not overflow.  
 
                                                
29 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 116. Referring to: Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, 
trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985), 141. 
30 Alice A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 159. 
31 Hélène Cixous, “Sorties,” La jeune née 10/18 (Paris: 1975): 115-246. In Jardine, Gynesis, 72. 
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Towards the end of her book, Jardine draws a series of distinctions between French and American 
writers’ approaches to woman and the feminine: 
 
On the one hand, there is a “French version” of our modernity (and gynesis) whose inflationary 
discursive dependence on “woman” and the “feminine” challenges what she knows; and, on the 
other, a very different “American version” of our modernity (and gynesis) whose fundamental 
conceptual assumptions in fact underwrite and reinforce her own most comfortable ways of 
knowing.32 
 
What we learn from these French writers is that these connotations are changeable (or at least able 
to be made flexible), and that it is therefore possible to intervene in the association of abject(ion) 
and woman. Abject(ion) as associated with the feminine is changeable precisely as it can also be 
characterised as non-gender specific, if we take it as purely physiological, as much of that 
physiology is shared by both genders. For both genders equally urinate, defecate, vomit and 
perspire. Despite for the most part Kristeva associating abject(ion) with the feminine, she does also 
identify it as pertaining to the masculine in Chapter 15 of Leviticus: “Any secretion or discharge, 
anything that leaks out of the feminine or masculine body defiles.”33 Although I am not interested 
in assigning a gender to abject(ion), one could easily associate abject(ion) with the masculine on 
two fronts. Firstly through the fact that abject(ion) inevitably leads to death – to the point where we 
no longer expel but we are expelled – to the ultimate abject the corpse, and from the perspective of 
death it is particularly man who comes to approach abject(ion), and who has been associated with 
death throughout history. The figure of Death/ Reaper is more often than not a man, as is the 
soldier, warrior or knight drawing blood for his country.34 One can see such a comment from 
French film director Catherine Breillat in her Anatomie de l’enfer (2004) which serves as one of 
the key exemplars at a further point of the thesis, “A man cannot give life. He takes it. He gives 
death. And thus, eternal life.”35 
  
Further, abject(ion) forms the work of men as much as women (Kristeva’s exemplars are in fact all 
literature by men). Whether abject(ion) merely appears in select passages: William S. Burroughs’s 
Naked Lunch (1959), the Comte de Lautreamont’s Maldoror (1868-9), or plays a more persistent 
role: Francis Bacon’s paintings, or more recently Matthew Barney’s films. This work is marked not 
only by male writers, painters, filmmakers, but importantly by the male figures in their work which 
are in the process of abjection, and which in the case of Barney’s films, is often himself. It is clear 
that abject(ion) exists within the masculine realm on a number of levels, and one could even say 
that if need be, it could be woven into men’s historical condition. 
 
In this sense, the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is highly useful, for although one could 
formulate an argument along the lines of Irigaray’s observation, the philosophy in actuality 
collapses distinctions (which interestingly has also been criticised by feminist philosophers for 
negating sexual difference). In terms of defining woman then, particularly in Deleuze’s ontology, 
Braidotti points to the fact that becoming (which is a key concept for Deleuze), is a state that both 
genders need to attain, and specifically that becoming-woman is not intrinsic to her. “it is therefore 
interesting to note that women are not a priori molecular; they too have to become woman.”36 
                                                
32 Jardine, Gynesis, 257. 
33 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 102. 
34 The figure of Death has also of course been portrayed as a woman, particularly in Spanish, French and Italian 
speaking countries as Karl S. Guthke notes. Similarly, the warrior need not be a man. For the most part the 
stereotype of the man as Death and as giving death however stands, enough at least to prove that man could be 
associated with abject(ion). Karl S. Guthke, The Gender of Death: A Cultural History in Art and Literature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 7. 
35 Catherine Breillat, Pornocracy, trans. Paul Buck and Catherine Petit (Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2005), 98. 
36 Adrian Parr, ed., The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 304. 
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The labelling of this rejectamenta as feminine reduces it to the negative case, and it remains 
defined in relation. Such an approach reaffirms the dualistic system. In this context, it is impossible 
to move beyond abjection’s definition as merely the other side of the border and to fully 
understand its workings and functionings. Thus although one must acknowledge the long standing 
associations between abject(ion) and the feminine – associations that given their rootedness cannot 
be entirely overcome, it is simultaneously critical to look beyond these meanings or associations, to 
as Deleuze and Guattari would say, not what something is but how it is. It is only when one starts 
to move beyond these meanings, and starts to enquire about the workings of abject(ion), that 
abject(ion) presents itself as not intrinsic to the woman, or to any one body. Abject(ion) flows 
between bodies. It is sometimes feminine (menstruation), sometimes masculine (ejaculation), 
sometimes spatial (decay), sometimes animal, sometimes all, but it never solely concerns one 
body. This is a crucial point, one where we diverge from Kristeva’s reading of abject(ion) through 
the lens of meaning and investigate it rather through the lens of the real37, the philosophy of 
Deleuze and Guattari. This is not to say that we negate meaning, but that, rather than rehashing the 
established relationships between woman-abject(ion) and dealing with these dated polemics, we 
approach abject(ion) through a more open framework. What I want to take forward therefore, is an 
understanding that abject(ion) may pertain to any body, space, or animal.   
 
WRITING ON ABJECT(ION), A FIELD OF CONNOTATIONS  
 
If we shift the focus to the architectural discipline at this point, and its dealings with not only 
abject(ion) but also more broadly gender, and its implications for space, a parallel series of issues 
and shortcomings to those prevalent within the philosophy of Kristeva are revealed. Here the 
relationship between woman-abject(ion) gets expanded to woman-space-abject(ion), and utilised to 
discuss any abject, womb-like or binding space, from a cave, grotto, cellar or sewer, to the interior 
and the home. In the same way that Kristeva traces abject(ion)’s origin back to the pre-Oedipal 
mother, to the maternal, there is also a symbolic origin of architecture, of dwelling, that has been 
traced back to the womb, as the most primitive form of shelter and covering. Elizabeth Grosz 
writes: 
 
Architectural discourse and practice must not forget its (prehistoric or archaeological) connections 
to the impulse to shelter and covering first provided by nothing but the mother’s body. The very 
concept of dwelling is irresolvably bound up with the first dwelling, itself a space enclosed within 
another space38  
 
Further in the same way that Kristeva writes that the association of abject(ion) with the pre-
Oedipal mother sets up woman’s position within society, we witness the repercussions of 
architecture’s symbolic origin through the classification of all that is concave and womb-like (the 
cave, the interior, the home) as feminine. “It is clear that the cave is a metaphor for the maternal 
womb. Through the processes of metaphorisation the attributes of the maternal womb are 
transferred over to this space, over to the figure of the cave.”39 These spaces are therefore at once 
gendered, they are at once, abjected. And they are at once understood psychoanalytically. Mary 
Douglas quotes Hungarian psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi, “the derisive remark was once made 
                                                
37 In employing the word ‘real’ here, I am also thinking of Hal Foster’s publication The Return of the Real 
(1996), and therefore a return to the materiality of bodies, the occurrence of which Foster observed in art and 
theory in the 1990s.  
38 Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 2001), 164. 
39 Mirjana Lozanovska, "Excess: The Possibility of Disruption on the Side of Woman/Women," Interstices 4 
(1995): 2. 
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against psychoanalysis that the unconscious sees a penis in every convex object and a vagina or 
anus in every concave one. I find that this sentence well characterizes the facts.”40 
 
In taking on associations of the feminine, these spaces have all become what Freud terms ‘object-
surrogates’ – surrogates for the key female reproductive organ,41 whose sole purpose seems to be, 
to always bring the conversation back to woman. Examples of object-surrogates and references 
being made to the penis as structure versus the womb as a hole – an absence in architecture – are 
well summarised in Meaghan Morris’ and Alessandra Ponte’s respective papers: “Great 
Monuments in Social Climbing: King Kong and the Human Fly” and “Architecture and 
Phallocentrism in Richard Payne Knight’s Theory” both in Beatriz Colomina’s Sexuality and 
Space. Most notable however in this instance is perhaps Friedrich Kiesler’s project Endless House 
(1950s), which Maria Luisa Palumbo describes as:  
 
the womb or shell house [an] organic and enveloping cavity which opposes the aesthetics of sun and 
light with the sensual, protective and dark visceral nature of the cave, a return to the earth, to 
formless matter, to natural folds rather than straight angles and orthogonal surfaces.42  
 
Here there is a clear association akin to Cixous’ list between the womb, the cavity, the sensual, the 
dark, the visceral, the cave and formless matter. In a description of Carlo Scarpa’s Fondazione 
Masieri (1968) Marco Frascari then goes one step further, likening the water within a concave 
shaped bathroom to amniotic fluid:  
 
Tectonically, these bathrooms are cylinders coated on the outside with a gleaming and wonderfully 
colored stucco lucido, which on the inside resembles a womb. They provide the means of creative 
egress. In their tectonic power and in their lustrous plaster omnipotence they reveal the lustral power 
of a font, where water is analogous to the amniotic liquid within which life originated and which 
facilitates birth.43 
 
To the Endless House and Fondazione Masieri one may add the recent comments on Zaha Hadid’s 
Al-Wakrah Stadium, which given that it is designed by a woman, and has a hole in the centre, is 
said to resemble a vagina, or in the words of a journalist “a vulvic bulge.”44 Throughout the history 
of architecture there are further precedents that speak to these associations going as far back as 
Leon Battista Alberti’s view that women are volatile, that their fluid sexuality endlessly overflows 
and that therefore they need to be confined to the interior. Mark Wigley discusses Alberti’s 
                                                
40 Sandor Ferenczi, Sex in Psycho-analysis, trans. Ernest Jones, (New York: Richard Badger, 1916), 227. 
41 For a discussion of Freud’s object-surrogates, see the following article from Vidler, within which there is also 
a mention of surrogates for the penis, such as obelisks. Anthony Vidler, “The Building in Pain: The Body and 
Architecture in Post-Modern Culture,” AA Files, no.19 Spring 1990: 4.  
42 Maria Luisa Palumbo, New Wombs: Electronic Bodies and Architectural Disorders (Basel: Birkhäuser, 
2000), 20. Brackets mine. 
43 Marco Frascari, “The Pneumatic Bathroom,” in Plumbing: Sounding Modern Architecture, ed. Friedman 
D.S. and Nadir Lahiji (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1997), 169. Frascari concludes by discussing 
his design of a bathroom for The Dream House of the Next Millenium. The bathroom adopts the same concave 
form as Scarpa’s and is further embedded within the centre of the plan. 
44 Jonathan Jones, “Zaha Hadid's vagina stadium, penis factories and Vincent van Coffee – the week in art,” 
Guardian (London), November 30, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/nov/29/zaha-hadids-
vagina-stadium-penis-chapman-brothers-turner (accessed November 30, 2013). Also see: Leon Watson and 
Jennifer Smith, “Architect Behind Designs of ‘Vagina Stadium’ for 2022 World Cup is a WOMAN… and she 
isn’t very happy about critics’ comparisons of her plans to female private parts,” Daily Mail (London), 
November 23, 2013. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2512451/Architect-designs-Vagina-Stadium-
2022-World-Cup-WOMAN--isnt-happy-critics-comparisons-plans-female-private-parts.html (accessed 
November 30, 2013). 
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positioning of women within the interior: “Women are to be confined deep within a sequence of 
spaces at the greatest distance from the outside world while men are to be exposed to that outside.” 
He further writes that the house by Alberti is seen: “as a mechanism for the domestication 
of…embodied women”45  
 
These associations between women, space and abject(ion) came noticeably to the fore in the period 
of the 1980s and 1990s, where particular focus was given to the subject-matter. Alice Jardine has 
commented on Irigaray, (a key figure in this period), and the intrinsic relationship that Irigaray sees 
between women’s bodies and what she terms ‘female spaces of modernity’: 
 
Even though it is ultimately unclear in Irigaray’s writing what women’s relationship to the female 
spaces of modernity should be, it is clear that she sees those spaces as intrinsically related to 
women’s bodies, and she insists, therefore, that women must allow their bodies to speak through 
and with those spaces.46 
 
Gendering spaces and associating them with women’s bodies is of course largely unproductive, 
and in the late 1980s, Victor Burgin and Denis Hollier commented in two separate instances on 
how simplistic, direct, and metaphorical, such dualistic associations are. Writing on the sublime 
and grottos, and the Bataillean labyrinth respectively: 
 
For all discussions recently devoted to the sublime, I still see it as a simple displacement, a banal 
metaphorical transference of affect from the woman’s body to these caverns and chasms, falls and 
oceans, which inspire such fervent ambivalence, such a swooning of identity, in these Romantic 
men.47  
 
But it is not simply a product of nature either, despite the diverse organotelluric connotations that 
would connect it with Old Mole’s tunnels, with the underground networks of chambers and 
corridors of caves (like Lascaux), with the “world of the womb,” with the “infernal and maternal 
world of the depths of the earth.” That would be too easy.48 
  
What is further interesting to note, as one trails through the texts from this period, are conflicts or 
discrepancies in the apparent qualities of woman, which although to me suggest the inadequacy of 
a dualistic framework, were not picked up on. For example in a film article “Cinematic Space: 
Desiring and Deciphering” (1996), Laura Mulvey on numerous occasions referred to “a home or 
homestead as signifier of stable space, the sphere of the family and the feminine”49, rendering the 
feminine stable – passive (a generally accepted categorisation hailing back to the Greek syntax and 
semantics as Jardine notes, where ““presence” or “being” is there ousia or parousia, signifying 
“homestead,” “being-at-home,” and “integral, unmediated presentness.””)50. Mulvey further 
outlines the masculine as outside in Sexuality and Space (a point Colomina confirms), adventure, 
movement and cathartic action.51 On the other hand, and in the same publication, we then have 
writers such as Wigley, whose description of woman parallels that of Kristeva, “The woman’s 
body is seen as an inadequate enclosure because its boundaries are convoluted” “it has been turned 
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inside out.” “Her house has been disordered, leaving its walls full of openings. Consequently, she 
must always occupy a second house, a building, to protect her soul.”52 Here the feminine is 
personified by abject(ion) and is thus volatile and ill-defined. 
 
Within the same period of the 1990s articles such as: “The Ugly” (1995) by Mark Cousins; “The 
Matter of the Cutting Edge” (1995) by Jennifer Bloomer; “Closets, Clothes, disClosure" (1996) by 
Henry Urbach; and books Sexuality and Space (1992); Architecture and Feminism (1996); and 
Plumbing: Sounding Modern Architecture (1997) amongst others also surfaced. Here we were 
faced with discussions of objects in the wrong place being termed ugly (Cousins), the womb as 
dirty (Bloomer), the symbolic abject (Urbach) and so on. In short, we were faced with texts that 
spoke to a duality and specifically to the ‘negative’ side of that duality, whether directly by the 
writer, or, whether by the writer merely pointing to the longstanding associations between things 
situated on the wrong side of the border.  
 
There are instances within these articles and books, such as Sexuality and Space that begin to map 
out a framework for the ‘in-between’ (as noted in the first Chapter), with many texts “insisting on a 
methodological “in-between””53 as Giuliana Bruno writes and the erosion of binary oppositions. 
But despite these attempts, the texts still do not manage to fully divorce themselves from these 
oppositions, as the in-between does not standalone, it does not function independently, it is in fact 
rendered through the very dualistic language that it is attempting to overcome.  
 
What becomes apparent through all of these associations between abject(ion), women, and space, 
is that it is the same dualistic paradigm that binds abject(ion) to the feminine, as binds abject(ion) 
to certain spatial types in architecture. In more recent thinking still that has continued to probe the 
matter, abject(ion) once again is approached not in terms of what it does but rather, the perpetual 
concern seems to be with meaning and with drawing parallels between concepts on the wrong side 
of the border. In William A. Cohen and Ryan Johnson’s edited book Filth: Dirt, Disgust, and 
Modern Life (2005) for example, David L. Pike attempted to challenge the categories that bodily 
excretions are historically assigned to and pointed to the positive potentialities of the London and 
Paris undergrounds through their expression of utopian dreams.54  Inevitably however to make his 
point, Pike ended up describing the London and Paris sewers as ‘dark, womblike’ spaces, hence 
reiterating the historical association between women and abject(ion) and playing into the dualism 
that he was attempting to get away from.  
 
Additionally, two years later, an entire journal publication dedicated to Architecture and Dirt 
(2007) appeared. This took as its starting point the parallels between modernism and hygienism 
within a current context and the consequent preoccupation or rather interest in dirt, with articles 
discussing; dust, sewerage (or architecture’s upholding of the clean and proper), and the writings of 
Bernard Tschumi and his distinction between the ‘ideal’ and ‘real’, among other topics. Here, akin 
to previous publications, abjection is approached from the perspective of hygienism – as the 
neglected opposite of the clean and proper. Consequently what we discover with such an approach, 
is the retelling of the history of hygienism, primarily through modernism and with very little focus 
and discussion of the abject qualities and workings of dirt itself. This approach essentially 
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addresses the topic from its current standpoint, that is, as the repressed other, as secondary to the 
clean and proper, as negative. Although these are discussions of the abject, they are not discussions 
of the abject and its process in their own right, they occur always in relation to something other. 
Thus although such articles are critical to mapping how architecture has engaged with the topic, at 
the end of such discussions we are no wiser as to the implications of abjection for architecture, we 
have merely reaffirmed the already established classification of abjection as the unclean and 
improper process that it is, in other words, we have accepted these adjectives and their association 
with the feminine as given. It is texts such as these that render explicit the current limitations of 
abjection in architecture and that we may utilise to fuel the reasoning for a productive mobilisation 
of abject(ion).  
 
The necessity for a productive mobilisation may be further fuelled by the various attempts made in 
practice at working with abject(ion), which for the most part, equally leave certain qualities and 
operations of abject(ion) wanting. Before moving to this work however, I would like to give a brief 
account of two concepts – dust and informe. These have received considerable attention 
architecturally and share similarities with abject(ion) in terms of questioning subjectivity, as well 
as straddling the line between process and product. The aim here is not necessarily to draw 
associations between abject(ion) and dust or informe, but rather to make observations about their 
uptake in architecture, in order to better employ abject(ion).   
 
INFORME 
 
Beginning with the informe (formless), in their book Formless: A User’s Guide (1997), (which 
followed an exhibition titled Informe the year prior), Yve Alain Bois and Rosalind Krauss define 
the concept in the following way: 
 
It is not only an adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves to bring things down 
[déclasser] in the world. It is not so much a stable motif to which we can refer, a symbolizable 
theme, a given quality, as it is a term allowing one to operate a declassification, in the double sense 
of lowering and of taxonomic disorder. Nothing in and of itself, the formless has only an operational 
existence: it is a performative, like obscene words, the violence of which derives less from 
semantics than from the very act of their delivery.55 
 
Further and perhaps more from an architectural sense, Foster defines Bataille’s concept of informe 
as, “a condition where significant form dissolves because the fundamental distinction between 
figure and ground, self and other, is lost”56. Simply put, the informe is both a process, (it has a task 
to perform) and bad or incoherent form. This binary nature is something it shares with abject(ion), 
however where in abject(ion) we are given two words: a physical expulsion (the abject) and a verb/ 
process (abjection), with the informe, both meanings are collapsed into a single word, hence 
amplifying even further the slippage between the two meanings. What this correlation between the 
two concepts allows us to do, is to look to the informe for possible approaches on how to engage 
abject(ion) as both process and product. However what one discovers very quickly, is a certain 
pulling apart of these two aspects. In Bois and Krauss’ book, the informe is evidently the end 
product, images of which fill the entire book, a notable tendency to bad form over process. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that although the text speaks of the operational/ processual existence of 
the informe, the images are for the most part of finished artistic work: of paintings, drawings, 
sculptures etc, that outlive the process of their production. The process is always implied, and 
though one could argue that it may be traced through the work, what becomes the artwork is the 
physical object rather than the process – the artwork gains precedence. It is bad form that is 
explicit. The process is implicit. The tending towards bad form and side lining of the process is a 
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remnant of dualistic thinking, which when used to discuss operational terms such as the informe 
and abject(ion), inevitably results in this negation, as process, cannot be pinned into one of the two 
categories. Not only do we then arrive at works which prioritise bad form over process, but the 
pulling apart of the two meanings results in a classification of bad form. Bad form becomes a type 
of formalism, which is precisely what allows Bois and Krauss to create a ‘user’s guide’, despite 
them writing that the informe is not ‘a stable motif to which we can refer’. It is the very 
terminology of a ‘user’s guide’, and what it implies; a framework, and a series of operational 
instructions – entropy, base materialism, horizontality and pulse, that attributes order and logic to a 
volatile concept that defies definition.  
 
In many ways this parallels the notion of ‘abject writing’, which Kristeva explored in: La 
Révolution Du Langage Poétique (1984); commented on in Pouvoirs de l’horreur, saying that it is 
a matter of imagining the logic of the abject and putting ‘oneself into its place’; analysed 
extensively in Pouvoirs de l’horreur, through the novels of Louis-Ferdinand Céline; and which is 
further present in works such as Samuel Delany’s 1993 short story On the Unspeakable.57 Here 
again, this mode of writing that is developed, (which feeds into the broader field of minority or 
minor literature discussed by Deleuze and Guattari), presents a series of clear operations such as 
the questioning of language and the subversion of narrative or writing structures.58 The ability to be 
able to take this to create our own informe art or abject writing, is a testament that these concepts 
have been captured and rendered determinate. This taking on of a form, is as Bataille has noted, 
necessary for academics to be satisfied and is philosophy’s ultimate aim – “to fit[ting] what exists 
into a frock-coat, a mathematical frock-coat.”59 
 
Perhaps an alternative would be to approach the informe more loosely, as an acknowledging of 
patterns or rhythms, rather than a ‘user’s guide’, which allows one to draw connections, but 
maintains a certain indeterminacy, for as patterns or rhythms meet one another and intersect, they 
affect one another, resulting in subtle deviations. The dualism we find in Bois and Krauss’ book, is 
not a mere observation here on my part, but is in fact, what Arata Isozaki and Akira Asada in 
Cynthia Davidson’s book Anybody (1997) bluntly point to: 
 
The Centre Georges Pompidou presented a show with this very title [informe], curated by Rosalind 
Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois, in 1996. I was disappointed by this attempt to deconstruct formalism by 
formalism, which degenerated into a merely thematic enumeration à la Georges Bataille, 
emphasizing the low, the entropic, and the amorphous – or, as Julia Kristeva would say, the 
maternal and semiotic as opposed to the paternal and symbolic. How could one return to such a 
simple dualism after a period of elaborate formalist sophistication?60 
 
In a further essay of the same book, Alejandro Zaera-Polo again comments on architecture’s 
engagement with the informe and its successful resolution in an informal language. The informe, 
much like abject(ion), is very easily transformed into a formal consideration – a manipulation of 
the building as object. This is a significant shortfall: 
 
During the last 20 years, an important amount of architectural theory and practice has been devoted 
to the formless, to the indeterminate.61 
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If this quest for indetermination was a necessary reaction to the crisis of modernity, enabling a 
critique of the previous models of architectural practice, there is no question that the objectives have 
been achieved. Architectures that resemble the organization of clouds, stains, and rocks more than 
Platonic solids are everywhere.62 
 
This of course brings us back to architectural movements such as deconstructivism. Maria L. 
Palumbo in New Wombs: Electronic Bodies and Architectural Disorders (2000) discusses the 
uprooting of architectural systems through the work of Lebbeus Woods, Coop Himmelb(l)au, and 
others, which manifested itself as deconstructivism i.e. non-form classified as form. Here the 
interest in fragmentation and distortion of various architectural elements was an attempt to break 
away from modernism’s purity of form and the structured framework of architecture. The work of 
Jacques Derrida was a constant reference, and although one can’t claim that the work grouped 
under the term deconstruction actively engaged in notions of the informe, I would say that it is not 
too implausible to draw parallels between the agendas and outcomes of deconstructivism and the 
informe. Anthony Vidler has in fact categorised the work of Friedrich Kiesler and contemporary 
computer generated work such as that of Greg Lynn as operating within the informe,63 distinctly 
pointing therefore to references on either side of deconstructivism. Such work has reached a point, 
where it is no longer in flux but instead assimilated with the concrete. We may no longer talk of the 
informe in such instances but rather of a formalist language of the informe – the informe as end 
product, as art or architectural object – the informe has regained meaning, the very meaning that 
collapses both in the operation of abjection and the informe has been reinstated, and with it, fantasy 
and phallic signification. It has once again re-entered the realm of the symbolic. The informe, like 
abject(ion), is no longer “a condition in which subjecthood is troubled, “where meaning 
collapses””.64 Interestingly, Vidler concludes with Diller and Scofidio’s Blur Pavilion (2002), as 
an unclassifiable example located beyond both form and informe – a constantly changing form we 
can equally see in R&Sie(n)’s Dusty Relief (2002), (a notable inclusion of process), and perhaps an 
architectural clue to dealing with abject(ion) were we interested in the physical manipulation and 
making of buildings. “Not a real mass, but a phantom mass; not form or informe, but constantly 
changing form.”65 
 
There exists also a secondary relation between the two concepts despite the fact that for Krauss, 
any relation between the two is in fact non-existent: ““abjection,” in producing a thematics of 
essences and substances, stands in absolute contradiction to the idea of the formless.”66 Yet the 
explicitly demarcated boundaries of such a definition become diluted in a discussion “The Politics 
of the Signifier II: A Conversation on the “Informe” and the Abject” (1994) with the informe 
linking subject and abject through a performative gesture: 
 
Hollier: There are two sides of this struggle. One is the abject, which we have discussed. The other 
is the subject, its experience, its desiring position, as absolutely singular. And that is why the 
informe must always be linked to some kind of pragmatics, to a performative gesture that ties 
subject and abject together. 
Foster: It seems to me we have come full circle, that is into complete contradiction. First, Rosalind 
argued that the Kristevan abject cannot be derived from the Battaillean informe. And now Denis 
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gives us an informe that is not simply a question of form or structure or referentiality. So which is 
it?67 
 
Despite this contradiction, could one not employ the informe as an adjective and state that the 
abject does not have a form i.e. is formless, or that what abjection results in is a formlessness as 
body and space bleed into one another? True that the abject cannot be derived from the Battaillean 
informe as it exists on its own, but it is not in absolute contradiction. Bataille speaks of a base 
materialism – a materialism that is constituted by active base matter akin to Baruch Spinoza’s 
notion of a single substance which has further not only inspired Deleuze but contemporary thinking 
in ‘new materialism’. Base materialism is a section in Bois and Krauss’ book. Base materialism 
deals with matter, with substances. Abjection is the expulsion of matter, form is the shaping of 
matter, and informe is matter in flux rendering an incoherent mass. Although I explore this 
materialism in a further Chapter, it is worth noting that understanding matter as active and self-
organising means that one does not give that matter form. To therefore produce informe 
architectures or artworks is to give matter form, to reduce the informe to a formalism. Perhaps if 
we approach the informe from the perspective of an active base matter, the informe would regain 
its own operational existence. 
 
DUST 
 
In his Critical Dictionary Bataille wrote the following of dust: 
 
The storytellers have not realised that the Sleeping Beauty would have awoken covered in a thick 
layer of dust; nor have they envisaged the sinister spiders’ webs that would have been torn apart at 
the first movement of her red tresses. Meanwhile dismal sheets of dust constantly invade earthly 
habitations and uniformly defile them: as if it were a matter of making ready attics and old rooms 
for the imminent occupation of the obsessions, phantoms, spectres that the decayed odour of old 
dust nourishes and intoxicates.68 
 
In the second paragraph that forms the definition of dust, Bataille writes of maids ‘arming’ 
themselves with feather-dusters and vacuum cleaners. This comment takes one directly to John 
Ruskin’s renowned book The Ethics of the Dust (1875) and places dust or the keeping of dust 
squarely in the middle of the feminine realm. For Bataille however, as for Ruskin, dust is more 
importantly, a register of time, a sign of material change, or as David Gissen has more recently 
noted, a “marker of history”69. 
 
At first glance, dust may be understood as approaching a reading of the abject architecturally, as an 
abject of a building itself, (although it is not merely the disintegration of the built environment but 
includes our bodily excreta, up to 90%).70 In a 2007 journal publication, dedicated to architecture 
and dirt, Ben Campkin and Paul Dobraszcyk wrote of the paradoxical nature of dust, “Dust 
physically attacks and alters the materials of architecture, while it is, in fact, partly made of 
architecture’s materials, through their wearing, weathering and ruination, from fragments, to 
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debris, to powder.”71  Dust’s origin or association with a physical entity – a building, its expulsion, 
and the threat that it poses upon that expulsion, in many ways echoes Kristeva’s descriptions of 
abject(ion). Where Kristeva however clearly speaks of the human body, here that body becomes 
replaced by space, such that it is not I that expels, but a building. The threat that such a spatial 
abject(ion) poses is rendered explicit in Bernard Tschumi’s advertisement of the rotting Villa 
Savoye, where we move one step further, and it is not the building that expels, the building is 
expelled and architecture is presented not as “society’s ideal nature”72 or “as untouchable 
symbol”73 but its opposite, it parallels the ultimate abject, the rotting corpse (“of Modernism’s first 
born.”)74. Abject(ion) therefore does not merely threaten a building or space itself, it threatens the 
architectural discipline, and through these threats, simultaneously, throws our subjectivity into 
question. 
 
There are many dusty exemplars that proliferate architecture’s history: Giovanni Battista Piranesi’s 
etchings of a dust overrun Rome; Le Corbusier’s attempts to rise above the dust ridden streets 
through the piloti typology; Gaston Bachelard’s references to French surrealist writer and 
ethnographer Michael Leiris “who tells of having picked the dust from the cracks in the floor with 
a pin”75; to more contemporary instances such as Jorge Otero-Pailos’ The Ethics of Dust (2008, 
2009, 2012), which utilises latex to take a series of imprints or pollution casts of the built up dust 
on building surfaces – a practice that was in fact utilised by Swiss artist Heidi Bucher between the 
mid 1970s to the early 1990s.76 But to concentrate on dust or any other form of architectural 
detritus and to substitute the human body for space, would seem to me, a far too simplistic move 
for addressing the Kristevan abject within architecture, for it neglects to take into account the 
complexity of the process and all that it implicates. Buildings overrun by dust, and in states of 
decomposition, are of value, but not in isolation, and not when they are situated on the wrong side 
of the border. What is most useful when speaking of dust from the perspective of abject(ion), is, 
rather than solely seeing it as a material ‘thing’, an abject, is acknowledging its operational nature. 
It is this operational nature that it shares with not only abject(ion), but the informe, and further dirt. 
Teresa Stoppani writes: “dust can be seen as part of a strategy that moves from a static 
consideration of the object (of research, of study, of making), to an agency of change (as alteration 
of form).” “It becomes the material and also the agent for the project”77 Teresa Stoppani, who has 
lectured and written several articles on dust in architecture and who is currently working on a 
project titled Architecture_Dust, comments on the productive nature of considering dust as a 
process rather than merely an object: 
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Dust as dusting then, both action and space containing in itself actions that are complementary but 
also contradictory. Construction as sedimentation, juxtaposition, imbrication; but also destruction as 
ruination, weathering, wearing: these are the workings of dust. These are also the actions of 
architecture, if we read it as a process rather than an object, and beyond and across the triad of 
conception, representation and building, in a continuous being that goes well beyond inhabitation to 
include dissipation.78 
 
When activated as a verb, dust contains in itself the opposite meanings of ‘dusting’ as both the 
removal and the addition of matter. Dust thus ‘performs an act of perfect circularity’ that knows no 
dichotomy, no stasis, no conflict, but triggers a continuous circular motion.79 
 
It is clear that there are instructive connections between the processes and products of abject(ion) 
and dust(ing). Where this project however diverges from Stoppani’s, is that there is no interest in 
utilising the properties of abject(ion) as an abstract process in the physical making of architecture, 
and this is exactly where Stoppani’s discussions lead, citing projects such as R&Sie(n)’s Dusty 
Relief. “And yet the dusty nature of this project does not reside in the fact that it uses dust as one of 
its materials, but in that it embraces the properties of dust as a process in its making – open, 
heterogeneous, growing, condensing, dissipating.”80  Despite this, what remains critical here is the 
workings with dust as both product and process (albeit an abstract process), the activation of the 
term as a verb, in order to manifest an architecture that is open on a number of levels. There are 
thus parallels to considering abject(ion) productively, however where Stoppani applies it to the 
physical making of architecture, I apply it to expanding the understanding of relations between 
bodies and spaces.  
 
WEATHERING OR SPATIAL ABJECT(ION) 
 
In further situating the research, it is worth examining the way that abject(ion) has been addressed 
within architectural practice. Although many of the exemplars in the following three sections are 
not directly concerned with abject(ion) in terms of the relations between bodies and spaces, some 
key findings that are of consequence do become apparent, such as those in David Leatherbarrow 
and Mohsen Mostafavi’s book On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in Time (1993). 
 
Weathering or decay, is spatial abject(ion). It is a building expelling itself from the inside out – a 
building in flux. Its effects can range from surface modification, to far greater physical 
deformation, which has the capacity to lead to formlessness – a slouching of the structure to the 
point where it no longer gives form to the building. Weathering is, staining, corrosion, vegetal 
growth, mould, rot. It is embodied within every building to various degrees, from the accumulation 
of dust on a windowsill, to the utter ruination of a structure. It is a process that is desirable for its 
aesthetic qualities only when it may be controlled, that is, only when we are the agents. Generally, 
given the understanding that a building has a point of completion, that it is static, the introduction 
of any sense of movement that detracts from this final point is seen in a negative light. Yet as 
Bernard Tschumi stated in his advertisement of the rotting Villa Savoye, “The most architectural 
thing about this building is the state of decay in which it is.” There is a pointed remark here on 
modernism, that no number of white planar surfaces or elevation off the ground via piloti will save 
our profession from getting soiled, but simultaneously there is a proposition that decay does not 
detract from the building but rather that it is the most architectural thing about it, implying that this 
notion of movement is critical to architecture. 
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Although one could speak at length of weathering, from modernism’s attempted suppression of 
weathering and aim at maintaining an idealised object, to the works of architects such as Carlo 
Scarpa whose structures deeply rooted within the ground, overcome by vegetation and purposely 
articulated for the promotion of decay, speak of an awareness of process and the importance of 
registering time. One could off course also take up “the relentless drive toward the New”, that 
Jennifer Bloomer commented on in the 1990s, which “is a strangely directed attempt to escape 
from Materia, the old, generative soil, the origin. The New is never dirty; it is always bright, 
spanking clean, light, full of promise, devoid of weight”81 a topic which has drawn comments on 
numerous fronts (see for example the work of Juhani Pallasmaa). What I would like to point to, are 
two key observations or findings that are of consequence for approaching abject(ion) productively. 
The first concerns a rethinking of weathering or spatial abject(ion) as negative. 
 
To consider weathering as anything other than negative, one needs to approach the building in 
process rather than as a product and end form. In other words, one has to understand that there is 
not necessarily ever ‘a’ point of completion that a building reaches, but rather that a building is 
constantly in the process of construction, whether by man or nature. Only then, may weathering or 
spatial abject(ion) be considered integral rather than detrimental to architecture. This is precisely 
the key finding in Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi’s book On Weathering. For them, weathering is “a 
process that can productively modify a building over time.”82 It is nature ‘refinishing’ the building. 
“Finishing ends construction, weathering constructs finishes.”83 It is nature therefore as agent, not 
man,84 which leads to, once again, a thinking of matter as intelligent, as active. Although 
Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi’s book is relatively small in its size, the potency of this key finding, 
that weathering constructs finishes and that therefore a building is perpetually in a state of 
construction i.e. that it is never complete, is undeniable. Given its scope, the book does not unpack 
the implications of this finding, but merely serves to illustrate it through a mass of exemplars 
ranging from Ancient Rome to the work of Carlo Scarpa. Where many of these exemplars lead 
however, is to discussions of weathering as surface modification. I think it is important to 
understand the potential risks of such a prioritisation through its possible direct application, that is, 
through the construction of surfaces or façades that attempt to render weathering explicit, as the 
notion of a building in process I would argue, takes in so much more, and if we are to speak about 
abject(ion) in its entirety, this is but the start.85 
 
The second observation pertains to Juhani Pallasmaa’s notion of a ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ architecture, 
the word ‘weak’ borrowed from the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, who speaks of a ‘weak 
ontology’: 
 
A distinct 'weakening' of the architectural image takes place through the processes of weathering 
and ruination. Erosion strips away the layers of utility, rational logic and detail articulation, and 
pushes the structure into the realm of uselessness, nostalgia and melancholy. The language of matter 
takes over from the visual and formal effect, and the structure attains a heightened intimacy. The 
arrogance of perfection is replaced by a humanizing vulnerability.86 
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Pallasmaa writes that such an architecture is not only “contextual and responsive” but also 
“concerned with real sensory interaction”87. What is worthy of note in Pallasmaa’s quote, is his 
association of a weak architecture, and therefore of an architecture in a state of decay or abject(ion) 
with the experiential dimension. Pallasmaa is then very clear to distinguish between an architecture 
that deals with the real, versus an architecture concerned with “idealized and conceptual 
manifestations”88 that successfully divorce one from matter, deterioration and death. Referring to 
an article by Ignasi de Sola-Morales from the late 1980s, Pallasmaa notes what is central to a weak 
architecture for Sola-Morales, is in fact event, the very concept that Tschumi adopts several years 
later. Where Pallasmaa gets to in the middle of his paper, is a statement that “the idea of fragility 
suggests empathetic listening and dialogue.”89 This dialogue is one between a space and a body, 
and what it begins to suggest (despite Pallasmaa’s phenomenological grounding) is a move beyond 
a phenomenological conception of experience where the body, the subject, is at the centre, to an 
active exchange between body and space, which may be understood through contemporary 
discussions of affect. These two findings therefore, that weathering or spatial abject(ion) allows 
one to understand a building in process, that it problematises its completeness, and that it is 
fundamentally rooted in experience, are critical starting points. 
 
ABJECT CONSTRUCTIONS 
 
In their book, Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi write, “dirt is not necessarily impure, buildings are 
made out of matter, earth is part of their fabric.”90 All buildings are made out of matter, but not all 
buildings are made out of earth/ dirt. Historically, dirt is abject. But despite the historical 
understanding of dirt as unclean, as matter out of place, it is the key constituent in numerous 
constructions, from bricks, which help form the enclosures for our bodies, to pottery, from which 
one eats, and into which one shovels further dirt for the planting of their herbs. There has been 
much attention attributed to dirt recently, with attempts at wresting it out of its historical 
understanding, and into a more productive one. The publication Dirt (2012) occupies the 
intersection of landscape and architecture. It works with dirt as fertile and life giving, and from this 
perspective points to its emergent behaviours and capacity for change: 
 
Dirt is not messy. 
Dirt is not ‘dirty’. 
Dirt is teeming with life, and rich with possibility. 
 
Dirt is less that by which we are repulsed than that which is endlessly giving and fertile. Organisms 
grow, thrive, and evolve amidst dirt. Dirt is thus a matrix capable of emergent behaviours, nurturing 
growth, spawning development, and igniting change.91 
 
What is notable in this publication, is its observation of dirt’s productive qualities, and the aim to 
compile a series of papers and projects that speak to this observation. The publication does not 
approach dirt as a building material literally, but rather is interested in (particularly in the ‘Process 
Work’ section), utilising dirt’s emergent behaviours for the generation of structures. In this sense, 
the projects are abstract dirt constructions. Although it would seem that as a whole the publication 
successfully moves beyond dirt’s negative connotations and foregrounds its productive nature, it 
                                                
87 Pallasmaa, "Hapticity and Time," 327. 
88 Ibid., 327. 
89 Ibid., 328. 
90 Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi. On Weathering, 103. 
91 Megan Born, Helene Furján and Lily Jencks, ed., Dirt (Philadelphia: PennDesign, 2012), 8. See also the 
relatively recent publications: Ben Campkin and Paul Dobraszcyk’s guest edited journal with the title 
Architecture and Dirt (2007), and Ben Campkin’s book Dirt: New Geographies of Cleanliness and 
Contamination (2007). 
56
does begin to risk the dilution of dirt into vagueness, as behaviours are abstracted, and material and 
sensory qualities subjugated. 
 
On the flip side of such abstract constructions, are examples of literal constructions – constructions 
from physical abject matter, that have long been experimented with in art, from Andy Warhol’s 
piss paintings in the 1970s, to Jana Sterbak’s Flesh Dress (1987) of raw meat, a more subtle 
version of which, interestingly, Diller and Scofidio made in 2006, using processed meat.92 In 
architecture, for such a construction one can look to Christine McCarthy’s “Constructions of a 
Culinary Abject” (1997), an account of A la Ronde, an 18th Century house in Exmouth, with its 
construction consisting partially of culinary abjects: feathers, bone, shells and sand. The article 
draws links between the production in the kitchen and the construction of the house, where a 
boundary is unclear and where waste that is produced as part of the cooking/ preparation process, 
becomes construction material for the house: 
 
The boundary between production in the kitchen and the construction of the house remains unclear. 
The shells scraped in the kitchen are plastered on the walls, the feathers plucked at the table pierce a 
lime skin putty, bones wrenched from bodies break the skin to haunt the grotto. … But this waste is 
intrinsic to the identity of the kitchen, once integral to its process.93 
 
She further describes the construction of the house through more invisible and volatile culinary 
abjects that slowly form layer upon layer on the kitchen walls and ceiling. 
 
Frying and boiling send culinary-enriched vapours to the walls and ceilings of the kitchen and 
beyond. Negotiating exits, the culinary waste leaves its traces. It leaves itself within, on its way 
out.94 
 
The house presents a scenario which recalls François Rabelais’ writings, where the character 
Panurge proposes “to build walls from genital organs of women”95 as well as from “the bones of 
soldiers”,96 or recalls perhaps even, the chapel Kostnice v Sedlci (1400), where again, once living 
bodies become building material. Such a process only becomes possible through rethinking the 
classification of carcasses and animal left-overs as waste or trash rather then filth, which is unable 
to be reused as William A. Cohen points out in Filth.97 In art, one can map such a rethinking of the 
abject from the 1960s to works such as Tracey Emin’s installation My Bed (1998) – an installation 
featuring Emin’s own unmade bed with its soiled sheets covered in bodily excrement. On a 
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contemporary front, the house identifiably shares parallels with select works of Mexican artist 
Teresa Margolles and her painting of walls, mopping of floors, with a mixture of water, blood, 
grime and detritus harvested from crimes in Mexico. Such structures become un-architectural, as 
McCarthy writes, for they “evade ‘proper’ definition by convenient architectural categorisation”98. 
They refuse to engage in the canonical symbolic of architecture, and for this reason are often 
labelled as follies, architecture washing its hands of them. Essentially, as they do not ‘fit’, they are 
cast out, and therefore remain understood as negative, as matter out of place. Despite such an 
understanding or reading, what is actually critical in McCarthy’s article, is that she not only 
discusses the construction of space with waste, but she discusses the process of abjection through 
which the abject – the waste, comes to exist. The literal process features in the writing, in all its 
volatility and materiality, and it is this that is rare within the architectural discipline. 
 
Left overtime, when all that physically remains is the abject, such constructions risk 
objectification. The objectification of the abject, or the abject as object, is a common shortfall 
within art, and often occurs in relation to works that not only utilise the abject as a construction 
material, but that directly exhibit the abject, of which fitting examples are Piero Manzoni’s Artist’s 
Shit (1961), followed in the 1990s by Tom Friedman’s Untitled (1992), a miniscule fragment of 
faeces on a pedestal. From a feminine perspective, Tracey Emin’s The History Of Painting Part 1 
(1999), and Jessica Chow’s Untitled (2009), both exhibitions of menstrual soaked tampons. Such 
work, some of which is catalogued in Klaus Biesenbach’s Into Me/Out of Me (2007), not only 
approaches the abject as object, but reiterates its historical position, as that, which is on the other 
side of the border, as the impure and the otherwise negative counterpart of the subject, the I. 
Particularly when one considers the exhibition of these abjects in the context of the white 
hermetically sealed gallery interior. For this reason, the abject never stands alone but is always in 
opposition to the symbolic. Although not as prevalent within the architectural discipline, examples 
of such objectification have occurred and do occur. Here the objectification is not solely of human 
abjects but also of spatial abjects, such as the routine collection of dust from a domestic vacuum 
cleaner, currently in progress by Julieanna Preston99, or R&Sie(n)’s proposal for a building that 
functions as an inside out dust collector, resulting in an immense dusty object. One could argue 
that where there is the abject, there is abjection, however Preston clearly prioritises the abject, 
R&Sie(n) inevitably risk objectification through form making, and A la Ronde through its 
existence now as a mere static collection of a/objects. The problem, particularly with Preston’s 
work and A la Ronde, is not that one can’t trace the process back through the work, but that 
abjection is temporal, it exists only for a certain period of time, after which, all that remains is the 
abject. A hierarchy of abject over abjection, product over process establishes itself, and upsets the 
slippage intrinsic to Kristeva’s definition. The abject remains an ambiguity as long as it is 
associated with abjection. The moment that one seals their own shit in 90 tin cans and exhibits it as 
art, or collects and packages dust, the abject becomes an object. An art commodity to be sold, 
exhibited and shipped around the world, “a representation of the body turned inside out, of the 
subject literally abjected, thrown out”100 as art critic Hal Foster points out. Here it is no longer real 
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but a mere representation, which differs significantly to the event of abject(ion), in the same way 
that a representation of architecture is not architecture101. 
 
To continue along this line of thought, it is not so much that the abject becomes an object, but 
rather that it becomes substituted for an object – a phobic object, in an attempt to retain that (the 
object) which helps reaffirm subjectivity, and which the abject would otherwise threaten. Kristeva 
has in fact written, “The phobic has no other object than the abject.”102 McCarthy explains this 
further, “It is in the abject that phobic subjects site their fear. Projecting their phobia onto the 
abject, they define their subjectivity by substituting the abject for an object.”103 Although the abject 
by many, not just Kristeva, is considered non-objectifiable, being referred to as material, and 
invoking a ‘direct encounter with the real’104, it does often fall into the realm of the symbolic as 
object. The abject can be and in isolation is, objectifiable, by the simple fact that it serves as 
referential content for our disgust. For this reason it is possible to situate the abject within 
language. Elaine Scarry, in her book The Body in Pain (1985) makes a point along these lines, not 
in terms of the abject, but more generally and isolates pain as objectless: 
 
Hearing and touch are of objects outside the boundaries of the body, as desire is desire of x, fear is 
fear of y, hunger is hunger for z; but pain is not “of” or “for” anything – it is itself alone. This 
objectlessness, the complete absence of referential content, almost prevents it from being rendered 
in language: objectless, it cannot easily be objectified in any form, material or verbal. 105 
 
Similarly, there is no referentiality to the abjecting body, it is referentially unstable through its 
perpetual shifting and is therefore non-objectifiable. To divorce the abject from abjection is to 
eliminate this referential instability and in effect render the abject static and objectifiable. 
 
What further comes into this discussion, and may clearly be seen in Preston’s dust collection, and 
in A la Ronde, if taken as it stands now, is that the abject does not only become an object, but in 
fact often becomes a fetishistic object of spectacle for our scopophilic society. In R&Sie(n)’s 
project, there isn’t such a clear-cut distinction between the process and the product, it engages 
both, and on an ongoing basis. There is a certain ambiguity through the continual formal shifting as 
more and more dust is electrostatically captured to the façade. The project avoids classification and 
problematises a reading from any one point. Hence it slips from one section to another within this 
Chapter. But despite its slipperiness it does result in a form, albeit a non-form, and presents itself 
as a massive dusty object for our viewing pleasure. 
 
To construct something from the abject, or to display the abject, is to re-present it, to give it a use-
value and to turn it into an object onto which one can transpose their desire. The abject come 
object is an ‘aestheticization of the unaesthetic’, a phrase that appears in Konstanze Kutzbach’s 
and Monika Mueller’s book The Abject of Desire: The Aestheticization of the Unaesthetic in 
Contemporary Literature and Culture (2007). A project that takes this to the extreme, is Manuel 
Herz and Eyal Weizman’s Open-Air Parkcafe (2003), which uses debris from the bombing of 
Cologne in WWII, to cover a series of regular shaped inhabitable volumes. The Parkcafe project 
deals with debris that has been both rendered unaesthetic because of its lack of structure and sense 
of a whole, as well as rendered abject, by the human detritus of casualities that once laid amongst 
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the built debris. Importantly, what the architects do with the debris that forms the basis of the 
project, is to plant it with wildflowers and weeds, covering up the debris and rendering the 
unaesthetic building an aesthetic object of spectacle. The objectification is reiterated further 
through the hermetically sealed interiors (also found in Dusty Relief), functioning to distance one 
from any physical contact with the debris or dust, and establishing a very clear demarcation 
between the inside and outside – the inside a space that neither debri nor dust is allowed to 
permeate. There is therefore a confrontation with matter that has the capacity to threaten our bodily 
boundary: debris, dust, or even mosquitoes in another R&Sie(n) project, but this threat is carefully 
kept at bay and controlled by the architect, such that there never really was a threat. In terms of the 
engagement with the key material qualities of the building, we are merely voyeurs, the visual takes 
precedence, therefore distance which reaffirms our bodily boundaries, and the proximity which is 
pertinent to abject(ion), where no two objects remain distinguishable, is lost. It is physical 
proximity through all our senses, not merely the visual that comes to approach the full affect of 
abject(ion), bringing us into the realm of a Deleuzean becoming – a process of change. As a point 
of distinction therefore, what I am drawn to is the breaking boundaries of bodies and spaces. Not in 
an attempt to capture such events but rather to contemplate their effect on the way that architecture 
thinks of the relations between bodies and spaces. It is precisely at this point that we are dealing 
with the visceral event, and it is this direct engagement with the visceral, which Deleuze discusses 
as attributed to sensation, and that clearly demarcates itself from a literal approach to the abject as 
sensationalist object or from architecture’s dealings with abject(ion) generally. 
 
PROCESS 
 
An interest in the breaking boundaries of bodies and spaces is above all an interest in the process of 
abjection, and it is the way that the process of abjection has been addressed in architecture that I 
would like to look at in this final section. To speak of process within architecture above all refers 
to the design process – to the process through which we as architects conceive of a building. 
Further it refers to adjacent processes such as the construction process through which a building is 
actualised. Hence process in architecture is directed to an end that yields a product. Similarly, 
abjection yields a product – it yields the abject. If we return to the example from the Dirt 
publication, what we find is the reinterpretation of dirt’s fertile and life giving properties, of its 
emergent behaviour into a design process. Such that, rather than cultivating plant life, these 
emergent behaviours or processes come to manifest buildings. Such a translation may be seen as a 
possible direction for engaging processual concepts, and links into similar contemporary studies 
interested in the utilisation of emergent phenomena to generate buildings. What this approach 
however entails, is an abstraction of the process – an over simplification. We over intellectualise 
and hence sanitise the base material qualities. So that although it seems that we have managed to 
engage with the process, we have in fact carefully edited it to prevent ourselves from getting 
soiled. To reuse a point from Dirt, these projects are “all metaphor, no matter”106. Such an 
abstraction further serves as a way for these processes to enter the architectural rhetoric, which is 
rational, functioning according to a system – an order. As French philosopher Vincent Descombes 
notes in his Modern French Philosophy (1980), it was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel that pointed 
out, that the real was irrational and questioned how the notion of the real as rational could have 
once been accepted. “If existence is wholly absurd and unjustifiable, how can the notion that ‘all 
that is real is rational’ have been accommodated?”107 Could it not be said then, that an architecture 
that rationalises such processes is not dealing with the real? That it takes what once was real and 
irrational and clothes it in the architectural straitjacket, turning it in the process into something that 
could not be any further divorced from its initial point of origin? 
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As a point of distinction, R&Sie(n)’s Dusty Relief does not only adopt dust’s properties, but works 
with dust itself, hence it does not negate its materiality. This project moves across not only process, 
but also the notion of abject constructions, which as I have alluded to, present another risk, that of 
objectification. It comes perhaps the closest to dealing with dust as both process and product. To 
engage with abject(ion) productively however, is for me, not a matter of employing abject(ion) to 
design or physically construct buildings/ spaces, it is not about giving abject(ion) a use-value, but a 
matter of remaining immersed within the visceral processes of expelling bodies and spaces. In this 
sense, Leatherbarrow and Mostafavi’s discussions of weathering, and McCarthy’s discussions of 
multiple processes in fact lend themselves as starting points for such an enquiry. What one may 
take from these, is the engagement with the literal process itself, void of resorting to abstraction in 
the first instance, and in the second, the criticality of discussing processes, plural, which perhaps if 
we read between the lines, begins to edge towards a Deleuzean line of thought that conceives of 
everything processually. 
 
The process of abjection however, is also (and for Kristeva), first and foremost bodily. Given the 
centrality of the human body to architecture, and to the concept of abject(ion), it must not be 
forgotten. Within the architectural discipline, the volatile body that leaks uncontrollably however, 
is rarely found. Hence a mapping of abject(ion) in architecture is often merely a mapping of spatial 
abject(ion). At times we do get hints of this body, only for it to end up being poetically skirted 
around: 
 
the Japanese toilet truly is a place of spiritual repose. It always stands apart from the main building, 
at the end of a corridor, in a grove fragrant with leaves and moss. No words can describe that 
sensation as one sits in the dim light, basking in the faint glow reflected from the shoji, lost in 
meditation or gazing out at the garden. The novelist Natsume Sōseki counted his morning trips to 
the toilet a great pleasure, ‘a physiological delight’ he called it.108 
 
What Japanese writer Junichirō Tanizaki aptly describes in his renowned In Praise of Shadows 
(1977), is the physiological delight from sensory stimuli in and around the toilet – the light, a 
fragrant grove, various materials, all elements and phenomena that undeniably constitute Christian 
Norberg-Schulz’s definition of place. There is also however something he negates to detail, the 
program, without which the experience would not occur – without which we would not travel to 
the toilet at the end of the corridor and we would not contemplate the surroundings to such lengths. 
It is because of abject(ion), that the water closet stands apart from the building, that it has been 
placed in a fragrant grove, busily working to mask bodily odours, that as soon as they leave our 
body are inhaled back in. Bodily processes, even those that have already been ordered and are 
controlled by hygienic infrastructure are of no consequence, not even worthy of mention, for as far 
as architecture is concerned, these processes have efficiently been taken care of and need no further 
attention.  
 
There are of course exceptions to the general subversion of abject bodily process within 
architecture. The Public Bathroom Project (1993) by Kennedy and Violich Architecture, and The 
Latrine Project (1987-88) by Interim Office of Architecture are notable in this regard.109 These two 
projects, both of which are a reworking of public bathrooms, not only work with abject bodily 
processes but intentionally draw attention to them: uninsulated pipe-work exposes the sound of 
excretions being carried to the sewer; the intentional lack of ties on the pipe-work causes them to 
wiggle under pressure; and the female and male lavatories are swapped, leaving unused and 
dysfunctional fixtures adjacent to new functional ones. Here the literal process of abjection is 
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engaged with in all its volatility. Examples such as these are however rare, and even then we are 
dealing with merely bodily abjection. The implication of other bodies or spaces – the bleeding of 
one on the other is absent. Yet it is this bleeding of one on the other – the visceral event – that has 
something to contribute to architecture’s understanding of the relations between bodies and spaces.  
 
What one finds after mapping the way that Kristeva speaks of abject(ion), and the way that 
architecture has dealt with this concept, (and with similar concepts), is that despite Kristeva 
defining abject(ion) as anything that crosses the symbolic, she addresses the concept purely in 
terms of the human body, the subject. Abject(ion) is always brought back to the subject, the I. 
Architecture on the other hand, more often than not, addresses abject(ion) through its primary 
medium of space. In her book Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo 
(1966), Douglas has been frequently quoted as saying that it is a “mistake to treat bodily margins in 
isolation from all other margins.”110 What this renders explicit for me, in the mapping of 
abject(ion) across both Kristeva and architecture, is that bodily and spatial margins or boundaries 
are treated in isolation. On the one hand are bodily boundaries, and on the other, spatial 
boundaries. I think it is critical, given that abject(ion) is anything that crosses the symbolic, that 
bodily and spatial boundaries are discussed simultaneously. Further if one imagines a human body 
or space expelling itself from the inside out, that expulsion landing on and implicating another 
human body or space, it becomes apparent that abject(ion) is a discussion of bodies and 
boundaries. As architecture is for the enclosure of our body, the rupturing of bodily boundaries is 
just as critical as the rupturing of spatial boundaries. Where this leads, is to an investigation of 
abject(ion) across both, that is, an investigation into the breaking boundaries of the body and the 
breaking boundaries of space, either of which when ruptured, rupture the boundaries of the other 
interdependently.  
 
There are therefore two tasks from the observations made in this Chapter that will be addressed in 
the preceding two Chapters. Firstly, in Chapter three, we turn to Tschumi, his notion of event and 
his definition of architecture, which begins to allow us to discuss bodily and spatial boundaries 
simultaneously within architecture, and which acts as a stepping stone that inevitably leads to the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, through whom such complex interrelations may be addressed. 
Given the processual nature of abjection and the processual nature of an event based architecture, 
Tschumi’s thinking provides a way of implicating abject(ion) into architecture. It is therefore not a 
matter of merely space, of abstracting and putting the process of abjection to work akin to the 
treatments of dust, informe and dirt, but rather is a matter of the process literally, experientially, 
and nowhere in architecture do we find discussions of abject(ion) as event. Yet it is precisely this 
realm within which abject(ion) operates. “Abjects … are experienced, much like traumatic 
events”.111 Subsequently in Chapter four, we will return to the Kristevan abject, and extend on its 
shortcomings through the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari and their notion of an open 
subjectivity. This will allow us to move beyond the dualistic structure imposed on abject(ion) by 
Kristeva toward a productive understanding. 
                                                
110 Douglas, Purity and Danger, 145. 
111 Berressem, “On the Matter of Abjection,” 20. 
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3. Event  
 
3.1 Event  
event: an incident, an occurrence; a particular item in a programme. Events can encompass 
particular uses, singular functions or isolated activities. They include moments of passion, acts of 
love and the instant of death (4).  
Events have an independent existence. Rarely are they purely the consequence of their surroundings. 
In literature, they belong to the category of the narrative (as opposed to the descriptive).1  
 
Bernard Tschumi’s theoretical writings from the 1970s – 1990s, and particularly his concept of 
event, are critical to discussions of abject(ion) productively. Through his definition of architecture: 
architecture = space + event, abject(ion), (which may be thought of as event) inevitably comes to 
define architecture, as “architecture is defined by the actions it witnesses as much as by the 
enclosure of its walls”.2 Tschumi’s equation allows for a rethinking of abject(ion) within 
architecture which has previously concentrated on meaning and abjects of a building. His theory 
allows us to discuss abject(ion) as process, as an event, rather than an o/abject, as Tschumi is not 
only interested in architectural form but further the political dimension of space, and it is precisely 
event that “take[s] place within the social and political realm of architecture.”3 This little equation 
moves us away from solely a menstruating woman, a decaying building, towards what Gilles 
Deleuze would call an assemblage. We are no longer discussing a body whether human or spatial 
in isolation but collectively. Tschumi’s equation essentially facilitates a system, where discrete 
wholes function according to individual logics but are in direct confrontation with each other. His 
equation is the beginnings of a Deleuzean assemblage – it is the beginnings of an architecture 
understood as a collection of parts. 
 
But Tschumi is not only useful for his concept of event, but his reference to the work of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as the work of Georges Bataille which draw deeper and more 
fundamental connections, not necessarily in relation to abject(ion) directly but through discussions 
of transgression, border crossing, limit points and metaphorical violence.4 His theoretical writings 
sit between the excesses of the Marquis de Sade and programmatic rationalism, they occupy the in-
between, the very paradox that according to Tschumi is architecture – the paradox of the pyramid-
labyrinth. There is a clear reiteration of the importance of excess in architecture – of the value that 
                                                
1 Bernard Tschumi, Questions of Space: Lectures on Architecture (London: Architectural Association, 1995), 
99. 
2 Bernard Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996), 100. 
3 It was in the 1970s when Tschumi taught at the Architectural Association in London, that he drew on the 
work of Henri Lefebvre, for whom space was never divorced from politics. Käthi Holt-Damant, “Space and 
Time in the Architectural Theory of Bernard Tschumi,” in UME Magazine, ed. Jackie Cooper and Haig Beck 
(Melbourne and Sydney: University of Melbourne, 1998), 48, 49. Brackets mine. 
4 Tschumi particularly refers to Deleuze and Guattari’s Mille Plateaux: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie, 
Deleuze’s Cinéma series, and was influenced by the Collège de Sociologie where Bataille was a member. He is 
also known to have referred to Kristeva, particularly her writing on intertextuality.   
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lies in excess. Within this context, abjecting bodies are then just as critical to architecture as form 
or program. 
 
It is only such an understanding of architecture, that admits that “architecture is constantly 
unstable, constantly on the verge of change”5, because of “the uncertainties of use, action, and 
movement”6 that allows for abject(ion) to begin to be addressed in its full volatility. It allows for 
abject(ion) to literally contribute to the understanding of architecture, it brings the visceral process 
of abjection up for consideration, and constitutes it as something profound for architecture. 
Abjection as event, destabilizes architecture from within. It brings abjection’s process to bear on 
architecture, such that boundaries rupture and are transgressed, bodies overflow and the centre is 
displaced. All is in motion. Architecture becomes a slippage. This framework for architecture, 
where architecture is not static but forever in flux, clearly posits that what abject(ion) has to offer, 
is much more complicated than merely a decaying building or defecating body. To Tschumi’s 
dictum: “there is no architecture without action, no architecture without events, no architecture 
without program”7, one could add: there is no body without abject(ion), no architecture without 
bodies, hence no architecture without abject(ion).  
 
Abjection considered as an event is intriguing, as in a single move, it comes to both define 
architecture and witness its rupture. This is a going beyond strictly functional requirements in 
architecture.  
 
Before moving into Tschumi’s event theory, it must be noted however, that much like with 
Kristeva, there is a clear limit point. In Tschumi’s theory, events are discussed only on the side of 
the human body, with space remaining static and being afforded very little attention. Yet events, 
and in our case abject events, are also spatial, and as we have learnt from David Leatherbarrow and 
Mohsen Mostafavi, they modify a building over time. In order to be able to discuss both bodily and 
spatial abject events, I turn relatively quickly to the philosophy of Deleuze, who considers event at 
a more in depth level. This serves to not only provide an extension to Tschumi’s notion of event, 
but also begins to extend our understanding of relations between bodies and spaces.8   
 
EVENT IS NOT PROGRAM 
 
To begin to discuss Tschumi’s notion of event, it is important to note its distinction from program, 
which Tschumi is rather explicit about: 
 
“Program” is to be distinguished from “event.” A program is a determinate set of expected 
occurrences, a list of required utilities, often based on social behavior, habit, or custom. In contrast, 
events occur as an indeterminate set of unexpected outcomes. Revealing hidden potentialities or 
contradictions in a program, and relating them to a particularly appropriate (or possibly exceptional) 
spatial configuration, may create conditions for unexpected events to occur. For example, one may 
combine or assemble programmed activities so that they charge a spatial configuration in such a 
                                                
5 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, 19. 
6 Ibid., 20. 
7 Ibid., 121. 
8 It is worth noting that space has been thought of in terms of event within architecture. Sanford Kwinter’s book 
Architectures of Time (2002) in fact provides an overview of how the static notion of space became superseded 
by event and field theory, which he argues was evident as far back as in the work of Antonio Sant'Elia. For 
Kwinter, architecture is understood as a time-based field. More recently, the publication Architecture in the 
Space of Flows (2012) (mentioned in Chapter 1) has continued this thinking, arguing that everything functions 
in terms of flows - flows of various kinds and scales make up architecture and connect it with the world. 
Although these two texts are important reference points, particularly the latter, utilising Deleuze’s philosophy 
as noted, affords us the opportunity to discuss both bodily and spatial events, as well as to move into the 
material realm so critical to abject(ion).  
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way that, by mixing otherwise common or predictable programmatic items, they generate 
uncommon or unpredictable events. I have often called that particular spatial configuration the “in-
between.”9  
 
Program is determinate, event indeterminate. A program gives us a fixed outcome – a fixed spatial 
experience, an event does not. What is critical about the notion of event, is that it activates 
potentialities. Each space in other words may be thought of as composed of multiple singular 
potentialities that lay dormant unless activated. Hence the programmatic function of a laundromat 
is clothes washing, however the space also contains multiple potentialities, one of which Tschumi 
activates with his well-known example of cycling in the laundromat. This line of thinking is 
Deleuzean – the notion that life is a plane of potentialities that may (or may not) be actualised, and 
necessitates the abandon of static notions of architecture for an architecture in flux, i.e. one which 
supports the Deleuzean nomadic ‘subject’ via itself being nomadic, allowing for events to pass 
through it, rather than statically capturing similar events and filling itself to excess. And it is 
precisely Deleuzean philosophy that Elizabeth Grosz has previously commented on as having the 
capacity to rethink static notions of architecture: 
 
There are a lot of different ways in which I think Deleuze’s work could take off in architecture. 
Whether this will happen or not, however, I cannot predict. Take the idea, for example, of building 
as a fixed entity or a given, stable object (which is the standard notion of building today). A 
Deleuzian framework may help us transform these rather static ways of understanding construction. 
A building is made up of other spaces within it that move and change, even if its own walls remain 
fixed. The idea of the mobility of the city and within building is one possible idea of Deleuzian 
thought that might be of tremendous value in architecture. Building is not only a movement of 
sedimentation and stabilization but also a way of opening space and living. If you want anything 
more concrete than that, this is something that architects should be asked to consider.10  
 
Writing on Deleuze and the notion of affect, Nigel Thrift refers to event, and even though what he 
means by event here, cannot be directly equated with Tschumi’s definition, it nevertheless echoes 
Tschumi’s line of thinking, noting that in order to approach affect, events must “be seen as 
genuinely open on at least some dimensions” and that it is precisely events such as “revolt, 
resistance, breakdown, conspiracy”11 that must not be discounted. To this we may add Tschumi’s 
list of generally considered unproductive activities: “luxury, mourning, wars, cults; the 
construction of sumptuous monuments; games, spectacles, arts; perverse sexual activity” which are 
critical, as “they suggest that the definition of architecture may lie at the intersection of logic and 
pain, rationality and anguish, concept and pleasure.”12 In this ‘intersection’, abject(ion) finds its 
foothold. This architecture is thus evidently minoritarian. It exists only as potential. It anticipates 
an architecture to come, a people to come, and as Jacques Derrida comments on Tschumi’s Parc de 
la Villette, “It runs the risk and gives us the chance.”13  
 
This Deleuzean line of thinking continues through terms Tschumi employs such as flows, vectors, 
the in-between, and which share attributes with trajectory, lines of flight and the excluded middle, 
“flows and vectors often intersect unprogrammed spaces: the place of the “in-between,” the space 
                                                
9 Bernard Tschumi, Event Cities 2 (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2000), 13. 
10 Elizabeth Grosz, Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 2001), 6-7. 
11 Nigel Thrift, "Spatialities of Feeling," in Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect (Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2008), 174. 
12 Bernard Tschumi, The Manhattan Transcripts (London: Academy Editions, 1994), 9. 
13 Jacques Derrida, “Point de Folie - Maintenant Architecture,” in Bernard Tschumi, La Case Vide, La Villette 
1985, Bernard Tschumi (London: Architectural Association, 1986), 19. For a discussion of a people yet to 
come see Deleuze’s Essays Critical and Clinical. 
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of all potentialities, is activated by the motion of bodies in it.”14 Importantly what the activation of 
these potentialities through event leads to, is what Deleuze terms becoming. At this moment, 
architecture is no longer a matter of being and hence dwelling but rather becoming, an open ended 
and indeterminate moment in time. It is only such an architecture that approaches the process 
nature of abject(ion) and allows for it to be considered in terms of the relations between bodies and 
spaces rather than merely as architectural detritus. Here there is no setting up of oppositions, no 
distancing of ourselves from ‘the other side of the border’, here architectural puritanism ceases to 
exist. Here we occupy Tschumi’s architectural paradox, the zone between the labyrinth (folie, 
madness) and the pyramid (reason, civilization). We are in the process of abjecting, we are 
immersed in expulsion – in the act of transgression – we are crossing borders, ““Inter faeces et 
urinam nascimus” (we are born between excrement and urine), wrote St. Augustine”15 and there is 
no escape.  
 
ABJECT(ION) AS PROGRAM 
 
Given the distinction Tschumi makes between program and event, it is equally important to draw a 
distinction in the context of abject(ion), which may be approached as either program or event. 
Beginning with the former, consider urinating in a bathroom. Here the program of the bathroom is 
informed by abject(ion), that is, it caters to our physiological processes. This form of abject(ion) is 
highly controlled. Systems put in place for immediate evacuation of our excreta. There is no 
productive engagement with the process, no affective intensity, as the outcome – the end product, 
the end experience, is predetermined. We know precisely where we will end up. Rather there is a 
sense of shame and disgust that needs to be collected at the bottom of the pan without any spillage, 
and flushed away as quickly as possible, body and space not having even touched the abject. Here 
the program serves to capture and dispose of all that has become other. This desperate need to 
distance ourselves from our expulsions is precisely what Kristeva means when she speaks of us 
expelling our non-self in order to reaffirm our identity. Abject(ion) as program, yields a 
predetermined outcome. It is static. It is an action, not an event, and as such, leads to being, not 
becoming. We piss, we defecate, we shower and perform all manner of cleansing rituals according 
to set rules. Here the side of our body that is about volatility and leakiness is constrained and 
bound by a system. This form of abject(ion) is heavily diluted, to the point where it struggles to be 
termed abject(ion), for all its attributes have been curtailed. Abject(ion) is matter out of place. Here 
that matter has been systematized, structured. It has been placed. And for this reason it is a dead 
end. The rationalization of abject(ion) and hence its inability to function as event, results in an 
incomplete architecture. An architecture of pure structure. Brian Massumi notes a similar problem 
with image and its relation to language:  
 
For structure is the place where nothing ever happens, that explanatory heaven in which all eventual 
permutations are prefigured in a self-consistent set of invariant generative rules. Nothing is 
prefigured in the event. It is the collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into 
paradox. It is the suspension of the invariance that makes happy happy, sad sad, function function, 
and meaning mean.16 
                                                
14 Tschumi, Event Cities 2, 13. Chris Jencks discusses the notion of the excluded middle referring to Jervis J.’s 
Transgressing the Modern: Explorations in the Western Experience of Otherness (1999). The excluded middle 
is the grey area that exists and has been neglected in a dualistic framework. “On/Off; Blackness/Whiteness; 
Male/Female become our regular currency and what becomes omitted is a key grey area, namely the idea that 
’not A’ is possibly a ‘diminished A’ rather than a B. This has serious political consequences. The grey area is 
the territory of the postmodern, chaos theory and more practically ‘fuzzy logic’.” Chris Jenks, Transgression, 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 10. 
15 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, 73. 
16 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (United States of America: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 27. 
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A word of warning: this is not to advocate the elimination of hygienic infrastructure but rather to 
clearly demarcate abject(ion) as program/ action, from abject(ion) as event, for it is only 
abject(ion) as event that escapes the architectural straitjacket and is able to be understood in terms 
of what it does and therefore is able to contribute to discussions about the relations between bodies 
and spaces. This instance of abject(ion), is what we come across in the work of artistic figures such 
as, Francis Bacon, Matthew Barney, Georges Bataille, Catherine Breillat, Orlan and many others, 
whose work will be touched upon at a further point. 
 
Once again, as Tschumi wrote, “like eroticism, architecture needs both system and excess”17 and it 
is abject(ion) as event that provides this excess. 
 
ABJECT(ION) AS EVENT 
 
Abject(ion) I would argue, is productive only when considered as an event in architecture. For 
here, we not only come to discuss it experientially but provide a framework, which acknowledges 
the perpetually changing nature of the process. And it is precisely because events are perpetually 
changing, because they are concerned with verbs, that events lead to new events, and that they are 
productive – they have agency.18 Here abject(ion) comes to manifest architecture and hence is 
understood as part of a larger assemblage rather than pertaining to an isolated expelling body. 
Abject(ion) is not reducible to a body, be it a human or spatial body. It is volatile. It excretes out of 
one body only to be ingrained in another, and in so doing, crosses and dilutes boundaries. This 
crossing of boundaries is erotic. Tschumi quotes Guillaume Apollinaire, the prophet of French 
futurism, “passing frontiers is erotic”.19  
 
Abject(ion) as event, and where space + event = architecture, results in a very specific type of 
architecture. It alters architecture’s physical, social, cultural, ethical and at times political 
properties: surface textures and densities change – concrete floors become sticky and runny, 
trailing/ drooping from various bodily orifices; unexpected relationships are created and objects 
take on different roles. As per, in a sense, novelist William S. Burroughs’ famous passage in Naked 
Lunch, “but no organ is constant as regards either function or position…sex organs sprout 
anywhere…rectums open, defecate and close…the entire organism changes color and consistency 
in split-second adjustments…”20 It sets in motion a particular series of potentialities that otherwise 
lay dormant. It creates a schism between space and program as in many of Tschumi’s surrealistic 
juxtapositions; bicycling in the laundromat, pole vaulting in the chapel, sky diving in the elevator 
shaft. And it does so precisely because, event, space and movement, each follow a distinct logic, 
which when superimposed over one another, create what Tschumi terms disjunction.21 However 
abject(ion) goes one step further and dilutes the reading of space as object and body as subject. It 
                                                
17 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, 50. 
18 Interestingly, Juhani Pallasmaa wrote in 2000, that authentic architectural experiences are concerned with 
verbs. In this sense, abject(ion) is an authentic architectural experience. “Architecture is usually understood as a 
visual syntax, but it can also be conceived through a sequence of human situations and encounters. Authentic 
architectural experiences derive from real or ideated bodily confrontations rather than visually observed 
entities. Authentic architectural experiences have more the essence of a verb than a noun. The visual image of a 
door is not an architectural image, for instance, whereas entering and exiting through a door are architectural 
experiences. Similarly, the window frame is not an architectural unit, whereas looking out through the window 
or daylight coming through it, are authentic architectural encounters.” Juhani Pallasmaa, "Hapticity and Time: 
Notes on Fragile Architecture," The Architectural Review 207, no. 1239 (2000): 326-7. 
19 Tschumi, Questions of Space, 45. 
20 William S. Burroughs, Naked Lunch (New York: Grove Press, 2009), 9. 
21 Tschumi, The Manhattan Transcripts, 8. 
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manifests a massive blur – a zone of indiscernibility. It de-centres the subject, the object, and hence 
de-centres architecture. 
 
For Tschumi, there is an intense confrontation that occurs between body and space. Bodies violate 
space and space violates bodies. The relation between the two is symmetrical.22 When abject(ion) 
is brought into the equation, the violence is amplified – bodies and spaces excrete out of 
themselves, they penetrate one another. Contemporary architecture does not know what to do with 
such borderless entities, it has no mode of thinking about assemblages of this kind, where once 
discrete ‘objects’ leak into one another creating indiscernible masses. Architecture is a discussion 
of distinct bodies: spatial bodies and human bodies, the two remaining physically and 
psychologically distinct. Yet abject(ion) facilitates precisely such an assemblage – a bodyspace. It 
enters into a discussion of bodies of various types. There is a multiplicity of bodies. Bodies that are 
forever being created and dismantled. Forever in flux.  
 
Tschumi allows for architecture to be considered as an assemblage, composed of a space and a 
bodily event, however even his equation retains a demarcation between spatial bodies and human 
bodies engaging in event, maintaining that the two function according to independent logics. For 
him, “event and space do not merge but affect one another”.23 But in abject(ion) there exists a 
moment when those logics crossover, when they temporarily cease being independent. Thus we 
must push Tschumi’s equation further, to the point where space + event does not equal architecture 
but rather where spaceevent = architecture. In abject(ion), spatial bodies and human bodies become 
temporarily indistinguishable, hence in this instance, space and event are not two discrete 
components of the equation but one.  It is at this moment, that the two come to affect one another 
on a higher level. The violence of this collision of bodies is dependent on the particular 
juxtaposition of space and event. For example, Bataille’s memories of his father urinating over 
himself uncontrollably differs from urinating in a bathroom, in the same way that menstruating all 
over a bed in a decomposing bedroom in a Catherine Breillat film, differs to menstruating in a 
bathroom. Radically. In the primary examples it is the intersection of bodies that speaks to affect – 
the indeterminacy of the event. It is abjection acting physically as the connective tissue between 
human and spatial bodies. Such a visceral assault does not occur in the secondary examples, as the 
‘controlled’ action of abjection does not lead to affect, it is already given by the program. Affect 
results from the particular coupling of spaces and events. Hence whether the space varies, the act 
of abjection or the abjecting body, the affect is never the same. And it is this singularity of not only 
events, but the juxtaposition of space and event, that Tschumi comments on:  
 
Spaces are qualified by actions just as actions are qualified by spaces. One does not trigger the 
other; they exist independently. Only when they intersect do they affect one another. Remember 
Kuleshov’s experiment where the same shot of the actor’s impassive face is introduced into a 
variety of situations, and the audience reads different expressions into each successive juxtaposition. 
The same occurs in architecture: the event is altered by each new space. And vice versa24  
 
MOVEMENT THROUGH SPACE VS MOVEMENT IN PLACE 
 
An event can be any number of happenings, importantly however, as event and action theorist 
Lawrence Lombard noted in Events (1986), it is “a change in an object; and a change is a 
‘movement’, from the having of one to the having of another property, by an object through some 
portion of a quality space during an interval of time.”25 In other words, “an event is a movement by 
                                                
22 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, 122-3. 
23 Ibid., 130. 
24 Ibid., 130. 
25 Lawrence Brian Lombard, Events: A Metaphysical Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 166. 
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an object through some portion of a quality space.”26 Movement is therefore a critical criteria for 
event, one which works on a number of levels and where not only is event a movement, but for 
Deleuze, becoming moves through event. When the event in question is abjection however, the 
body becomes a source of movement on a different level. Not only is there a movement introduced 
into space (akin to Tschumi’s pole vaulter), or do an object’s properties change permanently (i.e. 
an apple rots), but a tertiary movement exists – a movement from the inside out – the body 
escaping itself. This is a movement in place, the very type of movement that interested Francis 
Bacon, a movement that differs, to that described by Tschumi. Here bodies move out of themselves 
and through one another, bodies are produced.  
 
As an extension to this point, it is worth noting that there is a plethora of work on movement in the 
architectural discipline, from Tschumi to Le Corbusier and his concept of the promenade 
architecturale to more contemporary studies27, but that such studies are in fact all interested in the 
movement of the human body in space, rather than the movement of a body from inside itself out, 
into space, and vice versa. This movement is often looked upon in a negative light, relegated to 
hygienic infrastructure (in the case of the human body) and as irrelevant to architecture. Similarly, 
such a movement in a spatial body, where the spatial body abjects itself, i.e. decomposes and 
weathers, is generally avoided, as it subtracts from the original appearance, degrades structural 
integrity, and eventually leads to the death of the building. Why would anyone desire this fate for 
their building? David Leatherbarrow and Mohsen Mostafavi have asked just this question in their 
On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in Time, and have suggested (as I noted in the first Chapter) 
that weathering (or what I term spatial abject(ion)) constructs finishes, that it finishes the building 
over time, and that if one considers this as part of the processes of a building, (rather than as a 
subtraction from it), then we expand the boundaries of architecture, and come to understand 
architecture as a fleeting figure.28 
 
To expand on this nature of movement, one can look to the philosophy of Deleuze. Deleuze 
discusses movement and change in the first of his Cinema books, Cinéma 1: L’Image-Mouvement 
(1983) noting in a similar sense to event and action theory that “movement always relates to a 
change”29. When my body expels itself from the inside (position a), to the outside (position b), not 
only does my state change (i.e. I am less the expulsion) but the state of the whole also changes as 
Deleuze writes, “what has changed is not only my state, but the state of the whole which 
encompassed B, A, and all that was between them.”30 In the instance of movement in place, there 
is a series of forces that act on the body, they reorganise the body, whether that body is spatial or 
human: the deformed vomiting mouth; the menstruating vaginal orifice; the peeling wall; the 
decomposing shit smeared Villa Savoye, all attempts at returning to a base material structure. 
Through this reorganisation, bodies temporarily gain and lose organs, orifices expand and contract, 
skins transform from a dry outside to a slippery inside, human bodies and spatial bodies become 
one intertwined Klein bottle. Similarities between varying bodies become apparent and they cease 
being monstrous, instead, becoming a series of rhythms and compositions – pure material 
(dis)assemblies. Sublime tableaus reconfigured through expulsion.  
 
                                                
26 Lombard, Events, 114.  
27 A notable example is Decoi’s mapping of dancers in space, Ether/I (1995). 
28 Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow, On Weathering: The Life of Buildings in Time (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993). 
29 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 8.  
30 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 8. 
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What further comes into discussions of movement is Deleuze’s definition of the body, which 
inspired by Baruch Spinoza, is defined in terms of movement, that is, as “composed of many 
moving elements.”31 Brian Massumi writes that:  
 
Spinoza defined the body in terms of “relations of movement and rest.” He wasn’t referring to 
actual, extensive movements or stases. He was referring to a body’s capacity to enter into relations 
of movement and rest. This capacity he spoke of as a power (or potential) to affect or be affected.32 
 
This is precisely the point Deleuze makes in Ethology: Spinoza and Us (1992).33 Equally, space, 
which I have at times termed a spatial body, and which I will from now on refer to as a spatial 
body, in order to collapse the distinction between the human body and space and be able to speak 
of relations between the two, needs to be thought of in a similar way. Otherwise as Massumi points 
out, it becomes reduced to a series of plottable/ measurable points (cartesian coordinates) that 
eliminate any sense of movement, since for something to move, means that “it was never in any 
point.”34  
 
When we think of space as ”extensive,” as being measurable, divisible, and composed of points 
plotting possible positions that objects may occupy, we are stopping the world in thought. We are 
thinking away its dynamic unity, the continuity of its movements. We are looking at only one 
dimension of reality.35 
 
Approached this way, spatial bodies and human bodies have the capacity to enter into relations 
with one another, they have the capacity to move through each other, to affect and be affected, and 
it is the process of abjection that can mobilise that capacity. However it is only abjection as event 
that has this potential. For as Massumi writes, “if you know where you will end up when you 
begin, nothing [happens] in the meantime.”36 
 
TEMPORALITY 
 
Abject(ion) (as is event) is unstable and temporal. It may occur for a day, an hour, a minute, and is 
never repeated identically. Each event is individual, a particular, or to employ Deleuze’s term, a 
singularity, with specific spatio-temporal features, “To say then that events are particulars is to say, 
at least in part, that events have spatio-temporal features”37 It is the opposite of ritual, which 
                                                
31 Elspeth Probyn, “Writing Shame,” in The Affect Theory Reader, ed. Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth 
(London: Duke University Press, 2012), 76. 
32 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (United States of America: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 15. Inner quote, Baruch Spinoza, “The Ethics,” IIPI, 3, in The Collected Works of 
Spinoza, vol. 1, ed. trans. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 458-62.  
33 Gilles Deleuze, “Ethology: Spinoza and Us,” in Incorporations, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter 
(New York: Zone Books, 1992), 625. 
34 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 6. It is worth pointing out that the term ‘spatial body’ is something that 
Henri Lefebvre has previously employed. His definition however differs entirely to mine and the two should 
not be confused or seen as related. For Lefebvre the term is employed so as to allude to the human body being 
directly affected by and produced by space. For me, it comes about through Deleuze and Spinoza’s philosophy 
referred to in a further Chapter. Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith 
(United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing, 1991), 9. 
35 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 6. Massumi and Deleuze’s understanding of space is to an extent 
influenced by the philosophy of Henri Bergson who redefined space in terms of movement writing, “Space is 
not a ground on which real motion is posited” “rather it is real motion that deposits space beneath itself.” Hence 
for Bergson, space comes into being through motion or event. Deleuze wrote the monograph Le Bergsonisme 
on Bergson in 1966. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory (New York: Cosimo, 2007), 289.  
36 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 18. Brackets mine. 
37 Lombard, Events, 63. This notion of event has been discussed by event and action theorists such as Jaegwon 
Kim, Donald Davidson, and Myles Brand. 
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“implies a near-frozen relationship between actions and space” and “institutes a new order after the 
disorder of the original event.”38 For Tschumi, it is linked to festival and the sacred, or what 
Mikhail Bakhtin has called the carnivalesque.39  
 
The temporality of events further comes down to the fact that events do not exist. They happen or 
occur, but do not exist. They are virtual, and the virtual “is never actual but always in some way in-
act”40, always in process. Deleuze writes: 
 
We cannot say that they exist, but rather that they subsist or inhere (having this minimum of being 
which is appropriate to that which is not a thing, a nonexisting entity). They are not substantives or 
adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions. They 
are “impassive” entities – impassive results. They are not living presents, but infinitives: the 
unlimited Aion, the becoming which divides itself infinitely in past and future and always eludes the 
present.41  
and 
 
The agonizing aspect of the pure event is that it is always and at the same time something which has 
just happened and something about to happen; never something which is happening. … The pure 
event is … never an actuality.42 
 
It is for this reason, because an event cannot be fully choreographed, because it never has a 
predetermined end point43, and that it is only ever experienced in process, that it may only serve, as 
a conceptual framework for architecture, and that it has affective potential.  
 
THE DELEUZEAN EVENT 
 
Deleuze addresses event directly on two occasions: in the Logique du sens (1969) where it is 
discussed alongside sense and nonsense, and related to Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland; and 
in the essay “What is an Event?” (1993) which clearly defines the term, drawing on the philosophy 
of Alfred North Whitehead. The Deleuzean event, when considered in relation to the Tschumian 
definition, but also more generally to the event in event and action theory, differs on a number of 
levels. It is far more complicated in its construction, taking a lot more into consideration than 
Tschumi. The two are not directly interchangeable. Instead, Deleuze allows for an expanded theory 
of event, one which supplements Tschumi’s and has the capacity to account for the blurring of 
bodily and spatial boundaries. Here, event is transformed from the Tschumian conception: pole 
vaulting; bicycling; sky diving etc to that which is ‘actualised’ through these activities. For 
Deleuze, event is a discussion of forces rather than physical happenings. It is the product of the 
coming together of these forces. Therefore “an event does not just mean that "a man has been run 
over." The Great Pyramid is an event, and its duration for a period of one hour, thirty minutes, five 
                                                
38 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction, 126. 
39 See: Mikhail Bakhtin, “Carnival and Carnivalesque,” in Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader, ed. 
John Storey (Essex: Prentice Hall, 1998). Jean Baudrillard also touches upon carnival/ carnivalesque in his 
book Carnaval and Cannibale (2008).  
40 Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts, ed. Brian Massumi and 
Erin Manning, Technologies of Lived Abstraction (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 19. 
41 Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: Continuum, 2004), 7-8. 
42 Ibid., 73. 
43 Events are defined as having terminal-points in event and action theory, in the instance of Tschumi’s 
equation however, where space is coupled with event in unprecedented ways, there is no definite terminal-
point. There is no way of perceiving how and when a cyclist cycling in the laundromat will come to a stop. See, 
Kathleen Gill, ‘On the Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events’ in Roberto Casati and Achille 
C. Varzi, ed., Events, ed. John Skorupski, vol. 15, The International Research Library of Philosophy 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1996), 481. 
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minutes . . . . a passage of Nature, of God, or a view of God.”44 Cliff Stagoll in The Deleuze 
Dictionary (2005) describes the Deleuzean event in the following way: 
 
As the product of the synthesis of forces, events signify the internal dynamic of their interactions. 
As such, on Deleuze’s interpretation, an event is not a particular state or happening itself, but 
something made actual in the State or happening. In other words, an event is the potential immanent 
within a particular confluence of forces.45  
 
An event is neither a beginning nor an end point, but rather always ‘in the middle’. Events 
themselves have no beginning – or end-point, and their relationship with Deleuze’s notion of 
dynamic change – ‘becoming’ – is neither one of ‘joining moments together’ nor one in which an 
event is the ‘end’ of one productive process, to be supplanted or supplemented by the next. Rather, 
becoming ‘moves through’ an event, with the event representing just a momentary productive 
intensity.46  
 
Deleuze in his discussions, references Alfred North Whitehead’s four conditions of event: 
extensions, intensities, individuals or prehensions and eternal objects or ingressions. An extension 
is defined as an instance where an element is stretched over other elements, using these elements in 
effect, as parts to become a whole. “Extension exists when one element is stretched over the 
following ones, such that it is a whole and the following elements are its parts.”47 “Extensions 
effectively are forever moving, gaining and losing parts carried away in movement; things are 
endlessly being altered; even prehensions are ceaselessly entering and leaving variable 
components.”48 These extensions have intrinsic properties as Deleuze writes, “extensive series 
have intrinsic properties (for example, height, intensity, timbre of a sound, a tint, a value, a 
saturation of color)”, properties which “enter on their own account in new infinite series” such that 
they are no longer “extensions but, as we have seen, intensions, intensities, or degrees”,49 and it is 
because of these intrinsic properties, that event has the capacity to alter an architecture. Stated 
differently, events create momentary assemblages. They create compositions of heterogeneous 
organs/ elements that are forever being altered, each of which has intrinsic properties. From this 
perspective, we may not only therefore discuss architecture as an assemblage (of body and space) 
but body and space themselves are assemblages – collections of parts, for they may also be thought 
of as event-based. It is therefore no longer bodies and spaces that are interacting but rather bodily 
and spatial organs. Wholes are formed and fall apart. It is precisely this degree of openness 
afforded by event that accommodates the workings of abject(ion).  
 
The third condition, individuals or prehensions, has to do with creativity and the formation of new 
events. It points to event as an emergent phenomena. An individual is made up of parts and is a 
part, these parts actively interact with each other and affect one another. The relationship that 
forms between these parts is a prehension, which for Whitehead is “any (conscious or unconscious) 
“taking account” of another, such that the prehender is affected by what is prehended.”50 Deleuze 
gives the following example, 
 
First the solitary piano grieved, like a bird abandoned by its mate; the violin heard its wail and 
                                                
44 Gilles Deleuze, "What Is an Event?" in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 76. 
45 Adrian Parr ed., The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 87. 
46 Ibid., 88. 
47 Deleuze, "What Is an Event?", 77. 
48 Ibid., 79. 
49 Ibid., 77. 
50 Lewis S. Ford, “Afterword,” in Explorations in Whitehead’s Philosophy, ed. L.S. Ford and G.L. Kline (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1983), 329. 
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responded to it like a neighbouring tree. It was like the beginning of the world ….51 
 
In the final condition, we learn that objects modify events. They “produce [an] ingression in the 
event.”52 These modifications or ingressions may occur on a number of levels: 
 
Sometimes these can be Qualities, such as a color or a sound that qualifies a combination of 
prehensions; sometimes Figures, like the pyramid, that determine an extension; sometimes they are 
Things, like gold or marble, that cut through a matter.53  
  
It is because eternal objects possess this potential to alter events, that Deleuze sees them as ‘pure 
possibilities’.  
 
A further critical factor in the discussion of event is agency. The traditional definition of event 
calls for an agent, which by extension implies that what has occurred is intentional, “a man is the 
agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional.”54 In this 
definition of the event, the subject has agency, which immediately implies that what we are dealing 
with instead, is an action rather than an event. In philosophy, actions, states, processes and 
conditions,55 are at times interchangeable with event, event becoming an umbrella term. Similarly 
for Tschumi, the word action is often found interwoven in his definition of event, such that his 
equation should really read as: space + event or action = architecture. It is however critical to note 
the distinction between actions and events, as events are not conscious/ intentional acts. For both 
Deleuze and Whitehead, the human body is not necessarily the active component we find in 
Tschumi. The active component may be any body, any body of matter. Abjection is a perfect 
example, as although it pertains to a body – it issues forth from a body, the brain has no or limited 
control over the process. We cannot will our body to menstruate or to stop sweating, at best we can 
help reduce the menstrual flow by sitting with our legs crossed or reduce the excretion of sweat by 
moving to a cooler location. Here, we are not an active agent, rather abjection, the process itself, 
has agency, it is creative/ generative. Events lead to new events because they are perpetually 
changing of their own accord – they are productive. As I am interested in pure events, the word 
event will be used as meaning just that, event, and nothing else. I will however refer to abject(ion) 
as both process and event, as it is both simultaneously. It is a process because it leads to some end 
– the expulsion of an abject, and it is an event as it is an indeterminate happening or occurrence 
that cannot be programmed by the architect. 
 
In extension to this, another marked difference between Tschumi and Deleuze is that Tschumi 
draws a link between event and narrative. This locates event in a structured sequence (that is the 
narrative), hindering the creative potential. Tschumi’s concept of event is however still worth 
referring to, as although he explicitly mentions narrative in the definition of event, and the events 
that he discusses have an agent (a cyclist, pole vaulter, sky diver), his surrealistic juxtapositions of 
space and event do not subscribe to hierarchies or social conventions, they are unpredictable, non-
linear structures, and for this reason parallel certain attributes of the Deleuzean event, functioning 
as a process with no beginning or end point. It is the juxtaposition that destabilizes what would 
otherwise be ordinary spaces and actions.      
 
Although we may say that abjection is an event, it is not possible to directly substitute abjection 
into the Tschumian equation without Deleuzean philosophy acting as an extension, as the equation 
lacks the complexity to accommodate events that physically transgress bodily and spatial 
                                                
51 Deleuze, "What Is an Event?", 80. 
52 Ibid., 79. Brackets mine. 
53 Ibid., 79. 
54 Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 46. 
55 Terence Horgan, “The Case Against Events,” in Events, 243. 
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boundaries – events that require the discussion of parts rather than wholes. Hence what Tschumi 
grants us, is that an event has the capacity to transform an architecture, whether that event is 
abjection or otherwise. Photographing Eileen Gray’s e1027 produces a type of architecture, dusting 
e1027, produces another. Set out to clean modernism: mop the Villa Moller, vacuum the Villa 
Savoye. (fig 3.a) Tschumi’s equation allows for an understanding of how architecture is constituted 
by what would appear perhaps as dismissive or unrelated events and so can be used to point to the 
potential importance of abjection in architecture. Deleuze’s approach then allows one to 
understand the mechanics of abjection, as event, constituting architecture. It comprises of a 
language which explodes Tschumi’s space and event and hence space and body into millions of 
parts that are perpetually moving. Here abjection is truly a discussion of bodies, of indiscernible 
boundaries, of interchangeable organs. Here we may ascertain the precise relationship between 
human and spatial bodies.  
 
THE DELEUZEAN ASSEMBLAGE AND TSCHUMIAN ARCHITECTURE  
 
Tschumi gives us the equation, architecture = space + event, where architecture is understood as 
the beginnings of a Deleuzean assemblage, a heterogeneous configuration of the following 
elements: spatial bodies, human bodies and their events. (fig 3.b) But the Deleuzean assemblage 
works across a number of scales. For example we may move down in scale, where spatial bodies 
and human bodies are assemblages in themselves but at the same time, they are organs of a more 
extensive assemblage that is architecture. Or alternatively up in scale, where architecture as an 
assemblage not only contains assemblages but may enter into assemblages, with, for example, 
society. The Deleuzean assemblage is not a predetermined structure but rather indeterminate. It is a 
temporal grouping of bodies or entities. It is formed through becoming and not closed and static 
systems. Here we get an architecture that is in motion, in flux. In short, an architecture that is 
understood as embodying a range of processes that occur at various scales of perceptibility but that 
is also understood as a grouping of processes that engages with further processes outside itself. 
When abjection is the event in question however, the assemblage becomes constituted not by 
discrete bodies but rather by a massive blur, with abjection obscuring the boundaries between 
bodies. What this brings us back to, is that abject(ion) is not reducible to an isolated expelling 
body, which is precisely where we hit a dead end with Kristeva’s philosophy. One is not able to 
separate the menstruating woman or decomposing building from this composition and hence one is 
unable to set them up in opposition to neither each other nor the clean and proper. 
 
Bataille has a similar conception to Deleuze’s notion of the assemblage as noted in his introduction 
to Visions of Excess (1985), and it is perhaps because of Bataille, who Tschumi referred to 
extensively, that this line of thinking exists, or rather is beginning to take shape in Tschumi:  
 
A man is only a particle inserted in unstable and entangled wholes… the existence of the particle 
can in no way be isolated from this composition56  
 
For Bataille all entities are collections of other entities; there is no simply isolable ipse that would 
represent unitary being. What cells are to a human being, a human being is to that larger organism, 
the community. Being is not simple identity, but rather rupture or disequilibrium, the sudden change 
of levels: being is violent difference, precariousness and heterogeneity in relation to a given stable 
group (“the virulent madness of its autonomy in the total night of the world” [“The Labyrinth”]).57  
 
                                                
56 Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, trans. Allan Stoekl with Carl R. Lovitt 
and Donald M. Leslie Jr., ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse, vol. 14, Theory and History of 
Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 174. 
57 Ibid., xxi. 
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03 vacuum villa savoye 
02 mop moller villa 
01 dust e1027 
(fig 3.a) cleaning modernism
“What type of architecture do we get if we 
substitute the student taking photographs with 
one cleaning the building’s exterior?
Undertake a cleaning expedition. Visit the 
following buildings and clean their facades.”
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(fig 3.b) diagram for the Deleuzean assemblage versus the Tschumian
architecture
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What we arrive at hence with such a volatile process, is that no event of abjection can be 
identically reproduced, no event is ever the same, abject(ion) is not typologically reducible. 
Similarly, no architecture defined by an event can be identically reproduced. Because of this, there 
is a creative potential within events and the perpetual assembling and disassembling of 
assemblages. Abject(ion) produces a heterogeneous architecture – a minoritarian architecture. And 
this architecture cannot be captured. It cannot be assigned a model. It is about the connections that 
are made, broken and remade, it is highly relational. To approach abject(ion) productively is not to 
employ operative words such as instability or volatility in generating a physical building that is 
perpetually shifting, but to immerse oneself in the expulsion, literally. 
 
OCCURRENT ARTS 
 
As a concluding remark, if one is to engage with the process of abjection literally and investigate it 
in terms of what it does, it is worth noting disciplines that can embody such considerations and 
which are relational and event orientated, disciplines such as performance art, interactive art, 
theatre and film, that fall into what Brian Massumi has referred to as the ‘occurrent arts’. For 
Massumi, all arts are in fact occurrent arts, as “any and every perception, artifactual or “natural,” is 
just that, an experiential event”,58 and so anything from a painting to a sculpture, to even a novel, 
creates experiential events to varying degrees. However not all arts are spatial and consist of an 
active exchange between a human bod(y/ies) and a spatial body. It is this criteria that is critical to 
the architect and that has resulted in the above list. These disciplines are not new to architecture, 
they have been a constant reference in the work of Bernard Tschumi, Diller and Scofidio and 
Decoi to name a few, with many architects not only looking to them as conceptual starting points, 
but engaging in collaborations.59 They have not however been implemented in the context of 
abject(ion) architecturally, and yet, this is precisely the approach that abject(ion) could benefit 
from. Deleuze has in fact also commented on the link between performance art, event and 
becoming, as Adrian Parr writes: 
 
Strongly influenced by Antonin Artaud, Dada, the Situationists, Fluxus and Conceptual Art, 
performance art in its early days tended to define itself as the antithesis of theatre, in so far as the 
event was never repeated the same way twice and did not have a linear structure with a clear 
beginning, middle and end. More importantly though, all performance art interrogates the clarity of 
subjectivity, disarranging the clear and distinct positions that the artist, artwork, viewer, art 
institution and art market occupy.60  
 
Theatre and film, which traditionally dealt with choreography and therefore repetition, defying the 
singularity of events, have also since been approached in a way akin to the above quote. It is within 
such exemplars, which follow the fourth Chapter of this thesis, that abject(ion) finds its foothold. It 
is within these exemplars, that we find abjection as event in play.  
 
Despite these arts being useful for exploring abjection as event and for investigating the 
relationships between spatial bodies and human bodies, they have within themselves, an inbuilt 
tendency for operating “on the level of predefined objective function [rather] than fully lived 
                                                
58 The full quote reads: “All arts are occurrent arts. That’s another phrase from Susanne Langer. All arts are 
occurrent arts because any and every perception, artifactual or “natural,” is just that, an experiential event. It’s 
an event both in the sense that is a happening, and in the sense that when it happens something new transpires. 
…every event is utterly singular, a one-off, even though with and through its one-offness a “likeness” is 
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variations.” Massumi, Semblance and Event, 82-3. 
59 As an example of such collaborations, one can look to Belgian choreographer Frédéric Flamand who has 
collaborated with a number of architectural practices over the years. Beth Weinstein, “Flamand and His 
Architectural Entourage,” Journal of Architectural Education 61, (2008): 25-33.  
60 Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary, 25. 
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abstraction”61 as Massumi notes in his Semblance and Event (2011), which problematises the 
singularity of events and their relational potential. There is therefore always the possibility that 
these arts (and Massumi mentions specifically interactive art) will fall into this trap – a trap that in 
fact grows even larger, given the contractual nature of this form of art and the audiences pre-
empting of an experience.62 A few pages further, Massumi asks how this can be avoided, and how 
it can be set up “so that the relational potential it tends towards appears?”63 This question is not 
specific to art. In working with events, architecture must equally ask itself the same question. In 
this context, Massumi actually briefly mentions architecture, and refers to an architecture that 
releases relational potential as, a ‘relational architecture’.  
 
A relational architecture is oriented toward the disseminating end of things, toward potential 
expansion, but is anti-institutional. It unsettles. It pushes the dispositional envelope of the processual 
continuum just mentioned.64  
 
Hence “architecture may itself be practiced relationally”65. The techniques of how exactly this 
works, how the potential is made to appear and reappear, is what Massumi in collaboration with 
Erin Manning call ‘techniques of relation’. There are therefore ways or ‘techniques’ of resolving 
how an event may be spontaneous and uncaused in both art and architecture practice, however to 
understand this, we must wait for Massumi and Manning’s forthcoming paper.66 Massumi does 
however grant us a few points toward the end of his book, clearly noting that the conditions for an 
event are prepared but that the event itself may not be pre-determined, and that it occurs only when 
the elements come together just so:  
 
The elements have to come together just so, in just this disjunctive way, for the effect to lift off. The 
timing has to be right. The elements have to be brought into just the right proximity, in just the right 
way so that they detonate into a self-detaching experiential event. Technique is everything. In fact, 
the technicity of a technique of existence resides in how this is done: how the conditions for the 
event come together. The appearance of the effect is a spontaneous experiential combusting event. 
But the setting-in of the conditions is prepared. Meticulously prepared.67  
 
An event of lived abstraction is strictly speaking uncaused. Its taking-effect is spontaneous: 
experiential self-combustion. It is uncaused, but highly conditioned: wholly dependent on the 
coming-together of its ingredient factors, just so.68  
 
                                                
61 Massumi, Semblance and Event, 46. Brackets mine. 
62 Nicolas Bourriaud in his book Relational Aesthetics writes on the contractual nature of performance art 
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Regardless of not having these techniques of relation mapped out for us, we can still identify works 
that speak to a fully lived abstraction and begin to attempt to understand how they create event-
based architectures.  
 
One last thing must be noted about many of these arts, in particular performance and theatre art, 
and that is, that they attempt to include the audience, they improvise, and hence acknowledge that 
what is at stake is the collective body rather than an individual body.69 A performing body then 
acts: 
 
As the ‘meeting-place’ of the individual and the collective, the site where the private and public 
spheres of everyday life ‘can be traced’, the body is mobilized by artists to activate and, in some 
cases, to erase the division between self and other, body and space.70 
 
It is a version of this collective body, which for architecture would not only entail human bodies 
but also spatial bodies, that becomes of interest. Within architecture, there is still the issue of the 
singular body, of viewing the body and space as distinct, which effectively narrows down the 
possible relationships and exchanges between the two and puts us some thirty years behind when 
these ideas were first prominent in art and philosophy. Direct artistic exemplars are therefore of 
great value, often also probing the materiality of the body, and it is only through these works that 
we depart from scripted performances and approach the precise definition of architecture as an un-
programmable series of events. Massumi therefore rightly notes that space is not the medium of 
architecture, but that ““spatial strategies” create the space of inhabiting experience”, and that “this 
inhabiting event is the medium of architecture. … Architecture is a diagrammatic art of lived 
abstraction: lived-in abstraction, in a quite literal sense.”71 
 
In architecture, abject(ion) as well as abject matter has often also been addressed through the 
medium of space, determining abject(ion) as a static a/object. Further to this, the Kristevan abject 
fails to acknowledge that space (not simply the body) is also implicated in abject(ion). To that end, 
Tschumi’s notion of event has allowed abject(ion) to extend beyond the realm of the body and the 
spatial abject (dust, detritus and decay) into an architecture of process and relations between bodies 
and spaces, where abject(ion) as event comes to constitute architecture. The shortcoming of 
Tschumi’s event however, is that whilst it introduces a processual understanding of architecture, 
and mobilises the body in space, space itself remains static. By contrast, in the instance of 
abject(ion), the movement of bodies is not so much through space, as in place – a movement from 
the inside out – and as per Deleuze, this movement of bodies pertaining as much to the spatial body 
as it does to the human. Deleuze has allowed us to expand Tschumi’s notion of event, to the point 
where architecture becomes an assemblage in which the boundaries of bodies and spaces become 
indiscernible and inseparable. There is no longer a distinction between body, space and abject. The 
task that remains in arriving at a productive understanding of abject(ion) is to address the 
shortcomings of the Kristevan abject and its relegation to the negative, wrong side of the border. 
                                                
69 Amelia Jones has quoted dance historian Karen Schaffman on the explorations of the collective body in 
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4. Abject(ion) as Productive 
 
This Chapter will outline the continued development of a productive understanding of abject(ion), 
and particularly the Kristevan abject and its slippage into dualisms. There has been minimal work 
on the popularised Kristevan concept from this perspective generally, and none architecturally, 
however considering abject(ion) productively, I would argue, has much to contribute to the 
architectural discipline – particularly to the way it thinks about body-space relations.  
 
It is critical to immediately differentiate the usage of the term productive here from its association 
with rendering human excrement useful or recyclable, through re-conceiving or renaming filthy 
matter as trash or waste.1 This form of reappropriation is a very capitalist approach, in that nothing 
that leaves our body is allowed to go to waste but rather everything is attempted to be rendered 
profitable with “bodies inscribed in a new political economy and redefined in terms of profit and 
loss”2 as French psychoanalyst Dominique Laporte in his seminal book Histoire de la Merde 
(1978) comments. Here abject(ion) also becomes a form of what Georges Bataille terms productive 
expenditure and thus a part of homogeneous society, rather than existing within the field of the 
heterogeneous, and through this process, the very attributes that define abject(ion), the very threat 
that it presents to our bodily boundaries is eliminated. The meaning I would prefer to adopt is that 
abject(ion) is productive because of its potentialities for affective experience. What is productive is 
the schism that abject(ion) produces. In Visions of Excess Bataille writes:  
 
3. Depending upon the person heterogeneous elements will provoke affective reactions of varying 
intensity, and it is possible to assume that the object of any affective reaction is necessarily 
heterogeneous (if not generally, at least with regard to the subject). There is sometimes attraction, 
sometimes repulsion, and in certain circumstances, any object of repulsion can become an object of 
attraction and vice versa; 
 
6. In summary, compared to everyday life, heterogeneous existence can be represented as 
something other, as incommensurate, by charging these words with the positive value they have in 
affective experience.3 
 
                                                
1 In the introduction to Filth: Dirt, Disgust, and Modern Life William A. Cohen comments; “anything 
designated filthy cannot be reused, at least until it is renamed or reconceived as waste or trash, which can be 
recycled.” He continues, “but when polluting of filthy objects are thought of as trash, waste, junk, or refuse, 
they become conceivably productive, the discarded sources in which riches may lie, and therefore fecund and 
fertile in their potential.” William A. Cohen and Ryan Johnson, ed., Filth: Dirt, Disgust, and Modern Life 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), x. 
2 Laporte also notes that as long as the shit remains useful, it has not actually left the body, and the body 
therefore remains whole. Dominique Laporte, History of Shit (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2002), 123.  
3 Georges Bataille, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, trans. Allan Stoekl with Carl R. Lovitt and 
Donald M. Leslie Jr., ed. Wlad Godzich and Jochen Schulte-Sasse, vol. 14, Theory and History of Literature 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 142, 143.  
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To approach abject(ion) productively therefore means several things: 1/ that we rethink abject(ion) 
as the negative counterpart; 2/ that we approach it as both process and product (the ambiguity of 
which is central to Kristeva); 3/ that we consider the leaky process as part of an assemblage rather 
than isolating an abjecting body or space; and finally 4/ that we understand abject(ion) as both 
physiological and psychological (this keying into discussions of affect or affectus which for Baruch 
Spinoza is both body and thought4) as well as Gilles Deleuze’s intelligent materialism. The first 
point of departure is to map two models of excretory embodiment, that of Julia Kristeva which 
given her psychoanalytic grounding and interest in cultural abject(ion) reaches a clear limit point, 
and that of Deleuze, whose interest in violent material disassemblies alongside psychological 
disassemblies, moves abject(ion) into the realm of the productive, where we consider abject(ion) 
not solely in terms of what it is, but how it operates, hence moving beyond its historical position. 
Drawing primarily on the philosophy of Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, abject(ion) then 
becomes less a matter of an isolated event pertaining to a body, and instead becomes a matter of 
relations/ connections between various bodies – formations of assemblages to employ Deleuze and 
Guattari’s language. It sets a becoming in motion, and constitutes an architecture with a certain 
immanence.  
 
DELEUZE, KRISTEVA AND EXCRETORY EMBODIMENT 
 
Beginning with Julia Kristeva and her Pouvoirs de l’horreur, as discussed in the second Chapter, 
one encounters a very particular understanding of abject(ion). Within Kristeva’s philosophy, 
abject(ion) is that which crosses the symbolic, it is that which is excluded from language and is 
only ever considered negatively. At its origin, it is tied to the maternal and therefore gendered. It is 
because of this that abject(ion) within the context of Kristevan philosophy struggles to escape its 
association with the feminine, and further the dualistic framework which curtails its workings – 
serving to situate and name it. Where abject(ion) is ‘directly’ addressed in architecture, that is, 
where the words abjection or abject are used, as in many 1980s and 1990s articles, this is precisely 
the understanding we find. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, there are many notable observations that are able to be expanded 
upon: the materiality of abject(ion); abject(ion) as a series of affects, and so on. As an extension to 
Kristeva, one may employ the collaborations of Deleuze and Guattari, along with individual texts 
of Deleuze, such as Spinoza: Philosophie Pratique (1970) and Francis Bacon: Logique de la 
Sensation (1981) to name two key texts. A majority of which, was interestingly published, prior to 
Kristeva’s Pouvoirs de l’horreur.  The work of Deleuze and Guattari as a whole provides a way of 
approaching all bodies void of a dualistic framework. Deleuze’s work then specifically, touches on 
‘abject(ion)’, through his notion of an open and transformative or spasmodic body, which he 
discusses in the work of Francis Bacon. It is through this lens, that the real value of abject(ion) – 
the possibilities of abject(ion), become evident, and they become evident precisely because for the 
first time in architecture, it may be considered productively, rather than being curtailed as the 
negative component of a dualistic framework. Here abject(ion) has agency, it has affective 
potential. Here it truly functions according to its workings – it is volatile, it overflows, it is excess 
rather than lack. Importantly, through Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, abject(ion) may be 
understood as an active process that exists within an intelligent material realm – a realm inclusive 
of all bodies. Hence leaky bodies and non-leaky bodies come to be considered under the same 
rubric. What this line of thinking further allows for in the context of architecture, is a certain 
collapse of distinctions between human bodies and spaces, such that one is not only able to utilise 
                                                
4 Nigel Thrift quotes Spinoza on this point: “By EMOTION (affectus) I understand the modifications of the 
body by which the power of action of the body is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same 
time the idea of these modifications.” Nigel Thrift, "Spatialities of Feeling," in Non-Representational Theory: 
Space, Politics, Affect (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2008), 178. 
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the one framework for discussing expelling human bodies and decomposing spaces, but one is in 
fact able to explore the exchanges of matter from one to the other. Abject(ion) then becomes about 
the formulation of temporal connections or momentary linkages between bodies, rather than about 
polluting or dirtying another body.  
 
Now, even though (as we learnt in the first Chapter) the body in architecture is still to a large 
degree taken as whole, territorialised and organised – as an organism, particularly when one 
considers that prominent contemporary texts on experience are phenomenological, such as those by 
Juhani Pallasmaa, the notion of an open or transformative body, and the conception of things as per 
Deleuze, is nothing new. It has in fact been prominent since the 1990s, through articles such as, 
Robert McAnulty’s “Body Troubles” (1992), Georges Teyssot’s “The Mutant Body of 
Architecture” (1994), Greg Lynn’s “Multiplicitous and Inorganic Bodies” (1992), “Body Matters” 
(1998), and more recently, Arakawa and Madeline Gins’ Architectural Body (2002), and Eva Perez 
de Vega’s “Experiencing Built Space: Affect and Movement” (2010), to name a few. What these 
articles present, is the possibility for a non-dialectical position in architecture, they open up the 
possibility for working with the in-between, and as Greg Lynn notes: 
 
With a less whole and wholesome paradigm of the body, not only do typologies become dispersed, 
but moreover, their interiors open to productive alliances. That is to say, spatial bodies other than 
the ideal types are brought into affiliations with systems outside of their boundaries, where their 
determinacy at any point in time is available to the influences of external events.5  
 
Even though these writings at times draw on similar lines of thinking, and share an affinity with the 
work here, they are in no way concerned with abject(ion). What is interesting to note at this point 
about the timeframe within which a majority of these writings sit however, is that there was a lot of 
work published on abject(ion) and its associated areas within this same period of the 1990s. For 
me, this then begs the question: if there has been a model for the transformative body for the same 
period of time that abject(ion) has been actively discussed in architecture, why hasn’t one informed 
the other? I would suggest that it is perhaps a lack of investigation into excretory models beyond 
Kristeva, which precisely points to the criticality of a secondary model of excretory embodiment.  
 
To understand the fundamental distinction between Kristeva’s notion of the abject, and the notion 
of the abject that Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari allow for, one needs to look to the way the 
subject/ ‘I’ figures in both. For Deleuze, particularly as elaborated on in his Logique de la 
Sensation, the body repeatedly attempts to escape the organism – the particular organisation of 
organs that may be understood as constituting the subject, the ‘I’, in short, the body attempts to 
escape the ‘I’. In Kristeva instead, the other is expelled in order to reaffirm the ‘I’, this expelled 
other (the abject) then having the potential to also threaten our subjectivity. Kelly Pendergrast, who 
discusses Deleuze and Kristeva in parallel, and whose article “Flows of Power” (2007) is highly 
useful in considering abject(ion) across the two philosophers, suggests that the point of distinction 
is that there is no ‘I’ as such in Deleuze which allows for a productive reading. She writes, “the 
essential difference between the Kristevan and the Deleuzean description of bodies is that, for 
Deleuze, there is no “I” at the root of all of this, and therefore no issues of identity and repression”6 
When Deleuze therefore writes, “it is not I who attempt to escape from my body, it is the body that 
attempts to escape from itself by means of…in short, a spasm: the body as plexus, and its effort or 
waiting for a spasm”7 such a claim is substantiated. The absence of ‘I’ Pendergrast continues, 
allows us to move beyond a dualistic model where the expulsion is defined as other than ‘I’, and it 
                                                
5 Greg Lynn, "Multiplicitous and Inorganic Bodies," Assemblage 19 (1992): 36. 
6 Kelly Pendergrast, "Flows of Power: Rethinking the Abject in Ousmane Sembène's Xala," Octopus Journal 3 
(Fall 2007): 78. 
7 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 15. 
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is precisely because of this that the leaky body gains agency, therefore resulting in a scenario 
where body (and in our case space) become coupled with the abject and all may be considered 
under the same rubric. Although the article as a whole is constructive to the discussion at hand and 
it is precisely such an approach that is sought, there is a major fault in making such a claim, for 
Deleuze’s approach to ‘I’ is far more complicated.8  
 
Deleuze is interested more in moving ‘beyond’ the organism and its inherent framework of 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis, in a reconfiguration of the organism, rather than disregarding 
this structuring of the body, which is tied to subjectivity and hence ‘I’.9 For Deleuze, “a body need 
not have the hierarchical and dominating organisation of organs we call an ‘organism’”10, 
nevertheless, he makes it explicit that in his references to Bacon, the body escaping itself is in fact 
an escape from the organism, “the way the body escapes from itself; that is, the way it escapes 
from the organism”11. Therefore, it is not so much that there is no ‘I’, but rather that the body 
escapes the imposed organisation that is the organism, and which is akin to the subject – the ‘I’, “a 
centralised, hierarchised, self-directed body.”12 The subject has an organised body. When 
becoming-other, the subject deterritorialises their organism through the procedure of a BwO, hence 
becoming de-subjectivised and impersonal. The organism for Deleuze is a unifying agent. It unifies 
the organs according to select criteria, manifesting a certain hierarchy in the process. This ordering 
of organs is a particular construction, one of an infinite number of possible constructions and as 
such is viewed by Deleuze and Guattari as constricting. Adrian Parr in The Deleuze Dictionary 
writes: 
 
The organism as unifying emergent effect is a stratum on the Body without Organs (BwO), it is 
hence a construction, a certain selection from the virtual multiplicity of what a body can be, and 
therefore a constraint imposed on the BwO13 
 
As a body void of this organisation Deleuze and Guattari propose the BwO, a body defined by 
indeterminate organs. Deleuze writes:  
 
In fact, the body without organs does not lack organs, it simply lacks the organism, that is, this 
particular organization of organs. The body without organs is thus defined by an indeterminate 
organ, whereas the organism is defined by determinate organs14  
 
The body needs to escape precisely because it has been forcefully organised and confined into a 
subjective system. What Pendergrast is correct about, is that there is a distinction between Deleuze 
and Kristeva. For Deleuze it is about a boiling over and a search for a productive subjectivity, for 
Kristeva it is primarily about a cleansing, but also a staining if the system fails. “The main action 
here is not a spewing out of the self which becomes the abject not-self as in Kristeva, but the 
body’s spastic desire to force itself through an opening or orifice and into its surroundings. A 
boiling over, not a cleansing.”15 What this essentially leads us back to however, is that if there is an 
‘I’ in the equation even for Deleuze, how does one avoid falling into a dualistic model where 
abject(ion) is inherently negative?  
 
                                                
8 Academic Hanjo Berressem who I refer to below also makes these distinctions. Particularly towards the end 
of his article “On the Matter of Abjection”. 
9 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 44. 
10 Adrian Parr, ed. The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 32. 
11 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 50. 
12 Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary, 195. 
13 Ibid., 195. 
14 Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 47. 
15 Pendergrast, "Flows of Power," 79. 
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Although Deleuze and Guattari critique the subject, and certainly the phenomenological, stable, 
centred subject, they repeatedly point out that we cannot be entirely without a subject position 
which would bring on death and madness. If only for this reason then, there is always a ‘subject’ 
present to a degree. Where Kristeva however sets the abject in opposition to the subject, retaining it 
as a stable and organised entity, Deleuze attempts to reconfigure the subject, to set its various 
organs in motion, in this way, there are no clear distinctions between singularities, all relations are 
constantly variable. It is because all is in motion for Deleuze, that bodies, spaces and abjects are no 
longer discrete entities but indeterminate organs of a given assemblage. And it is for this reason, 
that it becomes impossible to classify abject(ion) as negative. 
 
Further, it is perhaps possible to discuss abject(ion) productively, even in the presence of the 
subject, as it is first and foremost a physiological process even before it is maternal as Kristeva 
insists. It is a necessary physiological process which exists in order for the body to be, and it has at 
this primitive stage nothing to do with subjectivity. It is purely about the body expelling that which 
it has exhausted all possible nutrients from, in order that it may rejoin the field of material 
structure, and because it is an uncontrollable expulsion, abjection temporarily overrides the subject. 
The body does not actively perform an action within a space, something uncontrollable is expelled 
from the body, informing the location within space and precise movements that the body performs. 
The body is re-organised through an unconscious spasm. 
 
What I would like to pose, is that both philosophical models are useful in looking at abject(ion), 
and that one may employ the philosophies in different ways, that is, we may utilise Kristeva in 
order to approach abject(ion) from the perspective of the subject/ ‘I’ and thus come to understand 
the meaning it has acquired, and on the other hand, we may utilise Deleuze (and further his 
collaborations with Guattari) in discussing abject(ion) as a multiplicity of bodies but also learn how 
to reconfigure the subject. The two consistently overlap, and in order to approach abject(ion) in its 
entirety, both must be considered.  
 
Essentially, what the Deleuzean model provides that the Kristevan one cannot is a way of looking at 
all bodies as parts of the same construct, to be linked or decoupled in strategic or momentary ways.16  
 
PHYSIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES 
 
We have seen through Kristeva’s philosophy that much of the power that abject(ion) poses, comes 
from the meaning that it has attained, and the threat that it presents to the notion of the body as 
subject – as a static, whole, and clean and proper entity. This threat is psychological. It pertains to 
psychological boundaries. The first of which is the boundary between self and (m)other, which 
must be crossed in order for the body to enter the Symbolic realm and thus acquire language. This 
is for Kristeva, the initial abject(ion) a body undergoes in order to become a subject. Abject(ion) 
however also pertains to physical/ material boundaries, as it is a physiological process of 
elimination. Every time a body expels itself from the inside out, a physical boundary is crossed (or 
diluted) and matter is transferred. We can see this summarised in a 1941 article by A. Angyal 
“Disgust and Related Aversions”: “the nature of the repulsion which one experiences with regard 
to the wastes of the body is related to the meanings which are attached to them.”17 He continues, 
“It was found that the objects of disgust are the wastes of the body, to which a meaning of baseness 
is attached; analogously the waste products are also biologically inferior substances. The reaction 
                                                
16 Pendergrast, "Flows of Power," 81-82. 
17 A. Angyal, "Disgust and Related Aversions," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 36, no. 3 (July 
1941): 397. My emphasis. 
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of the organism toward these substances is, physiologically, elimination, and, psychologically, 
aversion.”18  
 
Deleuze on the other hand, is interested in both, he is “interested in abjects and their relation to 
violent material disassemblies, such as biological death/disorganization, of living systems”19, as 
well as, a psychological disassembly or indiscernibility that is at play through his notion of 
becoming, which as Alice Jardine writes, means that “to be caught up in a “becoming animal” … 
[is] not that one will resemble either Man or the Animal, but, rather, that each will 
“deterritorialize” the other.”20 For Deleuze, it is about a fluctuation between the material and 
psychic registers, it is about the psycho-physical projective plane, as this is key to his notion of an 
open subjectivity. This is also something that Elaine Scarry has put very succinctly, in speaking 
about ‘unmaking’ the human body (the subject), writing that in “the “unmaking” of the human 
being…the in part naturally “given” and in part “made” body is deconstructed.”21 Deleuze’s 
thinking is further processual, which means that it is not so much a matter of crossing boundaries, 
but rather a matter of open-endedness, where boundaries have become diluted and where single 
figures are already coupled or heterogeneous figures i.e. in the case of Bacon, man-animal. Thus 
through Deleuze, one is able to engage abject(ion)’s two-fold indiscernibility, and move from a 
process that merely threatens us, to a process that reconfigures discrete entities such as bodies and 
spaces, and therefore reconfigures their relations. In this way, abject(ion) may be understood as a 
way of attaining an open subjectivity. It is also perhaps because of this, that Deleuze dedicates an 
entire book to the spasmodic bodies of Francis Bacon. 
 
I do not mean to suggest here that Kristeva does not consider abject(ion) within the realm of 
materiality, she in fact stresses this point, but that given the psychoanalytic framework through 
which she unravels abject(ion), these aspects remain unexplored. Hanjo Berressem who is another 
academic having delved into the philosophies of Deleuze and Kristeva in the area of abject(ion), 
recapitulates this adequately: 
 
although Kristeva would be the first to stress that abjects have to do with the realm of materiality 
and although she has been seminal in opening up the Lacanian logic to matters of the body, she does 
not truly address these levels because her critique of Lacan’s neglect of the pre-symbolic Semiotic 
and of the pre-symbolic chora remains fully within the frame of the Lacanian topologics, in which 
materiality is recuperated only in/as language and in which abjects are considered only negatively as 
things fundamentally excluded from language and representation – precisely as the unspeakable 
grounds of abjection. The limit is always that of primal repression.22 
 
Perhaps the most important thing that a dilution of boundaries or an open-endedness allows for, is 
a discussion of proximity. The reason why abject(ion) has the effect that it does, is because 
typically, objects are kept at a distance from our bodies and understood as outside of us. Abjection 
however brings the object within an overwhelming proximity to our body, to the extent that the 
object disappears both physically and psychologically. Put a different way, abject(ion) then not 
only reconfigures our still prevalent notions of space as object, a constant against which we as 
subjects can situate ourselves and measure our variation, and us as subject, us as centre and as 
                                                
18 Angyal, "Disgust and Related Aversions," 403. 
19 Hanjo Berressem, “On the Matter or Abjection,” in The Abject of Desire: The Aestheticization of the 
Unaesthetic in Contemporary Literature and Culture, ed. Konstance Kutzbach and Monika Mueller (New 
York: Rodopi, 2007), 41. 
20 Alice A. Jardine, Gynesis: Configurations of Woman and Modernity (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 215. Brackets mine. 
21 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), 122. 
22 Berressem, “On the Matter or Abjection,” 39. 
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distinct from our environment, but also reconfigures the body and space physically through the 
transference of matter. This interestingly brings on a feeling of nausea for philosopher Jean-Paul 
Sartre: 
 
Objects should not touch because they are not alive. You use them, put them back in place, you live 
among them: they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it is unbearable. I am afraid of being 
in contact with them as though they were living beasts.23  
 
His blue cotton shirt stands out joyfully against a chocolate-coloured wall. That too brings on the 
Nausea. The Nausea is not inside me: I feel it out there in the wall, in the suspenders, everywhere 
around me. It makes itself one with the café, I am the one who is within it.24  
 
Through abjection, the smells, textures and physical forms of our body, space and this excrement 
leaking out, become fused together. We become a part of the space, the space becomes a part of us. 
We form a multiplicitous assemblage, where individual elements are blurred, and together, begin to 
act as a kind of whole, but a whole that is not fixed, as the assemblage “also has a side facing a 
body without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism”25. We can almost formulate a 
kind of parasitic analogy, where abjection spreads through space, infiltrating and attaching itself to 
or soaking into space, but it has not yet entirely left the body either and so it is this substance that is 
strung between body and space. Whether abject(ion) issues forth from a human body, a space, or 
any other entity, it sets the whole world in motion, and instigates a chain of exchanges. In a sense, 
we come to occupy a state similar to that of the schizophrenic (who Deleuze and Guattari refer to), 
where our personal space increases, and objects to a certain distance become a part of our body, or 
we become a part of them, literally.  
 
ARCHITECTURE WITHOUT ORGANS 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned the BwO and the role it plays in the notion of an open 
subjectivity. But how are abject(ion) and the BwO related? And further, where does architecture 
come into this equation? The BwO is a concept that originates from Antonin Artaud’s 1947 radio 
play “To Have Done with the Judgement of God”. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the virtual 
dimension of the body – a set of potentialities that may be activated through becoming. It is a body 
understood as process that is continually constructing and deconstructing connections. In the 
introduction to Deleuze’s translated version of Critique et clinique (1993), Daniel W. Smith writes: 
 
But for Deleuze, the body without organs is not something that exists “before” the organism; it is 
the intensive reality of the body, a milieu of intensity that is “beneath” or “adjacent to” the organism 
and continually in the process of constructing itself.26 
 
To speak of process and the continual construction and deconstruction of connections, is to 
implicate numerous entities between which these connections are made, and to therefore speak of 
heterogeneity. For this reason, the BwO is heterogeneous, it is a model of zero intensity – “The 
body without organs is the model of death”27 and “every becoming itself becomes a becoming-
                                                
23 Jean- Paul Sartre, Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1959), 19. 
24 Ibid., 31. 
25 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London:  
Continuum, 2004), 4. 
26 Daniel W. Smith, “Introduction” in Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), xxxvii. 
27 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Helen 
R. Lane and Mark Seem (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 329. 
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death!”28 Being heterogeneous, the BwO may not be conceived of as a whole with an established 
hierarchy of organs, but rather as a series of organs void of organisation.  
 
The body without organs is in fact produced as a whole, but a whole alongside the parts – a whole 
that does not unify or totalize them, but that is added to them like a new, really distinct part.29 
 
The BwO may be produced or mobilised in various ways. One can find examples of these again in 
Deleuze’s analysis of Bacon, as well as in the excerpt “How do you make yourself a body without 
organs” from L'Anti-Œdipe: Capitalisme et Schizophrénie (1972), which details instructions from a 
masochist to his mistress. In art, numerous other examples come to mind: Hans Bellmer, Berlinde 
de Bruyckere and Orlan. What Bellmer and Bruyckere’s work brings to the fore through Bellmer’s 
reconfiguration of life-sized dolls and Bruyckere’s reconfiguration of animals, is that the BwO 
does not necessarily have to pertain to the human body, but may extend to the inanimate and 
animal. French artist Orlan is intriguing on another level, for her ‘literal’ manifestations of a BwO. 
Through subjecting herself to a series of medical operations since the beginning of the 1990s, 
Orlan has blurred the boundary between interior and exterior, physically deforming/ manipulating 
her body to the extent that it becomes impossible to return to a theological (whole) body. For her, 
the body is “no longer … the ideal it once represented”30. In her “Manifeste de l’art Charnel” Orlan 
wrote:  
 
I can observe my own body cut open, without suffering!... I see myself all the way down to my 
entrails; a new mirror stage ... I can see to the heart of my lover; his splendid design has nothing to 
do with sickly sentimentalities ... Darling, I love your spleen; I love your liver; I adore your 
pancreas, and the line of your femur excites me.31  
 
Abject(ion) easily slips amongst these as a way of producing a BwO. Through abject(ion), 
boundaries are disrupted, the expulsions leaving our body forge connections with once outside and 
foreign entities. The gaping body becomes a series of organs that are no longer bound into a 
coherent whole but instead available for exchange.  
 
Within architecture, the body is generally viewed as whole, unified and ideal, a point that Greg 
Lynn summed up clearly in his article “Body Matters” (1998) and that still stands to this day:  
 
Since the time of Vitruvius, the whole concept of architecture has been dependent on the model of a 
unified body. Only the characteristics of whole bodies are described in terms of architecture: any 
particular body is rejected in favor of all bodies in general. There are many variations of ideal or 
whole bodies in architecture, all of which result from a search for a universal model of symmetry 
and proportion for the regulation of whole bodies. Because of its desire for a holistic model of the 
body – one that is essentially static – only bodies that can be ideally reduced through a process of 
division to whole numbers are acknowledged in architecture.32  
 
In order to be able to explore the full implications of abject(ion) however, one needs to be more 
flexible with their thinking, and not merely with how we think about the body, but also space, for 
despite comments such as those by David Leatherbarrow and Mohsen Mostafavi or Sanford 
Kwinter within the discipline, space is still equally for the most part considered as a whole, discrete 
entity, and as static. It is therefore critical to set both body and space in motion. Space has to come 
                                                
28 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 330. 
29 Ibid., 327. 
30 Orlan, “‘Carnal Art’ Manifesto,” http://www.orlan.net/adriensina/manifeste/carnal.html, (accessed August 3, 
2012). 
31 Ibid.  
32 Greg Lynn, "Body Matters," in Folds, Bodies & Blobs: Collected Essays (Bruxelles: La Lettre Volée, 1998), 
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apart, because if it doesn’t, it is still an object against which we can define and orientate ourselves, 
we are still in a state of being/ dwelling, and further and more importantly, as space is an extension 
of our personhood, it remaining intact, symbolises the prevalence of the subject. If either subject or 
object remain intact there is nothing in motion, we are static. It is for this reason that Elizabeth 
Grosz suggested in 2001 that, “space itself needs to be reconsidered in terms of multiplicity, 
heterogeneity, activity, and force. Space is not simply an ether, a medium through which other 
forces, like gravity, produce their effects: it is inscribed by and in its turn inscribes those objects 
and activities placed within it.”33 
 
Under these circumstances, abject(ion) then not only facilitates a BwO but an Architecture without 
Organs (AwO). Body being neither singular nor merely human. As the BwO is a body void of an 
organising system, subsequently, an AwO is an architecture void of an organising system. What 
this means is that the structure of spaces and bodies has been disrupted and therefore their relation 
to each other as discrete entities. Abjection causes the body and space to be temporarily 
reorganised such that their separate organs become intertwined – a new assemblage. It is because 
the BwO is heterogeneous, that it has as its organs both those of space and the human body – a 
temporal body composed of indeterminate organs. In this sense, Georges Teyssot quotes Georges 
Canguilhem on the Greek word organon, which designates both human organs and mechanical 
organs.34 By extension, an organ in architecture may therefore be either human or spatial. This new 
assemblage is as much physical as it is psychical and with it there is therefore, both a physical 
indiscernibility of boundaries between body and space, as well as a psychological indiscernibility 
of subject-object.  
 
Abject(ion) is therefore a specific way of reaching zero intensity – the momentary juxtaposition of 
the abjecting human body and spatial body opening up an infinite number of possible connections 
between the two. Here the connections are infinite but also specific, as they are set in motion by a 
specific process – namely abjection. Abject(ion) activates a specific series of potentialities 
(movements, connections, affects) that would otherwise remain suppressed. And it is through its 
leaky nature that it inevitably comes to encompass bodies not a body. It allows us to extend the 
Deleuzean becomings between human bodies and animals (becoming-woman, becoming-horse 
etc.), to becomings between human bodies and spatial bodies – Comte de Lautréamont’s 
becoming-lamp: 
 
He seizes the lamp to carry it outside but it resists, grows in size. He seems to see wings at its sides, 
and the upper part assumes the form of an angel’s torso. The whole thing tries to rise, to take flight, 
but with firm hand he holds it back. A lamp and an angel forming one and the same body – that’s 
something one doesn’t often see. He recognises the shape of the lamp; he recognises the shape of 
the angel; but cannot separate them in his mind. Indeed, in reality they merge one with the other, 
and form only one free and independent body.35  
 
THE LOGIC OF SENSATION OR THE SPASMODIC BODY 
 
To begin to understand more specifically how bodies are reconfigured through the process of 
abjection, one must look to Deleuze’s Logique de la Sensation. Logique de la Sensation is the only 
instance where Deleuze addresses abject(ion) directly. In saying this, although abjection is clearly 
present from vomiting to excreting, to even the scream, it is important to point out that Deleuze 
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does not denote these as such, but rather uses the word spasm, which by definition, is an 
involuntary contraction, and entails things such as making love. A spasming body, is therefore not 
always an abjecting body. In the case of Bacon however, more often than not, it is a matter of 
abject(ion). This spasmodic body as Pendergrast has noted, “functions as a kind of variation on the 
abject”, and hence provides a secondary model of excretory embodiment adjacent to Kristeva.36  
 
The book is less an analysis of Bacon’s work in the traditional sense, and more a mapping out of 
the workings of spasmodic bodies. It is a mapping of the logic, of sensation. In it, Deleuze 
introduces an aesthetic Figure, the ‘athletic body’, which is unlike the athletic body of Le 
Corbusier that appears in select photographs, an ideal and masculine body, but rather is an eruptive 
body, a body in turmoil that attempts to spastically force itself through a conduit (be it spatial or 
bodily, or both), in an attempt to “escape from itself”37. More specifically, Deleuze writes that the 
body escapes the organism through various holes/ orifices: open mouth or anus, stomach, throat, 
circle in washbasin, point of umbrella etc38. The body escapes literally and figuratively, through 
orifices or conduits that may be either spatial or bodily or both. Given that the body escapes 
through such orifices, an escape that is manifest through spasm, one may pose the question, what 
does space escape through? Do similar orifices exist for space as for the body?  
 
In Deleuze’s discussions, space plays an important role and is always there, unlike for Kristeva. It 
is never however in a moment of spasm or abjection. In fact, in the work of Bacon, space is a 
‘constant’ (although I am hesitant to use this word), a support structure or armature, which 
necessarily remains so in order for the deformation of the body to be measured. It serves as an 
attendant-Figure, a Figure against which the deformation of the passive and active-Figures is 
measured. This attendant-Figure does not necessarily have to be, but is for the most part, spatial 
e.g. the circle of a circus ring. The approach to space would then almost seem to echo that of 
Tschumi, where the body is understood as variable and space is static, which as I have noted 
before, gets us only half-way. Space as an attendant-Figure however, does not automatically mean 
that it does not undergo any alteration at all. And this is one of the most useful things that 
Deleuze’s book suggests for architecture – the fact that space is not only implicated but also 
reconfigured in instances of bodily abject(ion), and that therefore by extension, bodies are 
reconfigured in instances of spatial abject(ion).  
 
The Figure Deleuze writes, “is the body without organs”, it is in a state of becoming, and in 
becoming-imperceptible, it disappears.39 An attendant-Figure is therefore equally in a state of 
becoming, as is a passive or active-Figure, and is in fact always “on the verge of springing up or 
falling down, becoming active or passive”40, the prefix referring merely to the Figure’s momentary 
state. It would seem, if we take any of the spatial examples, for instance the circus ring, that what 
occurs to space in this state of becoming, is that certain parts of it are left behind, while others 
remain i.e. the ‘circle’ of the circus remains and is painted by Bacon, not the whole circus. That is, 
select parts or organs of the space pertinent to the event of the abjecting body are brought to the 
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fore. There is intrinsic to this, quite evidently, a reorganisation of space – of its parts, where 
momentary linkages with other entities are formed. What becomes interesting is which organs are 
isolated from the whole. There seems to be a pattern where, the organs more often than not, take 
the form of an orifice through which the body may escape: circle of circus ring, circle in 
washbasin, point of umbrella. These then get overlapped with the orifices of the expelling body: 
open mouth, anus, stomach, throat, in such a way that bodily and spatial orifices become 
intertwined and one is unable to tell where one body begins and the other ends. The orifices, which 
serve as indeterminate organs formed during the process of abjection, themselves also become 
indiscernible – the circle in the washbasin bleeds into the mouth. This overlapping is a tactic that 
functions to illustrate the connections between bodies and spaces, and is something that also exists 
in varying forms through the work of Catherine Breillat, Matthew Barney, and Georges Bataille. In 
a scene of Breillat’s Anatomie de l’enfer for example, the menstruating vagina, the glass infused 
with the used tampon and the open mouths (his and hers) that ingest the contents of the glass, 
become indiscernible. Momentarily, one cannot distinguish between the leaky vaginal orifice, the 
blood filled mouths and the circle of the glass out of which the blood infused liquid flows. This is a 
becoming, in which both body and space are implicated.  
 
When such events take place, and bodies and spaces are drawn out of themselves and into one 
another, it becomes relatively easy to understand architecture as a mobile mass - an assemblage of 
moving parts, that shifts with each subtle difference and that is contingent on the relations between 
these parts. Abjection then not only allows us to see this, but functions as the process that does this 
shifting. It presents itself as an uncontrollable re-organisational strategy, whose only aim is to 
allow bodies to “rejoin the field of material structure”41. And this sits precisely in the middle of a 
material area that encompasses Deleuze’s ‘intelligent materialism’ as well as Bataille’s notion of 
‘base matter’, an area that Greg Lynn noted as being ignored in architecture in the 1990s, and that 
is still largely underdeveloped. “This whole architectural concept ignores the intricate local 
behaviors of matter and their contribution to the composition of bodies.”42 Architecture is designed 
to fight the attempts (particularly of space) at rejoining the field of material structure, but spaces 
and bodies, when left purely to their own devices, strive for just this. If space were constructing 
itself, it would put all the weatherboards upside down to hasten this union. Lautréamont has long 
known of the intricate local behaviours of matter and therefore of the potential that abject(ion) 
holds: 
 
I am filthy. Lice gnaw me. Swine, when they look at me, vomit. The scabs and sores of leprosy have 
scaled my skin, which is coated with yellowish pus. I know not river water nor the clouds’ dew. 
From my nape, as from a dungheap, sprouts an enormous toadstool with umbelliferous peduncles. 
Seated on a shapeless chunk of furniture, I have not moved a limb for four centuries. My feet have 
taken root in the soil forming a sort of perennial vegetation – not yet quite plant-life though no 
longer flesh – as far as my belly, and filled with vile parasites…43  
 
PROCESSES 
 
What Deleuze’s description of Bacon’s bodies and spaces reiterates, is his belief in the world as 
process44. Deleuze wrote in 1989, “I have, it’s true, spent a lot of time writing about this notion of 
event: you see, I don’t believe in things.”45 This non-belief in things, and instead a belief in 
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process, is one of the key distinctions between not only Deleuze and Kristeva, but further also 
architecture, where although process is a common word, the thinking is not processual in a 
Deleuzean sense. In architecture, process spans between discrete entities. For Deleuze, as well as 
Guattari, these entities are also processes. Although Deleuze and Guattari’s processual thinking has 
been touched on throughout the thesis, I would like to be very explicit here about what it affords 
us, and that is, rather than approaching abject(ion) as a process that moves amongst discrete 
entities, approaching it as a process amongst other processes. Allowing therefore, for a discussion 
of relations between what would otherwise be unrelated entities. Such an approach sets down a 
path of volatility, which is precisely what is necessary in order to explore the full potential of 
abject(ion) and allow abject(ion) to literally overflow. It avoids in other words, a simplistic 
rendering of abject(ion).  
 
There is one instance in architecture, where abject(ion) and Deleuze and Guattari cross paths. In a 
presentation at the “Writing Architecture” conference in 201046, architect, academic, Cathy Smith, 
presented a paper on the making and remaking of her workers cottage. She spoke about the process 
the cottage went through, referring to the work of Deleuze and Guattari, particularly their notion of 
the artisan and the flow of matter. What was interesting in the presentation, was the number of 
times that this engagement with the flow of matter resulted in abject references or rather in a 
discussion of abject processes, whether this was spatial abject(ion) such as decomposition of wall 
and ceiling linings, or bodily abject(ion) such as her children’s bodily fluids leaking through the 
gaps between the timber floorboards:  
 
…the wall-becoming-fence, partially made of broomsticks, dissolved gradually into the earth with 
bacterial assistance. 
…the space became one of colicky vomit dripping onto shoulders and floors, seeking out the cracks 
between the tongues of the floorboards and returning to the damp clay below.47 
 
She pointed out that the cottage was not able to be read as a whole and static object, as it was 
remade so many times that instead, the inhabiting bodies became constants to a degree. Here not 
only do the leaking fluids and bacterial dissolution begin to suggest a zone of proximity – of 
physical indiscernibility between body and space, but the perpetual remaking of the cottage that 
took place over several years, means that it is never an end product. It throws space as a constant 
(and discrete entity) into question, and we can only approach the cottage in transition – as a 
process. But the cottage, irrespective of its remaking, is also a volatile body in its own right, 
perpetually in flux, as David Malouf recalls: 
 
A complex assembly: of organs, nerve-ends, bones, cartilage, muscle. An experience machine, that 
observes, thinks, smells, attends, touches. It learns to listen in this forest for the creaking of familiar 
boards that is the approach of this or that sharer of the house, and as the day’s heat ebbs and the old 
house-frame resettles, marks the distance we have moved into night. It gets cramps and growing-
pains; it sweats, stinks, grumbles; but at certain intangible contacts, it soars till it might be angelic 
gifted with unique, undeniable powers – of flight, of change, of eternal instant being. It is always in 
a state of becoming.48 
 
To understand both human bodies and spaces as process – the world as process, allows for a much 
more fluid field, where one may not only map relations between what would otherwise be 
unrelated entities, but where any component within that process may attain agency. There is then 
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no abjection as process, no architecture as process in isolation, all is process and all is perpetually 
shifting to varying degrees.  
 
To think processually has meant a whole new vocabulary for Deleuze and Guattari, a vocabulary 
that in fact has its own dictionary. Within this vocabulary there are a number of terms key to the 
discussion at hand, a majority of which have already been referred to. Amongst these terms there 
are two in particular that feature at length in the subsequent chapter and that are closely linked to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a plane of immanence. It is these that I would like to expand on 
here. 
 
ASSEMBLAGE 
 
In the process of abjection, human bodies and spaces contract, dilate, descend. Waves and flows 
pass through and over them, constituting assemblages of intertwined organs, tracing levels and 
zones of varying amplitude. Through abjection in other words, assemblages are formed.  
 
Assemblage, in its general meaning, refers to an aggregate or collection of things. For Deleuze and 
Guattari it is a relatively loosely defined term and assumes two words in French: agencement 
(layout), and dispositif (device, apparatus), both of which have been translated as assemblage. An 
assemblage may be concrete, or it may be fluid as in the BwO. It may last for a second, or a 
number of years. And importantly it traverses a range of scales, such that one assemblage may be 
enfolded in another, and another, and so on. It is a multiplicity. There are many examples of 
assemblages, Deleuze and Guattari give us the book:  
 
A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very different 
dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working of matters, and the 
exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a beneficent God to explain geological movements. In 
a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but also 
lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. Comparative rates of flow on 
these lines produce phenomena of relative slowness and viscosity, or, on the contrary, of 
acceleration and rupture. All this, lines and measurable speeds constitutes an assemblage. A book is 
an assemblage of this kind, and as such is unattributable. It is a multiplicity – but we don't know yet 
what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, after it has been elevated to the 
status of the substantive. One side of a machinic assemblage faces the strata, which doubtless make 
it a kind of organism, or signifying totality, or determination attributable to a subject; it also has a 
side facing a body without organs, which is continually dismantling the organism, causing 
asignifying particles or pure intensities or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects what it leaves 
with nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity.49 
 
Architecture in a similar sense is an assemblage, an assemblage of bodies and spaces, which 
themselves are assemblages. As an assemblage has a side facing the BwO, it lacks organization, 
drawing various disparate elements into itself. It is in short, heterogeneous, and may be composed 
not only of bodies, spaces, animals, plants, etc, but of lines, movements and intensities. Which 
highlights once again the possibility of addressing bodies and spaces simultaneously and with a 
common language. To be more specific, and given Deleuze and Guattari’s processual thinking, the 
architectural assemblage however is not between a body and space, that is, between discrete 
entities, but rather between the processes that constitute those entities. When abjection is one of 
those processes, a very particular assemblage manifests itself, where boundaries are disrupted, 
connections made, and zones of proximity that are otherwise absent are reached. Abject(ion) 
causes an inherent schism on a physical and psychological level. It opens bodies to one another, it 
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opens up bodies for exchange, such that they are in a perpetual process of being made and unmade 
– unfinished bodies in the sense of François Rabelais’ grotesque body, Mikhail Bakhtin writes: 
 
The grotesque body, as we have often stressed, is a body in the act of becoming. It is never finished, 
never completed; it is continually built, created, and builds and creates another body. Moreover, the 
body swallows the world and is itself swallowed by the world … [It] is not separated from the 
whole by clearly defined boundaries; it is blended with the world, with animals, with objects.50  
 
As abjection dilutes boundaries not only between the interior and exterior of the body and/or space, 
but between the two, neither remains cohesive – singular. Instead they temporarily form a 
composite assemblage in a literal sense, which will eventually decompose, the organs having 
constituted this assemblage descending to their respective structures. The reason why one is able to 
discuss such a relationship between body and space is because both are material entities that may 
be broken into parts, lose parts and acquire new parts, hence altering the composition of the whole. 
Bakhtin writes that organs are detachable, he names the bowels and the phallus, organs “can even 
detach themselves from the body and lead an independent life”51. In this way, bodies and spaces 
may displace one another, exchange parts and importantly affect each other. To fully address 
abject(ion), is therefore to never solely reduce it to investigations of an abjecting body or space in 
isolation, but to understand that through its leaky nature, it is inevitably a discussion of bodies and 
that what one is therefore dealing with, is heterogeneous assemblages where the constitutive parts 
have become indiscernible.  
 
BECOMING, BECOMING-IMPERCEPTIBLE 
 
Bodies and spaces reconfiguring one another and being rendered indiscernible on a number of 
levels is a matter of becoming. Becoming as Deleuze and Guattari illustrate through the following 
example, is not to be misinterpreted as imitation or mimicry, but is rather “an exploding of two 
heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be 
attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying.”52 It is, in other words, a generative movement 
that brings about a new way of being for the entities involved:  
 
The line or block of becoming that unites the wasp and the orchid produces a shared 
deterritorialization: of the wasp, in that it becomes a liberated piece of the orchid’s reproductive 
system, but also of the orchid, in that it becomes the object of an orgasm in the wasp, also liberated 
from its own reproduction. A coexistence of two asymmetrical movements that combine to form a 
block, down a line of flight that sweeps away selective pressures. The line, or block, does not link 
the wasp to the orchid, any more than it conjugates or mixes them: it passes between them, carrying 
them away in a shared proximity in which the discernibility of points disappears.53  
 
As a generative movement, it differs to being and by extension the notion of dwelling - of 
remaining in the one condition or state for an extended period of time. Hence becoming is not 
concerned with situatedness and one’s ability to “orientate himself within and identify himself with 
an environment” which Christian Norberg-Schulz famously identified in the 1980s as “the task of 
the architect”.54 It does away with the classic subject/ object distinction, with signifiers, which 
exist only in a static notion of things. For Deleuze and Guattari, becoming replaces this thinking, it 
is all there is, and being is only a relative stability. Becoming is a process, a change in a given 
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assemblage, where the properties of certain elements become altered - deterritorialised. Being 
perpetually on the move, it is never the beginning, middle or end-point but the in-between. It is that 
which passes through every event and in doing so follows unpredictable and non-hierarchical lines 
of flight. “becoming ‘moves through’ every event, such that each is simultaneously start-point, 
end-point and mid-point of an ongoing cycle of production.”55 The temporality of becoming is then 
what is real for Deleuze and Guattari, “what is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, 
not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.”56 
 
Becoming importantly brings us back to event, as it requires an event to take place.57 For Deleuze, 
events are a confluence of forces that harbour potential immanence. It is this potential immanence 
that firstly allows becoming to pass through event, and to subsequently activate that immanence. 
Without event, there is no confluence of forces to facilitate becoming but merely disparate forces 
floating on the plane of immanence. Event is thus fundamental to becoming. It allows for 
becoming to take place – it facilitates becoming – the dynamism of change: 
 
Becoming is the pure movement evident in changes between particular events. This is not to say that 
becoming represents a phase between two states, or a range of terms or states through which 
something might pass on its journey to another state. Rather than a product, final or interim, 
becoming is the very dynamism of change, situated between heterogeneous terms and tending 
towards no particular goal or end-state.58 
 
As an event, abjection then instigates becoming. This becoming can occur in the same way as it 
does in Bacon’s work and the case of the wasp and orchid, that is, where there is a single active-
Figure and the reciprocity is asymmetrical, alternatively, it may be symmetrical (Smith’s example). 
If asymmetry refers to a single active-Figure, then symmetry would refer to two (or more) active-
Figures, and rather than becoming, it would be a matter of becoming-imperceptible, the climax of 
becoming. One would no longer be recognizable and know who one is, which is why Deleuze and 
Guattari advise caution here, as there are potential risks such as madness associated with divorcing 
oneself completely from an existing framework and deterritorialising to a state where we are 
unable to reterritorialise back. From the perspective of abject(ion), becoming may therefore be 
thought of as entailing an abjecting body or space, with becoming-imperceptible entailing a 
simultaneous abjection of the two.  
 
JUXTAPOSITION - TENSION 
 
In becoming-imperceptible, the bodies and spaces have shifted too far. A schism has been created 
between the two, as the distinction between a peeling wall and our peeling skin is obscured. Here 
we do not stop at aversion but continue to a state of excess. It is this openness of bodies and spaces, 
of the world as process that we will explore in the ‘Proximity Fragments’ following this Chapter. 
Through the various events that constitute these fragments from the works of Georges Bataille, 
Catherine Breillat and Matthew Barney, one gets closer and closer to approaching abject(ion) 
productively and to reconfiguring the relationship between bodies and spaces. Why? because they 
do not isolate abjecting bodies and abjecting spaces but address them simultaneously, and it is 
precisely within such a move that critical clues lie.59 
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As a precursor to the physical indiscernibility that these fragments manifest, I would like put forth 
a passage by Dr. J. F. Handley from 1842, which David Trotter refers to in Filth, and where the 
unsettling proximity between body and space results in a bodyspace: 
  
When the small-pox was prevalent in this district, I attended a man, woman, and five children, all 
lying ill with the confluent species of that disorder, in one bed-room, and having only two beds 
amongst them. The walls of the cottage were black, the sheets were black, and the patients 
themselves were blacker still; two of the children were absolutely sticking together. I have relished 
many a biscuit and glass of wine in Mr. Grainger’s dissecting-room when ten dead bodies were 
lying on the tables under dissection, but was entirely deprived of appetite during my attendance 
upon these cases. The smell on entering the apartments was exceedingly nauseous, and the room 
would not admit of free ventilation.60  
 
Here we clearly have a physical disintegration of body and space; children stick together, bodies 
are indistinguishable from the walls, the sheets, from each other. The various objects no longer 
appear as singular entities, their coherence has collapsed, as bodily excretions leak out of various 
orifices and onto the adjacent space, as their membranes, their interior and exterior skins 
disintegrate. Trotter comments further:  
 
In the slum-cottage, however, objects no longer present themselves as discrete entities disposed, like 
the dissecting room’s ten dead bodies, within a coherent visual field. Everywhere, figure lapses into 
ground. The blackness of the walls cannot be distinguished from the blackness of the sheets, which 
cannot be distinguished from the blackness of the patients. The children stick together, presenting 
themselves less to the knowing eye than to the fantasized touch. Confluence is the note not only of 
the species of smallpox that has struck this family down, but of the scene itself, of the anti-banquet. 
As the sense of sight loses its way, baffled by confluence, the sense of smell takes over. The 
nauseating stench kills appetite. For Handley, the scene in the slum-cottage really does take the 
biscuit.61  
 
What the above juxtapositions of abjecting bodies and spaces allow for, is the activation of 
potentiality. As processual and in motion, connections are constantly being constructed and 
deconstructed. There is between these what Deleuze would term immanence. A highly specific 
type of architecture is created through the interaction of the abjecting bodies and abjecting spaces - 
from the becoming-space, becoming-body that issues. An architecture with a certain immanence. It 
is through this simultaneous becoming-space, becoming-body brought on by abjection, that an 
AwO is created, that we are thrown into a state of excess, as body and space collapse into one 
another – into one heterogeneous body. It is in such instances where simultaneous processes of 
abjection are set in motion that we move beyond disgust and otherness to a vast material field of 
only potential relations – an affective field – a field of immanence. 
 
As we have seen, the Kristevan abject is curtailed within a dualistic framework – situated on the 
wrong side of the border, associated negatively with the Other and the feminine. Despite notions of 
an open, transformative body permeating the architectural discipline prominently since the 1990s, 
discussions of abject(ion) in architecture have for the most part persisted with a Kristevan 
understanding, and hence accepted all of the associated shortcomings that have been described 
previously. It is here then that the introduction of the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari has 
opened up a way of approaching bodies void of a dualistic framework, and importantly allowed us 
                                                
60 David Trotter, “The New Historicism and the Psychopathology of Everyday Modern Life,” in Filth: Dirt, 
Disgust, and Modern Life, ed. William A. Cohen, and Ryan Johnson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2005), 35-6. Quoted by Dr. J. F. Handley in Edwin Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of the 
Labouring Population of Great Britain, 1842. 
61 David Trotter, “The New Historicism and the Psychopathology of Everyday Modern Life,” 36. 
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to collapse the distinction between human and spatial bodies, such that a singular framework may 
be established for discussing expelling bodies of all kinds. One key in Deleuze’s thinking that has 
allowed this to develop is the distinction between his concept of subjectivity and that of Kristeva. 
Where Kristeva sets the abject in opposition to the subject – ‘other than I’ – Deleuze’s open 
subjectivity sets everything in motion through the BwO. Bodies, spaces and abjects become 
indeterminate organs within a given assemblage, where both physical and psychological 
boundaries are disrupted and hence abject(ion) may no longer be negatively classified on the other 
side of the border. This open ended, processual framework, allows for discussions of proximity, 
where abject(ion) reconfigures both body and space through the transference of matter – bodies 
and spaces can now be discussed together, through the process of simultaneous abject(ion). In this 
way architecture becomes an extension of Deleuze’s BwO – an Architecture without Organs, 
where we move towards an understanding of architecture as an assemblage of processes. 
Architecture therefore is defined by a condition of becoming, and it is abject(ion) as an event that 
instigates this becoming and culminates in affect. It is from this point then that we depart in the 
Chapter following the ‘Proximity Fragments’, to consider affect, and to break down our 
understanding of bodies and spaces further into the realm of matter.  
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4.1 Proximity Fragments 
 
Throughout the thesis and particularly at the end of the ‘Event’ Chapter, I mentioned art forms that 
are not only relational and event orientated but that bear a close similitude to architecture through 
their engagement with bodies and spaces. The ‘Proximity Fragments’ draw on works from two of 
these art forms and explore the architectures that they create, namely the architectures of Catherine 
Breillat, Matthew Barney and Georges Bataille, in their respective works Anatomie de l’enfer 
(2004), Drawing Restraint 9 (2005), and Historie de l’œil (1928).  
 
The ‘Proximity Fragments’ are denoted as such since they do not engage with and attempt to 
analyse the entire oeuvre of Breillat, Barney and Bataille but rather identify a fragment, or more 
particularly, an event(s) from the bodies of work. These fragments/ events have been carefully 
selected as they speak both to a Deleuzean notion of process and an open subjectivity generally, 
and a productive notion of abject(ion) specifically. Within them, much like in the ‘Contracts’, 
architecture becomes a matter of volatile body-space relations and abject(ion) becomes the matter 
that ties these together and hence facilitates exchanges. Where these architectures then lead, is to a 
more in depth exploration of not only the notion of abject(ion) as matter, but body and space as 
matter in the subsequent Chapter, appropriately so perhaps, given that Breillat and Bataille’s work 
falls under the category of French erotica which has long been known for its lowering of bodies to 
base matter, and that much like François Rabelais grotesque body, is also concerned with the real. 
 
The Breillat fragment, which is the longest of the three, tracks back to abject(ion)’s association 
with the feminine and touches on the reconfiguration of not only abject(ion) but bodies and spaces, 
as Breillat is interested in redefining a new form of feminine subjectivity. It then moves onto 
discussions of the event itself analysing the particular relations formed between human and spatial 
bodies due to the presence of abject(ion). The following two fragments from Barney and Bataille 
delve directly into the events themselves, and as such, assume a much more condensed format. 
Despite this distinction, what is perhaps most critical to note, is a pattern that begins to emerge 
across all three fragments, between the strategies that the authors/ directors employ, as well as 
between the workings of the embodied events. One witnesses a questioning of traditional structures 
of narrative through a working with a series of unfolding events rather than a structured whole with 
a beginning, middle and end, and as a consequence of this open-ended and processual approach, an 
overlapping and hence indiscernibility of events comes to the fore, allowing one to question the 
notion of discrete entities. These observations, along with the inherent productive workings of 
abject(ion), lead us to the following Chapter, and in this instance in particular, to the discussions of 
Baruch Spinoza’s notion of composition and decomposition, along with Brian Massumi’s notion of 
the joint event.    
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Anatomie de l’enfer 
 
The work of French film director Catherine Breillat engages with ideas of symbolism, censorship, 
the segregation of mind and body, the flesh and importantly abject(ion) from a feminist 
perspective. In the words of Douglas Keesey who has published the only book on the director, 
Breillat’s work attempts to “reunite the body and the head”1, an approach that is phenomenological 
at the core, however transcends this framework through its openness. At the core of this is her 
interest in the female body and sexuality, their misconception. The reunion of body and head 
therefore refers to woman redefining herself inclusive of the mind, where typically she would be 
associated with the body. The work in other words, challenges and rethinks a dualistic mode of 
thought – it rethinks the cartesian mind-body dualism, but simultaneously and critically, it rethinks 
the dualism of subject-object that comes to the fore through the attempt at resolving this primary 
dualism (as noted in the first Chapter). Hence although the redefinition of woman is what forms 
Breillat’s primary interest, space also becomes imperative, and a certain emphasis is placed on its 
articulation and on its efforts to either support or hinder a productive reconfiguration, and it is 
Breillat’s refined and highly articulated approach that then allows for bodily-spatial investigations 
key to the architect. The contribution that Breillat’s work makes to discussions of architecture, and 
importantly, a productive reading of abject(ion) within architecture, are manifold. On a 
fundamental level, being filmic, the works necessarily implicate space, events or actions and 
bodies. Whilst any work of cinema may do this, Breillat’s films are remarkable in the context of 
this thesis in that the meditation on volatile bodies and spaces and the events that transgress the 
boundaries between the two, result in works that may serve as potent case studies. Her work is then 
one of the most immediate exemplars that considers the process of abjection and allows for a 
discussion of the architectures that are created when abjection is the event in question. It is these 
events within the films that form the basis of the investigation here. 
 
Of the numerous works that make up Breillat’s oeuvre, her film Anatomie de l’enfer, which is 
based on Marguerite Duras’ La Maladie de la mort (1982) and first appeared by Breillat as the text 
Pornocratie (2001), is of particular interest from the perspective of considering abject(ion) in 
relation to the body and space, and therefore architecture. The film unfolds over four nights in a 
room of an abandoned and isolated house, where a woman (Amira Casar) initiates a series of 
encounters by paying a gay man (renowned porn star Rocco Siffredi) to watch her where she is 
unwatchable. Within the confines of the room, one learns about man’s fear of female sexuality. 
Although many indirect references to Julia Kristeva may be seen through the film, Breillat I would 
argue, is primarily Deleuzean in her approach to abject(ion), and more broadly the notion of 
subjectivity. She deals with the body in process. The philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari hence 
plays a key part in reading Breillat’s work. And in the same way that Deleuze’s “How Do You 
Make Yourself a Body without Organs?” describes how a particular type of the BwO may be made 
i.e. the masochistic body, Breillat’s work may be employed to illustrate an open subjectivity that is 
interlaced with abject(ion). There aren’t merely concerns here then of portraying a body in an act 
of abjection, that is, dealing with a body in isolation, and a female body at that, but rather broader 
relationships can be read into the work. These are investigations into how abject(ion) constitutes 
larger assemblages, how it is not solely bodily (in the direct sense) but implicates human bodies 
and spatial bodies. It is from this perspective that we begin to describe the various connections that 
are made and remade between the interacting bodies.  
 
A NOTE ON MINORITARIAN CINEMA 
 
                                                
1 Douglas Keesey, Catherine Breillat, ed. Robert Ingram and Diana Holmes, French Film Directors 
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2009), 7. 
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The first point of departure with Breillat’s Anatomie de l’enfer is that it is a work of what Deleuze 
terms minoritarian cinema, “a creative act of becoming”2. The film has no narrative or structure in 
a traditional sense consisting of a beginning, middle and an end, but is rather a series of unfolding 
events that build off one another and propel the film forward. In other words, instead of a rigid 
framework where everything is already fixed, what one finds in play is a provisional structure, ‘to 
watch a woman where she is unwatchable,’ the eventual form being structured by the actions of the 
man doing the watching. With the proposition being set by one person and undertaken by another, 
a certain unpredictably issues and the film may only be approached as a process, as a mobile 
mass.3 It is only within such an open framework that Breillat is able to reconfigure the body, and I 
would add space, and approach them processually. She does this on two fronts: through their 
perpetual shifting in relation to one another; and through abject(ion) and its capacity to set bodies 
in motion materially.  
 
THE SPACE 
 
Beginning with the former, one encounters a shifting of the human bodies – a shifting of subject-
object, active-passive and voyeur-exhibitionist, and of the spatial body – of public-private, clinic-
boudoir. To understand how these relations shift, one must intimately understand the space of the 
room: 
 
The room is relatively square with high ceilings. It comes off a long low-lit corridor, with similarly 
high ceilings and with the door of the room at the end so that one must turn 90 degrees before 
entering the room, an obscured window directly ahead and a small painting opposite the door. The 
corridor is introverted, with no direct relation to either the outside or adjacent rooms – a 
momentary space. There are frosted, dark framed casement windows on three of the walls, 
allowing warm light into the room but no view out – an introverted room, divorced from any 
relation to the outside, directing the view solely to the woman’s body inside the space. Despite this, 
it is pronounced externally, it pushes out of the external envelope on one side akin to a Loosian 
boudoir. The walls are solid, masonry, and painted white, (however not freshly painted). One may 
imagine that it smells as though it has not been occupied for a while, a musty, cold and damp 
smell. Only a mirror and crucifix hang, the crucifix necessarily rendering the sense of 
transgression more acute, the mirror reflecting and reproducing the transgression. And the floor, 
old but silent dark timber boards. A simple grey concrete fireplace that appears as a prop rather 
than a masonry and permanent object, is centred on the wall with the door – the fireplace is unlit, 
an unused, cold, cavernous object. On the mantelpiece, two lamps that are pointed at the wall, 
several clay objects, a naked doll, and importantly the landscape, gold, antique framed mirror. 
 
An old ‘firm’ armchair that is not overly comfortable, and that serves to promote concentration 
and short periods of occupation, is positioned on the side of the fireplace furthest from the door 
and orientated to the bed, allowing for a direct, unobstructed view of the entire bed (this is 
critical). A small round side table on the left and a delicate, unobtrusive, unlit floor lamp on the 
right. An old unstable brass bed cold to the touch, not large, but big enough for two people 
intimately close together is placed off-centre, under the hanging pendant light and nearest however 
not touching the walls adjacent and opposite the door. It is shrouded with white sheets, not an off-
white, but a pure, stark white, suggestive of the clean, the sanitised, in the otherwise aged space. 
And at least four large pillows at the head, one white, the other three an off-white (the bed head is 
                                                
2 Adrian Parr, ed., The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 165-6. 
3 As a real life example of such a provisional structure, one may refer to Vitto Acconci’s performance 
Following Piece (1969), where his proposition ‘to follow another person’ is directed by the person being 
followed. The end-point once again is unforeseen, the following continues until the ‘subject’ enters an 
apartment or drives off in a car, bringing the event to an abrupt climax.   
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at the wall adjacent to the door), and a bed cover is folded and laid over the sheets at the foot of 
the bed – a subdued green on the first night, a blood red the following (three) nights. The 
temperature is such, that a naked body on the bed, once having lain on the sheets for a while is not 
cold. A small square side table with a stout glass filled with water sits near the head of the bed, on 
the left side when one is on the bed, with a gooseneck lamp directed at the bed and the body on the 
bed. A floor lamp is also positioned on the same side, but this time at the foot. Again it is directed 
at the bed and its occupant, such that the three light sources illuminate and warm her body from a 
number of angles, objectifying it, stripping away all possible shadows, and revealing everything. 
Exposed, the body willingly submits to the penetration of the light and gaze. The crucifix is hung at 
the head of the bed, on the wall adjacent to the door. A small inconspicuous bathroom is tucked 
into a corner, in line with the wall at the foot of the bed, its presence hinted at only by the cream 
framed partition wall with obscured glass panels, which separates the harshly lit bathroom from 
the dimly lit room, with its carefully selected direct light sources and their penetrating heat waves. 
The room is sparsely but selectively furnished, with a bare and cold shell, thus promoting the 
occupation of the select furnishings – its ephemerality is made explicit by the non-permanent/ 
transitory occupation of the space. The space is silent – absolute silence – but for the protagonists’ 
limited engagement and at times, the ticking of a gold twin-bell alarm clock. 
 
Spatially it is worth drawing attention to Breillat’s choice of setting – the house, and her 
concentration on the interior, her insistence on an introvertedness, through redirecting one from the 
exterior with openings filled with obscured glass.4 Within this setting, the woman is the centre of 
attention and is on display. This may seem to directly lend itself to associations between the 
feminine and the interior, and hence further an association with abject(ion), which is precisely the 
type of psychoanalytic pigeonholing that prevents us from approaching abject(ion) productively. 
But if one looks at the film more carefully, what Breillat does, is work with the house, the interior, 
the woman, the abject, not in an attempt to reinforce their association but rather reconfigure it. In 
other words, Breillat intentionally introduces dualistic relations such that she may deconstruct them 
and set the human and spatial bodies in motion. 
 
The selection of the introverted and shut-up house is then not only intentional but fitting, for as 
Deleuze and Guattari write, “The house takes part in an entire becoming” it “communicate[s] with 
the landscape, through a window or a mirror,” and “the most shut-up house opens onto a 
universe.”5 The house therefore takes part in a becoming, there is a house-sensation and 
importantly the shut-up house multiplies the number of possible connections. This then becomes 
about an infinite number of potentials rather than a closed circuit of relationships: interior, 
feminine, abject and so on.  
 
BED-WOMAN-EXHIBITIONIST, ARMCHAIR-MAN-VOYEUR 
 
Now what is perhaps most critical to pull out of the description above is the two key furnishings, 
the bed and the armchair. To note in particular their exact location and orientation within space, 
and their association with a body: the bed with the woman, the armchair with the man. For it is 
these that set the potential of the spatial body in motion through reconfiguring the way one would 
                                                
4 This is a technique that Breillat similar uses in an earlier film Romance (1999). Here the openings are either 
absent from the cinematic frame or function merely as an indirect light source. Within an architectural context 
such practice is brought forth through Beatriz Colomina’s discussion of the shrouding of the exterior via 
infilling windows with either ground or opaque glass, or sheer curtains in relation to Adolf Loos’s interiors. 
These however are exercised to a different end. Beatriz Colomina, Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture 
as Mass Media (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994), 234. 
5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Graham Burchill and Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: Verso, 1994), 180. 
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ordinarily inhabit it. Typically, these objects are merely for laying and sitting, distinct from one 
another. In this instance, they perform the same underlying function, however, their relationship is 
altered from bed-bedroom-private, and armchair-living-public, to an overlay of the two. The public 
enters the sphere of the private and facilitates an exhibitionist-voyeur scenario, where the woman is 
watched where she would ordinarily be unwatchable by the gay man sitting in the armchair. The 
bed becomes a dissecting table, with female sexuality the voluntary cadaver.  
 
On a fundamental level, to speak about exhibitionism and voyeurism, is to speak about the gaze, 
and Breillat’s work is undeniably about the gaze.6 The gaze implies distance, and in cases where 
the body being looked at is a woman, it implies objectification and fetishization, which brings one 
into the realm of psychoanalysis. Within a psychoanalytic framework, fetishization is a 
psychological device that relies on physical distance and an affirmation of bodily boundaries in 
order to keep castration at bay. Deleuze and Guattari quote D.H. Lawrence on this phallocentric 
and psychoanalytic tendency to fetishize the feminine.  
 
…sticking a woman on a pedestal, or the reverse, sticking her beneath notice; or making a ‘model’ 
housewife of her, or a ‘model’ mother, or a ‘model’ help-meet. All mere devices for avoiding any 
contact with her.7 
 
Architecturally, this ties into writings from the 1990s regarding sexuality and space, and brings to 
mind exemplars that were key to those writings such as Adolf Loos’ objectification of the boudoir 
within his villas, his design of the Josephine Baker house as one massive voyeuristic apparatus, as 
well as the objectification of women within a public setting such as the theatre, on which Jane 
Rendell has commented.8 Where Breillat however differs in her approach is that the relationship 
between the two is evidently not fixed, and is convoluted by the man firstly being gay, by him 
secondly being assigned the role of the voyeur by the exhibitionist, and thirdly by sharing at times 
the location within space that the voyeuristic gaze is aimed at – namely the bed-dissecting table. 
Hence these psychoanalytic relations, which are underlined by the same dualistic framework as 
phenomenology in architecture, are not passively adopted but critically probed.  
 
The fact that the man is gay, that he has been assigned the role of voyeur by the woman, allows the 
woman to place herself from the outset within the interior, knowing that she will not be turned into 
a fetishistic object of spectacle – a passive receptacle of his gaze. Being gay, she does not arouse 
him, nor is she necessary for his sexual gratification. It is because the man is gay, that there is no 
threat of castration issuing from the woman. His being gay essentially substitutes for the need to 
fetishize the woman, therefore allowing for a direct engagement with the real. It is therefore clear 
                                                
6 Sarah Cooper speaks about Breillat’s work in relation to the gaze. See her article: Sarah Cooper, "Breillat's 
Time," Journal for  
Cultural Research 14, no. 1 (2010): 103-16. 
7 D.H. Lawrence, “We Need One Another,” in Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D.H. Lawrence (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1936), 191. Quoted in: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Helen R. Lane and Mark Seem  (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 351. 
To further this point it is worth referring to Laura Mulvey’s article “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema”, 
within which she discusses Freud’s comments on scopophilia and the reduction of the exhibitionist to an object 
of spectacle. John Berger’s book Ways of Seeing (1972) is also worth noting here, in which he observes the 
recurring fetishization of women and draws parallels in this regard between classical paintings and 
contemporary advertisements.  
8 For discussions of Loos’ work see Beatriz Colomina’s book Privacy and Publicity and her Chapter in 
Sexuality and Space. In Privacy and Publicity Colomina specifically points to Loos’ fetishization of Josephine 
Baker’s body writing, “the image of Josephine Baker offers pleasure but also represents the threat of castration 
posed by the “other”: the image of woman in water - liquid, elusive, unable to be controlled, pinned down. One 
way of dealing with this threat is fetishization.” For the Rendell reference see: Jane Rendell, The Pursuit of 
Pleasure: Gender, Space and Architecture in Regency London (London: The Athlone Press, 2002), 118, 124. 
108
that he is not an active voyeur and that this is not about reinforcing some psychoanalytic 
relationship, but rather that there is an interest in the real, in the actual interaction between the two. 
In other words, there is no deployment of fantasy here, no act or performance which serves to 
substitute production for fantasy, myth, tragedy or dream as in psychoanalysis.9 Essentially what 
becomes evident in diverging ever so slightly from these relationships, is that Breillat is not 
seeking to replace a dualistic approach where the woman is defined in negation and in relation to 
the man, with a monistic approach where the woman assumes the subjective position of man 
resulting in a negation of sexual specificity. Both renditions are inevitably versions of a theory of 
the subject, which Luce Irigaray sees as always appropriated by the masculine.10 Instead, she 
attempts to portray a certain in-betweeness, an un-categoriseable state, a becoming. The woman 
shifts from someone who consciously places herself in a position to be viewed – a subject, to 
someone who is being viewed – an object. The man shifts from someone who is passively assigned 
the role of voyeur – an object, to someone who is actively doing the watching – a subject. Subject 
and object are not fixed. 
  
Given the ever-changing role of subject and object, there is a certain nomadism in play on an 
intellectual level. A nomadism that is synonymous with the work of Deleuze, or even Rosi 
Braidotti, whose publication Nomadic Subjects (1994) is dedicated to unpacking this non-literal act 
of travelling. Braidotti writes:  
 
the nomadism in question here refers to the kind of critical consciousness that resists settling into 
socially coded modes of thought and behavior. Not all nomads are world travelers; some of the 
greatest trips can take place without physically moving from one’s habitat. It is the subversion of set 
conventions that defines the nomadic state, not the literal act of travelling.11 
 
In being nomadic (constantly shifting), the bodies cannot be named, and therefore assigned a 
concrete identity. They are clearly non-characters “the inhabitants of Anatomy of Hell are also not 
really characters in any specific way because they contain no personality traits outside of the basic 
ones needed for the films provocation”12 and as such a hierarchy cannot be established between 
them. The mobility of the identities is particularly explicit in the man, who through the series of 
physically intimate interactions that constitute the film, loses his identity as gay. He is 
deterritorialised. He begins to desire the woman. In other words, having lost his desire for men, he 
must remap it, and he does so as desire for the woman. This for him constitutes an open 
subjectivity. Kristyn Gorton in “Desire, Duras, and Melancholia” (2008) refers to such a re-
mapping of desire, a deterritorialisation followed by a reterritorialisation, writing that “once the 
subject has lost her coordinates of desire she must re-map them”13. When in the final scene the 
woman disappears (the key to his open subjectivity), he abruptly falls back to the subjective system 
and finds himself without an identity, thus his remark at the end of the film, “she has taken 
everything.”14 In Deleuzean terms then, the woman helps make the man a temporary BwO. The 
events that he partakes in constitute his BwO. 
 
                                                
9 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 305. 
10 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 133-46 in Jane Rendell, The Pursuit of Pleasure: Gender, Space and Architecture in Regency London 
(London: The Athlone Press, 2002), 12. 
11 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 5. 
12 “Anatomy of Hell,” BentClouds, http://www.bentclouds.com/films/anatomy.html (accessed June 4, 2013). 
13 Kristyn Gorton, "Desire, Duras, and Melancholia: Theorizing Desire after the 'Affective Turn'," Feminist 
Review 89 (2008): 31. 
14 Catherine Breillat, "Anatomy of Hell," France: Tartan Video, 2004. 
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Through the final move where the man shares the bed-dissecting table with the woman, Breillat 
then confirms the un-categorisability of the bodies on a material level. She not only collapses the 
visual distance pertinent to the gaze – the distance required to affirm our bodily boundaries, to 
keep castration at bay, and hence to be able to define one term in relation to the other, but brings 
about an indiscernibility through the presence of abject(ion). Here it becomes about proximity, an 
explosion of the viscera, which one can taste, smell and touch, and which is precisely what 
dualistic modes of thought such as psychoanalysis and phenomenology attempt to avoid. The 
bodies through being un-categorisable as subject or object, and through being indiscernible as 
wholes, cannot be placed. This forms the beginning for Breillat’s open subjectivity. 
 
THE CLINICAL BOUDOIR 
 
Tied into this shifting relation of exhibitionist-voyeur, is the shifting of the spatial body from 
public to private, clinic to boudoir. Let’s be very clear here that this is not about reading the 
bedroom as a clinic, it is not about metaphor, which serves to overlay meaning onto a space and 
mask its primary function. Both clinic and boudoir are the space’s primary functions. The space 
supports both anatomical examinations as well as sleeping and sexual intercourse. In coupling 
these two functions, Breillat is drawing on the work of the Marquis de Sade, who she has been 
familiar with since her teenage years. Sade has been well known for introducing medicine into the 
boudoir in an attempt to heighten pleasure. Sean M. Quilan who has written on this aspect of 
Sade’s work writes that the Sadeian libertines “could not separate medicine and eroticism: they 
needed to understand their own bodies in order to heighten pleasure and pain” and that this 
“allowed them to calculate erotic experience and thus move into a transcendent realm of 
experience.”15. Despite pointing out this overlap, and one may further also point to the use of 
philosophy in the boudoir, Breillat is no way Sadeian. She in fact only borrows what is necessary 
and directs it to her own end – to redefining a new form of female sexuality. The woman’s 
understanding and exhibitionism of her anatomy therefore is not about erotic gratification as per 
Sade or the textbook definition of exhibitionism, but rather about educating the man. 
 
Spatially, the relatively barren room supports medical practice via the selectively positioned and 
orientated floor lamps, bedside lamps and pendants, around the perimeter of the bed-dissecting 
table. It presents a scenario where one’s body loses its privacy, becoming a possession of the 
numerous examiners – a public body – a Sadeian body, recalling initially, a psychoanalytic 
tendency to “maintain sexuality under the morbid yoke of the little secret, while finding medical 
means for rendering it public”16. Here the room is no longer private. The particular setup however 
that such a space presents, the roles that it assigns to each of the participating human bodies is not 
adopted here. The dissecting table is not set up for and by the institution of medical practitioners, it 
is isolated from the penetration of the symbolic, it is a choreographed set by the examined body, 
the body of the woman, where the woman is not only being examined, but has subjected herself to 
the examination. Hence the woman, akin to the artist Orlan who has undergone multiple cosmetic 
surgeries where she mocks the ideals of classical beauty, “uses the hospital setting to expose the 
medical objectification of female bodies”17 and thus comment on it. What becomes interesting 
about mentioning Orlan in this context, is that her Operation Opera (1979-1993) performances not 
only parallel Breillat’s ultimate aim but that they employ the same means to get there: poetry is 
read, music played and costumes specifically designed by Paco Rabanne and Issey Miyake are 
                                                
15 Sean M. Quinlan, "Medicine in the Boudoir: Sade and Moral Hygiene in Post-Thermidorean France," Textual 
Practice 20, no. 2 (2006): 236. 
16 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 351. 
17 Danielle Knafo, “Castration and Medusa: Orlan’s Art on the Cutting Edge,” Studies in Gender and Sexuality 
10, no.3 (2009): 151.  
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worn, in other words, the hospital – the operating theatre, is also a theatre in the literal sense. The 
spatial body clearly shifts between the two and is integral to setting the architecture in motion.  
 
As a boudoir on the other hand, the room is a private, feminine space – a gendered space that 
“resist[s] the penetrating gaze of law, public opinion and moral authorities like doctors.”18. In a 
Sadeian context, (and one can see this explicitly in La Philosophie dans le boudoir (1795)), a male/ 
philosophy would be introduced as a penetration of the space (and metaphorically of the female).19 
Breillat however once again twists this and introduces a ‘gay’ male, thus the male does not 
penetrate the space, he enters equivalent to the female.  
 
The shifting between medical practices and the boudoir, in relation to the dual role of the woman 
as patient/ object and subject, begins to manifest an intensive affective space – the woman as is the 
spatial body, are categorisable as neither. This un-categorisability results in a direct engagement 
with what Deleuze terms matters of fact. What is useful then to architecture, is the explicitness of 
affects that this fluctuation allows for, where in other words, one cannot stop and rely on the pre-
established understanding of an actual boudoir or clinic to occupy the space, but must rather come 
to respond to it directly. As the space schisms between boudoir-clinic, so does our relationship to 
it, and architecture starts to move away from what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as molar-machines 
to something more akin to a desiring-machine or assemblage: 
 
large molar machines presuppose pre-established connections that are not explained by their 
functioning, since the latter results from them. Only desiring-machines produce connections 
according to which they function, and function by improvising and forming the connections.20 
 
Once again, this time on a spatial level, Breillat has attained a certain openness through 
reconfiguring common associations of these spatial types. Medicine introduced into the boudoir is 
seen as rendering a utopian space by Quinlan21, implying an ideal space (a fantasy space to an 
extent). The film as it portrays a clinic and a boudoir, I however would rather argue, depicts an 
atopia – a volatile, borderless space, a ‘real’ space rather than a psychoanalytic fantasy space, not 
necessarily ideal socially, politically or morally. It is within this atopia that the abject finds its 
foothold, for it is itself atopian as Kristeva writes.22 It is the unavoidable, non-idealised, yet critical, 
counter-part. 
 
MENSTRUAL BLOOD 
 
On the final two nights, Breillat sets bodies and spaces in motion materially through exposing the 
highly censored bodily process of menstruation, (recalling once again another of Orlan’s 
performances Documentary Study where she magnified her sexual organs during menstruation in 
response to the Freudian quote "at the sight of the vulva, even the devil runs away”). Other 
processes of excretion that take place are purposely left unexplored, as there is a very clear interest 
in abject(ion) specific to the female body in order to pursue what in society is still the peak of 
obscenity – the ultimate threat from within, as Kristeva comments:  
 
                                                
18 Quinlan, "Medicine in the Boudoir," 246. 
19 Jane Gallop, "The Liberated Woman," Narrative 13, no. 2 (May, 2005 May, 2005): 92, 94. 
20 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 181. 
21 Quinlan, "Medicine in the Boudoir," 246. 
22 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 22. 
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Menstrual blood, on the contrary, stands for the danger issuing from within the identity (social or 
sexual); it threatens the relationship between the sexes within a social aggregate and, through 
internalization, the identity of each sex in the face of sexual difference.23  
 
Menstrual blood presents such a threat precisely as it is linked to the womb, which as Creed points 
out does not require a point of reference, in effect it does away with subjectivity. “Unlike the 
female genitalia, the womb cannot be constructed as a ‘lack’ in relation to the penis. The womb is 
not the site of castration anxiety. Rather, the womb signifies ‘fullness’ or ‘emptiness’ but always it 
is its own point of reference.”24 This threat from within is further marked by not only the 
eradication of subjectivity but its replacement with the ultimate abject, the corpse. For as Mary 
Douglas points out, certain cultures regard menstrual blood as having the status of a dead person. 
“The Maoris regard menstrual blood as a sort of human being manqué. If the blood had not flowed 
it would have become a person, so it has the impossible status of a dead person that has never 
lived.”25 
 
Night 3: The woman expels a tampon soaked in menstrual blood from her vaginal orifice. She dips 
it in a glass of water like a tea bag creating a red haze. The contents of the glass is then ingested 
through the open mouths of the woman and the man. Here the process of abjection does not stop at 
the expulsion of the abject, the body does not merely excrete out of an orifice, the process becomes 
substantially more complicated, with the woman expelling her menstrual blood only to re-ingest it, 
and the man taking something into his body as a means of escape rather than expelling something 
from the inside out. Here the bodily fluid is displaced numerously and we come to understand 
ourselves not merely as a leaky body but a type of Klein bottle that ingests itself only to expel itself 
on the other end – a continuous surface that collapses into a single orifice. In many ways this ties 
directly into a quote by William S. Burroughs, who Deleuze and Guattari have referred to on 
several instances, in an effort to illustrate their notion of the BwO:  
 
The human body is scandalously inefficient. Instead of a mouth and an anus to get out of order why 
not have one all-purpose hole to eat and eliminate? We could seal up nose and mouth, fill in the 
stomach, make an air hole direct into the lungs where it should have been in the first place…26  
 
Hence what Breillat has essentially done through displacing the menstrual blood from one orifice 
to another, is reconfigure the organs of various bodies. She has created one all-purpose hole 
capable of ingestion and expulsion, the vaginal orifice, the two mouths and the circle of the glass 
are no longer four separate holes but one. The new temporal body is now truly efficient.  
 
There is a clear ability to upset the organism by not merely expulsion but also ingestion, that is, 
rather than a boiling over and reconfiguration of the organs (such as we saw in Bacon), one may 
reinsert that which has been expelled, back into the subjective system, in order to disrupt it from 
within. A type of cyclical boiling over, where I menstruate myself out, re-ingest myself, only to 
perhaps vomit myself out again. The menstrual blood, is a by-product, something the body no 
longer has a need for, if we then take this by-product and re-ingest it into the system it spreads 
through it and exists as an excess within our body. This excess then has the capacity to reorganise 
our bodies from within. Tatjana Pavlov refers to this re-ingestion as ‘endocannibalism’, which she 
                                                
23 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, 71. 
24 Barbara Creed, "Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection," Screen 27, no. 1 (1986): 63. 
25 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (England: Penguin 
Books, 1970), 116. 
26 William S. Burroughs, Naked Lunch (New York: Grove Press, 2009), 110. 
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links to Christian worship and the notion of the ingested body dwelling within the ingesting body.27 
The woman’s comment on the ingestion further points to past cultural tendencies of re-ingesting 
and re-corporealising the bodies’ of our enemies, as in the reference “Mustn’t we drink our 
enemies’ blood, and isn’t that what women are to men?”28. Thus symbolically and within a 
subjective/ masculine framework, the menstrual blood is the blood of the enemy, the defeated, the 
abject, the woman. Through ingestion, the identity of his sex is threatened. Similarly through a 
staining of space with any form of bodily expulsion, its identity as object is threatened. Whenever 
abjecti(on) cannot be contained by the hygienic systems in place, and leaks out, becoming matter 
out of place, as the subjective system relies on a strict demarcation between us, space and the 
abject, the system momentarily fails.  
 
Akin to Orlan’s magnification of the menstruating female sexual organ, Breillat tightly crops the 
frame around the vulva, and she does this precisely at the point where the blood leaks out into the 
bed sheets. This act is of significance for the architect, as the obscured boundaries that result from 
these leakages eliminate the distinction between body and space allowing for a new assemblage to 
start to form between bodily organs and spatial components. Night 4: The bed is red, the sheets are 
red, the woman is red and the man who withdraws from the depths of the woman is red. There are 
no discrete entities here anymore, this is no longer a coherent visual field, one must rely on other 
senses. Body and space are necessarily reconfigured/ reorganised as they are no longer 
recognisable as discrete entities. What now constitutes a body/ assemblage is both the human 
bodies and the spatial body. Akin to Deleuze’s comment on Bacon, Breillat “constitutes … a zone 
of indiscernibility, of undecideability”29 between all the bodies, and quite literally. Something 
undecidable then passes between the bodies, a sensation.30 Deleuze writes, “There is an area ab 
that belongs to both a and b, where a and b “become” indiscernible.”31 The bodies are becoming. 
 
The obscuring of boundaries evidently is not limited to the body but extends to the boundary 
between body and space in such an event. It is the blurring of this boundary that upsets subjectivity 
and sets it in motion. The menstrual blood upon leaving the body saturates the space, penetrating 
and transforming it such that it is no longer purely classifiable as space. It has been infiltrated by 
what once resided within the depths of the uterus. A subject is no longer able to situate and 
understand itself in relation to this blur. The space is no longer object. It is the viscous state of the 
menstrual blood that is pertinent to this blur, a state that Douglas specifically comments on in 
relation to Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay on stickiness in his novel La Nausée:  
 
The viscous is a state half-way between solid and liquid. It is like a cross-section in a process of 
change. It is unstable, but it does not flow. It is soft, yielding and compressible. There is no gliding 
on its surface. Its stickiness is a trap, it clings like a leech, it attacks the boundary between myself 
and it. Long columns falling off my fingers suggest my own substance flowing into the pool of 
stickiness. Plunging into water gives a different impression. I remain solid, but to touch stickiness is 
to risk diluting myself into viscosity. Stickiness is clinging, like a too-possessive dog or mistress.32 
 
The menstrual blood dilutes all into viscosity – the woman via its expulsion from interior to 
exterior, via its ingestion, the man via his touching and ingestion of the stickiness, and the space 
                                                
27 Tatjana Pavlov, “Consuming the Body: Literal and Metaphorical Cannibalism in Peter Greenaway’s Films,” 
in The Abject of Desire: The Aestheticization of the Unaesthetic in Contemporary Literature and Culture, ed. 
Konstance Kutzbach and Monika Mueller (New York: Rodopi, 2007), 132.  
28 Catherine Breillat, Pornocracy, trans. Paul Buck and Catherine Petit (Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2005), 78. 
29 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (London and New York: Continuum, 2003), 21. 
30 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? trans. Graham Burchill and Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: Verso, 1994), 173. 
31 Ibid., 19-20. 
32 Douglas, Purity and Danger, 51. 
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via its absorption. None remain solid – whole. Abject(ion) in effect obscures two boundaries – a 
bodily boundary and a body-space boundary. The breach of the body-space boundary testifying to 
the fact that one is no longer able to discuss the bodily – the corporeal, nor the spatial, but has 
entered something in excess of it – a heterogeneity.  
 
It is worthy of note that the man similarly experiences the breach of the boundary between body 
and space, body and body and inside-outside via the menstrual blood. His presence clearly adds 
complexity to the event and moves away from considerations of the abject within a purely 
feminine realm, which is precisely where Kristeva falls short of approaching abject(ion) 
productively. Breillat temporarily obscures sexual identity. The man is menstruating.  
 
But what do such events really mean for architecture? There are already the obvious implications 
that have been making their way through the thesis: abject(ion) as the in-between; it blurring 
multiple boundaries resulting in a temporal assemblage of human organs and spatial components; it 
creating an expansive body and drawing connections between the woman, the man, the bed, the 
room but further the film itself (which sits outside the discipline, fluctuating between film, 
philosophy and architecture). It is obvious then that one does not merely take the menstruating 
woman in isolation, that one understands her as part of the other bodies – the house is old, hasn’t 
been painted in years, it is in the slow process of decay, one can even smell the dampness. The 
house as well as containing an expelling human body is imperceptibly expelling itself. There is a 
clear juxtaposition between these two expelling bodies, a schism occurs which does not allow one 
to differentiate between the two. It is this precise moment where the event of the abjecting human 
body occurs concurrently with the abjecting body of the house, that zones of indiscernibility are 
created and the assemblage of body, space, film, becomes evident. Abject(ion) only reveals the full 
power of its workings within a larger assemblage. Here then, there is no hierarchy where the 
human body is able to situate and orientate itself in relation to space, as per a typically 
phenomenological framework, but rather we come to read the two via abjection as part of the one 
system. The bodies have successfully, temporarily, returned to their material structure. What 
becomes noteworthy about such an architecture is not necessarily the reaction that is provoked but 
rather the absence of a structure – a building. That is, we have not created an ‘abject’ architecture 
but a temporal moment of becoming, which is precisely what occurs for Deleuze in the work of 
Bacon, where “flesh, or meat, constitutes the zone of indiscernibility between man and animal”33, 
only in our instance, the indiscernibility is granted by abject(ion), and is between body and space. 
Adrian Parr writes of Deleuze:  
 
The understanding that we are all meat is not a moment of recognition or of revelation, but rather, 
for Deleuze, a moment of true becoming. The separation between the spectator and the spectacle is 
broken down in favour of the ‘deep identity’ of becoming. 34 
 
But further to this there is something else at play made explicit by Pavlov’s endocannibalism – the 
notion of the ingested body dwelling within the ingesting body (which I might add links to 
Spinoza’s discussion of composition and decomposition in the following Chapter, as well as 
Rahm’s project Pulmonary Space). This begins to suggest a hybridisation of bodies, in this case 
male and female bodies, but may this perhaps extend to bodies and spaces? Cannot space open its 
internal workings to the body and add a bodily organ to its composition? Can it not allow a part of 
itself to disappear in a human body? Or can the body not allow a part of space inside it? And all of 
this interchangeably? Would not such a violent union produce an intimacy between our body and 
space akin to orgasm? A sort of J.G. Ballard crash or a Donna Haraway cyborg, where the 
                                                
33 Adrian Parr, ed. The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 20. 
34 Ibid., 20. 
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boundaries between bodies and automobiles, bodies and machines are blurred.35 Wouldn’t all this 
result in a single body for which one requires a single language? Although such a union and 
reorganisation of bodies and spaces maybe half imagined, it is also real, for body and space are at a 
fundamental level merely matter, it just happens that we have come to know space as distinct from 
ourselves, and that we have managed to overlook these potential exchanges through abject(ion), 
which are precisely what allow for an open subjectivity.  
 
OPERATION 
 
In the manifestation of the BwO, Deleuze and Guattari ask: (1) What fabricates the body? and (2) 
What circulates on or passes over the body?36 It is worth posing the same questions here for both 
the human and spatial bodies, as it is precisely these questions that single out the direct affects that 
are at play. What fabricates the bodies is the shifting relations of subject-object, active-passive, 
voyeur-exhibitionist, and public-private, clinic-boudoir. These set the bodies in motion. What then 
circulates on or passes over these bodies are various forces, waves and flows that serve to 
reorganise the bodies, namely the following: 
 
Spatially one may discuss the number of light sources, with their varying proximity to and 
coverage area of the human body, directing the intensity of light and heat waves falling on the 
naked skin, and further the lighting up of the woman’s entire body despite the uneven nature of the 
heat given the varying sizes and types of globes. Such light and heat waves similarly come to pass 
over the man’s skin, upon his occupation of the bed-dissecting table, where the presence of his 
body interrupts the even lighting, mediating its circulation on her body.  
 
One can also imagine the musty, still, used and unclean air of the old room, and it not only passing 
over the clean naked skin (on the surface) of the human bodies but pervading the bodies through 
the nasal cavities.37 Parts of the room in other words enter the human bodies and come to occupy 
the lungs, beginning to suggest perhaps the possibility of the questions posed above. 
 
In terms of the bodily relations, the man’s gaze is the primary affect to circulate on the woman’s 
body, a physical stimulation incited by the visual sense, covering the entirety of her body akin to 
the lamps. This scenario is rendered explicit by the fact that the man is in a suit – not just dressed 
but overdressed in relation to the woman, so that her nakedness is all the more pronounced. Further 
Breillat, borrowing once again from Duras, this time her novel Les Yeux bleus cheveux noirs 
(1986), strips the room from permanent habitation rendering it naked.38 The simultaneous removal 
                                                
35 There is also a passage in Georges Bataille’s novella Histoire de l’œil laying out an intimacy between body 
and machine, in this instance a bicycle. “We soon found our bicycles and could offer one another the irritating 
and theoretically unclean sight of a naked though shod body on a machine.” Accompanying this passage in the 
illustrated version of the novella, is a detailed line drawing by Hans Bellmer where body and bicycle are 
interwoven into one. Georges Bataille, Story of the Eye, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (San Francisco: City 
Lights Books, 1987), 31. 
36 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 168.  
37 This brings to mind the work of artist Teresa Margolles and her installation Vaporización (2001) where “The 
rinse water of the anonymous dead settled on the skin of the living and penetrated them when breathed in.” 
Clearly what is breathed in here is the corpse and not a decomposing spatial body, despite this differentiation, 
the work clearly reaffirms the notion of heterogeneity. Hans Rudolf Reust, “Teresa Margolles: Galerie Peter 
Kilchmann,” Artforum 42, no.3 (November 2003): 199. 
38 I am thinking here in particular of the following passage from Duras; “She says one day she’ll write a book 
about the room, she thinks it’s a kind of accidental place, in theory uninhabitable, infernal, a closed-in stage. He 
says he took away all the furniture, the chairs, the bed, the personal possessions, because he wasn’t sure, he 
didn’t know her, she might have stolen things. And he says that now it’s the opposite, he’s always afraid she 
might leave while he’s asleep.” Marguerite Duras, Blue Eyes, Black Hair (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987), 
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of clothes and the bareness of the room allowing for not only an unmediated circulation of affects 
across all bodies, but a commonality of affects.39 Most importantly however, what passes over and 
circulates through all the bodies is abject(ion) – menstrual blood on the one hand, and decay on the 
other. It is this simultaneous abject(ion) of the human bodies and spatial body that then serves to 
obscure the boundary between them and allow for organs to be exchanged. In this way, abject(ion) 
generates a truly heterogeneous body – a BwO, and further an AwO, one which we shall also see in 
play, in the work of Barney and Bataille. 
 
                                                
26. 
39 To this I would add that clothes are matter that prevent/ mediate contact between bodily and spatial matter, 
and that the removal of clothes here therefore allows for a direct contact between body and space. It is worth 
noting that within the fashion discipline there has been much exploration into this mediating layer between 
body and space. Of particular interest to the notion of abject(ion) at hand is the work 9/4/1615 (1997) of 
Maison Martin Margiela where 18 dummies were dressed in clothes treated with various bacteria, mould and 
yeast, and nurtured to grow until the clothing began to disintegrate, and also contemporary explorations into 
biological decomposition of hemp and silk by Pia Interlandi at RMIT. These do not so much remove the clothes 
from the body as attempt to dissolve it. From a different perspective, Bataille wrote about being naked in a 
pigsty, sitting naked atop of bull’s testicles, and Pauline Réage about lifting up skirts before sitting on cold 
leather upholstery. There is a risk with such a contact that something may either leak out of the body and onto 
space or that a part of space may slip inside the body. There is an anxiety that the two may cross-populate and 
hence be obscured. That matter will be exchanged. See: Bataille, Story of the Eye. Pauline Réage,. Story of O,  
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1976). 
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Flayed Bodies  
 
Drawing Restraint 9 – “IX The Storm”, “X Holographic Entrypoint”:   
Sashimi and flayed bodies/ 
Gustatory pleasure and pain/ 
Love making and butchering 
  
Moving from the filmic work of Catherine Breillat to the filmic work of Matthew Barney, we 
encounter a more theatrical but no less potent series of abject events, which serve to further 
illustrate the notion of an architecture as a matter of shifting body-space relations. Of particular 
interest to this discussion is Barney’s film Drawing Restraint 9, which forms part of his ongoing 
Drawing Restraint series begun in 1987, consisting of primarily performances generating 
numerous drawings and sculptures. The series is based on the idea that resistance is a prerequisite 
for development and a vehicle for creativity. Within the performance work, resistance manifests 
itself through restraints attached to Barney’s body as he attempts to draw on the surfaces of a given 
space. In the film, resistance is most notably addressed in a symbolic way through what Barney 
refers to as the Field Emblem – an emblem in the shape of a capsule with a line through the middle. 
Resistance is described as the dividing line that keeps the two halves of the capsule apart and takes 
the form of ambergris – a whale abject. Despite the criticality of this idea for Barney, what is of 
more significance here are other facets of the film, namely Barney’s engagement with processes 
rather than end states, his use of parallel events and his working with the process of abject(ion). It 
is these facets that form the content of the discussion below, and within which one begins too see 
overlaps with Breillat’s work.  
 
Breillat’s Anatomie de l’enfer as we have seen, may be understood as a piece of minoritarian 
cinema – a series of unfolding events rather than a structured whole with a beginning, middle and 
end. In a similar sense, Drawing Restraint 9 is conceived of as an open framework given the 
overlapping and hence indiscernibility of events. The plot centres around a love story between two 
occidental guests (Barney and his then partner Björk) onboard the notorious Japanese whaling ship 
Nisshin Maru. Whilst the love story unfolds within the bowels of the vessel, a whale sized 
petroleum jelly Field Emblem is cast on deck. The starting point for the film was a commission for 
an exhibition at the 21st Century Museum of Contemporary Art in Kanazawa, Japan, which 
resulted in an in depth study of Japanese culture and religion. As such, the film is steeped in ritual, 
and an importance is placed on events or processes rather than the outcomes – the crew casting the 
Field Emblem; the chef preparing sashimi; Barney and Björk flaying one another’s bodies as a 
consummation of their marriage. These events are all performed diligently and with great precision 
as though they were century old rituals. One further also witnesses the petroleum jelly change 
states from hot to cold, and from having a clear form to being formless and primitive, as well as 
witness Barney and Björk metamorphose into whales. This engagement with indeterminate states 
not only reiterates the film’s processual nature, but also points to the tendency of all organic matter 
to decompose (or abject itself) and eventually return to its base material structure. Within this 
processual framework, abject(ion), alongside other often ‘negatively’ classified processes, may be 
considered in terms of what it does rather than what it is. It is because of this, that relations 
between entities and events, which would typically be seen as having no relation at all come to the 
fore, and an indiscernibility between these entities and events becomes explicit. This 
indiscernibility goes a long way towards questioning the notion of discrete entities and the clear 
demarcation of body and space, and is in many ways analogous to the shifting of bodies and spaces 
in Breillat – bed-woman-exhibitionist; armchair-man-voyeur; clinic-boudoir; bed-dissecting table. 
 
One such overlapping and indiscernibility of events occurs between the flaying of the bodies and 
the chef preparing sashimi. Here there is no differentiation between the preparation of food and 
mutual mutilation, but merely the expression of potentialities of different forces at play. Björk and 
Barney stand in a sea of jelly within a cabin on the ship, carefully carving away their bodily 
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boundaries with flensing knives into bite-sized pieces. A form of controlled and orchestrated 
abject(ion) takes place, which again akin to Breillat, is taken full circle with the ingestion of the 
portioned flesh. The bodies come to dwell in one another to the extent that one is no longer able to 
talk about two bodies but one – a new temporal body. Abject(ion) clearly blurs the boundary 
between the two. This is a butchering but simultaneously, a love making. The bodies are animals, 
being prepared for meat – for each other. A sublimely sensual climax of endocannibalism. Their 
bodily boundaries are slowly carved away below the surface of petroleum jelly within which they 
stand facing each other. With each cut, they draw closer to a zone of proximity, of indiscernibility. 
With each cut, a new point of contact, a new orifice. These are Alphonso Lingis’s “points of high 
tension; intensities zigzag across them, releasing themselves, dying away orgasmically, into a 
tingling of pleasure.”1 Similarly to abject(ion) the petroleum jelly manifests a zone of proximity. It 
is the connective tissue through which all bodies (both human and spatial) physically touch. The 
inside begins to leak to the outside and the outside is allowed to penetrate into the inside. Bodies 
flow through each other – the ship enters the human bodies, at the same time as the bodies leak into 
the ship, and the bodies’ carved away flesh, parallels the sashimi ingested by the crew on the upper 
deck. 
 
This is once again an exercise in creating a BwO in a sadomasochistic way. But rather than sewing 
each other’s bodies shut akin to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s famous passage in “How do 
you make yourself a Body without Organs?”2 (1980), the bodies are thrown open. The flaying 
fabricating the BwO, the petroleum jelly circulating on it and passing through it, connecting it to 
the space of the ship. A temporal assemblage is created between the bodies, the ship, the jelly and 
the sea. The jelly is the sea. A liquid body in which Björk and Barney upon flaying their lower 
bodies, reducing them to stumps that resemble tails, dive below the surface of having transformed 
into whales. The bodies become-animal literally. 
 
Further to the blurring of bodily and spatial boundaries, and the overlapping of events above and 
below deck, one finds an overlap – a schism – between the Figures in the petroleum jelly within 
the cabin, the ship within the sea, the storm within the sky. In short, all is in motion and 
exchangeable. In this sense, Barney is metonymic akin to (as we shall see) Georges Bataille’s 
erotic texts. And it is the films’ constant slippage between these events that opens up not only the 
potential for active exchanges but manifests a space of speculation. The event then, is all of these 
things at once, a move that complicates Bernard Tschumi’s equation and results in a multi-faceted 
architecture. Here architecture is not only in motion because it is defined by event but we are able 
to move between these happenings by means of many passages. In this way, Barney’s film 
operates akin to the seminal novel Finnegan’s Wake (1939), on which Michel Butor comments, 
“each of these words can act as a switch, and we can move from one to another by means of many 
passages; hence the idea of a book which does not simply narrate one story, but a whole ocean of 
stories.”3 What this overlap of events/ processes in conjunction with the material exchanges 
facilitated by abject(ion) allows for then, is an understanding of architecture as a matter of shifting 
body-space relations. Architecture is not a complete and autonomous piece of construction, even if 
on the surface it strives to be, it is a teeming heterogeneous assemblage. It is a territory whose 
boundaries expand and contract whenever matter stirs.  
 
 
 
                                                
1 Alphonso Lingis, Excesses, Eros and Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 33-4. 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 165-184. See particularly 167. 
3 Michel Butor, Introduction aux fragments de “Finnegan’s Wake” (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 12, in Gilles 
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: Continuum, 2004), 55. 
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The bullfight  
 
 
In just a few seconds: first, Simone bit into one of the raw balls, to my dismay; then Granero 
advanced towards the bull, waving his scarlet cloth; finally, almost at once, Simone, with a blood-
red face and a suffocating lewdness, uncovered her long white thighs up to her moist vulva, into 
which she slowly and surely fitted the second pale globule – Granero was thrown back by the bull 
and wedged against a balustrade; the horns struck the balustrade three times at full speed; at the 
third blow, one horn plunged into the right eye and through the head. A shriek of unmeasured horror 
coincided with a brief orgasm for Simone, who was lifted up from the stone seat only to be flung 
back with a bleeding nose, under a blinding sun; men instantly rushed over to haul away Granero’s 
body, the right eye dangling from the head.1  
 
Georges Bataille’s writing is raw and affective. It oozes sensation. A visceral expulsion! But might 
such passages be instructive to architecture in a similar way to the filmic work of Catherine Breillat 
and Matthew Barney? Returning to the theory of Bernard Tschumi who in the 1980’s to the 1990’s 
insisted that there is no architecture without event, and himself in fact persistently referred to 
Bataille, it becomes obvious that Simone biting into one of the two raw testicles and inserting the 
other into her cunt, and the simultaneous puncturing of Granero’s eye from Histoire de l’œil are 
inextricably linked to architecture. These events/ processes help constitute a particular 
understanding of architecture – a volatile and heterogeneous architecture.  
 
We have already seen an indiscernibility of bodies, and bodies and spaces through the literal act of 
abjection, as well as seen an overlap between abject bodily and spatial events in Breillat. And in 
Barney we similarly witnessed an indiscernibility, however the overlap of events broadened to 
include multiple and not always abject events. Bataille’s Histoire de l’œil and particularly the 
above passage from Chapter 10 – ‘Granero’s Eye’ – once again explores these two aspects in an 
effort to provide one last study through what is perhaps the better known exemplar within the 
architectural discipline. It is worth reiterating that the overlap of events and the indiscernibility 
come to the fore only as a result of the engagement with process and hence an open subjectivity 
and productive notion of abject(ion). For only within such a processual framework does abject(ion) 
gain agency and is able to be understood as constituting assemblages (be they architectural or 
otherwise) through the various connections that are made, remade and unmade. Here architecture 
finds itself in a Deleuzean state of becoming. 
 
There is once again a very distinct overlap of abject events – an overlay of three events which due 
to their ability to be transposed onto one another are essentially the one event: Simone bitting into 
the raw balls; Simone inserting a raw ball into her vaginal orifice; and the bull puncturing 
Granero’s eyeball. In addition to this overlap of events, there is also the overlap of the various 
spherical objects such that Bataille’s writing is essentially metonymic – testicles, eyeballs, mouths, 
eye sockets, vaginal orifices and the sun, each substitutable.  The ‘sphère métaphorique’ (spherical 
metaphors) exchange meanings and usages, they are in a state of flux, divorcing themselves from 
the static metaphors often employed in architecture. Roland Barthes writes, “by their metonymic 
freedom, they endlessly exchange their meanings and their usages”2 and “by metonymic exchange, 
Bataille exhausts a metaphor.”3 The bull “has punctured its own ball.”4 Simone has inserted 
Granero’s eyeball into her moist orifices. Here the bodies force themselves into and out off each 
other, each in a violent spasm, they map themselves onto each other in a sexual way, constituting a 
                                                
1 Georges Bataille, Story of the Eye, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1987), 64. 
2 Roland Barthes, "The Metaphor of the Eye," in Critical Essays, trans. Richard Howard (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1972), 245. 
3 Barthes, "The Metaphor of the Eye," 246. 
4 Hélène Frichot, “Bullfighting, Sex and Sensation,” Colloquy, no.5 (September 2001). 
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process-based flowing body, where the spasms of Simone’s orgasm become indiscernible from 
Granero’s (and the Bull’s) spasmodic dying bodies within the ring of the arena. The various 
globules, orifices and spasms become conjoined, diluting boundaries. There is a displacement of 
organs, an ambiguity, such that what is human, spatial or animal, becomes blurred. Organs become 
interchangeable akin to Alphonso Lingis’ “sea anemones consisting of skin with a single orifice 
which is simultaneously mouth, anus, and womb,” the body becomes a BwO, and Bataille’s 
novella, a “sea … full of the detached organs of some dismembered monster that never was.”5  
 
This interchangeability is something that is further signified through language and through 
Bataille’s adoption of the word cul for vagina, which has the dual meaning of vagina and anus in 
French,6 and hence results in effect, in collapsing the two orifices into the one. The novella is then 
clearly about bodily parts – about organs, and their relations and exchanges, as Patrick Ffrench 
notes: “One should not talk about the body in relation to Histoire de l’œil, but about its parts, in the 
sense that Deleuze and Guattari talk of desiring machines, an eye that has its own mind, a rhythm 
of insertion and ejection, a vagina that deploys itself around various objects.”7 Where Ffrench is 
leading us through his reference to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, is to a specific material line 
of thinking – an intelligent materialism, which gives parts/ organs (and if we break these down to 
an even finer scale of matter) agency, and tied into this is also the understanding of all parts being 
situated on the plane of immanence. What Bataille has created, is an architecture on the plane of 
immanence – an architecture that is perpetually shifting, as the relations between parts change. It is 
an architecture that is formed by a multiplicity of events or processes:  
 
Thus the text privileges not only liquids - milk (‘le lait’), urine (‘l’urine’ or ‘le pisse’), sperm (‘le 
sperme’ or ‘le foutre’), blood (‘le sang’), rain (‘la pluie’) - but also the process of liquefaction, the 
action of liquefying: flowing (‘couler’), soaking (‘tremper’), streaming (‘ruisseler’), inundating 
(‘inonder’), pissing (‘pisser’), moistening (‘mouiller’), spurting (‘jaillir’), spitting (‘cracher’), 
drinking (‘boire’) and nouns and adjectives associated with this process: the jet (‘le jet’), the drop 
(‘la goutte’), the trickle (‘le filet’), the stream (‘le ruissellement’), the torrent (‘le torrent’), the pool 
(‘la flaque’), the stain (‘la tache’), the humid (‘l’humide’).8  
 
The space in this bullfight, which is not the architecture, one may imagine as a standard arena. 
Bataille provides minimal description of the scale and layout, instead focusing on the visceral 
assault of the “stench of equine and human urine” exacerbated by the great heat – a “stinking 
shithouse, where sordid flies whirled about in a sunbeam”9, the sweat of the bodies mixing with the 
urine and mud. This sensorially loaded selection of filthy spaces reveals an interest in the sensation 
rather than perception of the space. For Bataille (akin to Breillat and Barney), there is a specificity 
to the spatial components, because the space within which the Figures find themselves, relate to 
their condition. Both attempt to return to their respective material structures, both are 
disassembling, decomposing. And it is an awareness of this, which allows for a very different 
understanding of architecture. One in which the boundaries between bodies and spaces are broken 
down in favour of, to reuse Adrian Parr’s wording, “the ‘deep identity’ of becoming.” To put this 
another way, at the same time as there are human bodies expelling and being pervaded, the spatial 
body is rotting, decomposing, essentially expelling itself. What is powerful about this is the 
indiscernibility, we are no different to the space and this is both exhilarating and confronting. We 
see ourselves in the space, and if the space is able to fall apart than so must we, this is threatening. 
In Mille Plateaux Deleuze and Guattari write in relation to becoming-animal that “what happens to 
                                                
5 Alphonso Lingis, Excesses, Eros and Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 12. 
6 Patrick Ffrench, The Cut/ Reading Bataille's Histoire de l'œil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 110. 
7 Ibid., 22. 
8 Ibid., 95-6. 
9 Bataille, Story of the Eye, 61. 
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a horse can also happen to me”10 and this is precisely the relationship between the body and space 
here, where forces are permitted to exchange and circulate between the two.  
 
What is further critical is the basic function of the space, in fact, the above events that transpire are 
dependent on the space, that is, they are a consequence of the function of the space. In this respect, 
Ffrench comments that, “bullfighting does not interest Bataille as such” but that, “it is rather the 
possibilities it offers of a failure of the feint that fascinate him.”11 In other words, one could say 
that Bataille is fascinated by the events made possible by the program. Simone can insert the two 
globules into her various orifices only because a bull has died in the ring by the pure function given 
by the space. The function is however perversely twisted, and employed for Simone’s pleasure. It 
assumes an independent logic. And it is this that creates the distinction between the architecture 
that would normally result from the bullfight and sets up a tension between eros and thanatos (sex 
and death). Here abject(ion) exists outside the feminine realm of the interior, the home that it often 
finds itself in within architecture, it flows through the bullring, the stand, through Simone’s two 
wet orifices to Granero’s empty socket and back again. This circuit renders the subject redundant. 
Architecture no longer has a human body at its centre but a conglomeration of bodies or rather 
organs. It becomes heterogeneous, multiplicitous. “If you make the apparatus into a circuit, the 
subject, human agency, becomes redundant, or rather, it becomes the victim of the apparatus which 
is represented, thematically, as a torture machine, which runs on its own.”12 
 
Simone inserts and bites into the raw balls, not in an act of dirtying or polluting herself but rather 
in an attempt to connect with the body of the bull, a connection that through the final event also 
comes to include the body of Granero. Through this quasi-erotic event, the bull arena, which would 
typically be associated with death, also comes to be linked with orgasm. The event comes to 
occupy the space between the sensual and grotesque, it is de-eroticised such that it avoids 
fetishisation and has agency. Which is precisely what is required for such events to climax in affect 
– an affective architecture. The architecture becomes transformed by the nature of the event. Such 
events do not give us instructions for how to design spaces, but rather allow us to understand 
architecture as a matter of shifting events and relations, to which abject(ion) is inextricably tied. 
They serve as conceptual frameworks for an architecture in excess – an architecture which has 
been thrown open. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 172. 
11 Ffrench, The Cut, 138. 
12 Ffrench, The Cut, 122. 
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5. Affect, Matter  
 
To discuss affect in architecture means that experience no longer revolves around being so much as 
becoming. Rather than the repetition of singularities that is being,1 and a focus on the state of 
things, process and the perpetual making and remaking of connections between parts becomes once 
again critical. In the introduction to The Affect Theory Reader (2012), affect is said to:  
 
arise in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted upon. Affect is an 
impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state of relation as well as 
the passage (and the duration of passage) of forces or intensities. That is, affect is found in those 
intensities that pass body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those 
resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very 
passages or variations between these intensities and resonances themselves. Affect, at its most 
anthropomorphic, is the name we give to those forces – visceral forces beneath, alongside, or 
generally other than conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion – that can serve to 
drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in 
neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us 
overwhelmed by the world’s apparent intractability.2 
 
Affect is what is found in the midst of bodies bleeding into one another. It is a discussion of matter, 
of bodily matter, and its capacity for self-organisation,3 which leads to relationships and 
interactions between human bodies and spatial bodies at a material level. In a Chapter of The Affect 
Theory Reader, Patricia T. Clough comments on affect returning us to bodily matter and that this 
“may be the most provocative and enduring contribution of the affective turn.”4 It is such a line of 
thinking that not only restructures the way we perceive the relationships between these bodies but 
also restructures what is considered to be a body as Gilles Deleuze writes; “a body can be 
anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea; it can be a linguistic corpus, a 
social body, a collectivity”5 that then departs from the persistent understanding of the human body 
as organism, as agent and space as an inert object within architecture. Only from this perspective, 
do we get fully immersed in the materiality of abject(ion) and are able to understand its potency. 
Here the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and contemporary writings on ‘new 
materialism’ feed directly into a volatile conception of bodies and spaces, and make explicit 
abject(ion)’s role within such a conception.  
 
                                                
1 Pheng Cheah, “Non-Dialectical Materialism,” in New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, ed. 
Diana Coole and Samatha Frost (London: Duke University Press, 2010), 83. 
2 Melissa Gregg and Gregory J. Seigworth, ed., The Affect Theory Reader (London: Duke University Press, 
2012), 1. 
3 Patricia T. Clough, “The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies,” in The Affect Theory 
Reader, 206-7. 
4 Clough, “The Affective Turn: Political Economy, Biomedia, and Bodies,” 206-7. 
5 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 
1988), 127. 
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MATERIAL DISASSEMBLIES  
 
Materialism/ matter is a long-standing topic that has been approached through streams of 
philosophy such as existential phenomenology and structural Marxism,6 with a contemporary 
interest being revived through readings of Deleuze and Guattari, and also through the affective 
turn. It is because of information and biogenetic technologies as Rosi Braidotti has pointed out,7 
that bodily materialism has been fore-grounded within philosophy and the natural sciences and is 
being rethought, with books such as New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010), 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (2010) and within architecture Matter: Material 
Processes in Architectural Production (2012) emerging.  
 
Generally, matter was viewed as passive, inert, therefore in need of an agent to set it in motion, it 
was discussed in terms of its final states, with the processes that took place between these states 
being overlooked. The Deleuze and Guattari approach, which has been referred to as an ‘intelligent 
materialism’ by writers such as German Bernd Herzogenrath, overturns the key principles of such 
dialectic materialism. It overturns the external organisation of matter, the notion that matter tends 
to become parts of a whole and therefore leads to organisms. It overturns the need for a human 
agent. Deleuze and Guattari arrive at this new conception of materialism through their interest in 
chaos and complexity theories: complexity theory “developing new technologies [that] are 
rendering bodies less discrete”; and chaos theory being “a science of process rather than state; of 
becoming rather than being.”8 For Deleuze and Guattari, “matter … is not dead, brute, 
homogeneous matter, but a matter-movement bearing singularities or haecceities, qualities and 
even operations”9. It is alive and self-organising. Herzogenrath summarises intelligent materialism 
thus: 
 
‘Intelligent materialism’ is so designated not because it is supposed to be a more intelligent version 
of classical materialism, but because it is preoccupied with ‘intelligent matter’ and supports a belief 
in the force and richness of matter itself: one that is not dominated by form, one that does not need 
form to be imposed on it to become alive, but is in and of itself animate and informed. Matter 
engenders its own formations and differentiations because it carries them in itself, as potentialities, 
so that form/soul/mind is not something external to matter, but coextensive with it. Deleuze’s 
intelligent materialism claims that matter is not [only] an effect of representation – matter is 
productive, and this productivity must be accounted for by its own, immanent criteria.10  
 
As an extension to this, in a Chapter of New Materialisms, Pheng Cheah aptly points out that the 
material body is a BwO:  
 
matter as the plane of immanence is a dynamism of the differentiations, speeds, and flows of 
particles that are prior to any organized form.   
 
                                                
6 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms” in New Materialisms, 3. 
7 Rosi Braidotti, “The Politics of “Life Itself” and New Ways of Dying”, in New Materialisms, 201. 
8 Coole and Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” 19, 13. Brackets mine. Deleuze and Guattari see chaos 
as the realm of potential, of the virtual. “Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed 
with which every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a virtual, containing 
all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which sprung up only to disappear immediately 
without consistency or reference, without consequence.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is 
Philosophy? trans. Graham Burchill and Hugh Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), 118. 
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 563-4.  
10 Bernd Herzogenrath, An American Body Politic: A Deleuzian Approach (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of 
New England, 2010), 25. 
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It is not an organized system but “an aggregate whose elements vary according to its connections, its 
relations of movement and rest, the different individuated assemblages it enters”. Hence, the 
material body is not an organism but a body without organs.11  
 
 As such:  
 
Matter is no longer imagined here as a massive, opaque plenitude but is organized instead as 
indeterminate, constantly forming and reforming in unexpected ways. One could conclude, 
accordingly, that “matter becomes” rather than that “matter is”. It is in these choreographies of 
becoming that we find cosmic forces assembling and disintegrating to forge more or less enduring 
patterns that may provisionally exhibit internally coherent, efficacious organization: objects forming 
and emerging within relational fields, bodies composing their natural environment in ways that are 
corporeally meaningful for them, and subjectivities being constituted as open series of capacities or 
potencies that emerge hazardously and ambiguously within a multitude of organic and social 
processes.12  
 
What this intelligent materialism implies is that “the whole edifice of modern ontology regarding 
notions of change, causality, agency, time, and space needs rethinking.”13 From an architectural 
perspective then, this shift in thinking about matter is highly useful, as it not only implies but 
allows for, a rethinking of body and space. Further, it allows us to expand on the physical workings 
of abject(ion), it allows us to understand the mechanics of the process, and in doing so, identifies 
abject(ion) as a key constituent in this mode of thought. 
 
If we think about human bodies and spatial bodies as fundamentally matter, as organisations of 
matter, akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s intelligent materialism, and therefore of the various 
assemblages that this matter may enter into, rather than considering these bodies in terms of a final 
state, we may begin to discuss the interactions between them on another level. Tying into 
discussions of process in Chapter 4, no longer is it of consequence that one is human, the other 
non-human, one is alive and the other considered not alive, nor that they formally differ but what 
becomes critical is the dynamic interactions that occur on the molecular level. Here we are 
divorced from oppositions, we become immersed in the material process, the physical, the real. 
Here there is no distancing ourselves from the abject. All is inextricably conjoined. It becomes 
about the relationship of the parts rather than the wholes, and the architecture emerges out of these 
very connections. One can think of this as a Deleuzean assemblage at a molecular level. Gail Peter 
Borden and Michael Meredith in the publication Matter comment: 
 
Today we must come to terms with our knowledge that there is no clear objective mind-body split, 
that we are part of the fields of matter, materials are matter, and matter is always connected to all 
other matter, the notion of negating materiality is no longer ontologically possible.14  
 
Architecture shies away from approaching abject(ion) on this material level, and on the level of 
experience. Sure it has attempted to construct spaces with expulsions, but this is about drawing 
reactions, it is sensationalism, it is about reinscribing our bodies in terms of profit and loss such 
that nothing, (including our shit) goes to waste. This materiality is inline with the humanist/ 
phenomenological approach, where the material is an end in itself, as architect, theorist Stan Allen 
observes in relation to the work of Kenneth Frampton, Peter Zumthor and Juhani Pallasmaa.15 In 
the interview that Allen makes this observation, Michael Meredith points out that architecture has 
                                                
11 Cheah, “Non-Dialectical Materialism,” 87. Inner quote Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 282. 
12 Coole and Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms,” 10. 
13 Ibid., 9. 
14 Gail Peter Borden and Michael Meredith, ed., Matter: Material Processes in Architectural Production 
(Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 2. 
15 Stan Allen and Michael Meredith, “Interview 1,” in Matter, 9. 
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not as yet worked out a way to move beyond materiality as end product to materiality as process.16 
This is precisely where Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy becomes useful, as it confronts us with 
the material process – the workings of matter. Theirs is a visceral philosophy, an affective 
philosophy. With Deleuze and Guattari we are engrossed in our expulsions. Deleuze and Guattari 
do not speak of bodies as discrete entities but inline with Baruch Spinoza, as composed of many 
moving elements in direct confrontation with other elements – a sea of potentiality. Their 
materiality is a violent series of disassemblies, their body “shits and fucks” and as such it cannot be 
inscribed into the symbolic realm.17  
 
If we therefore look at the process of abjection from the perspective of matter and the forces 
inherent to that matter, rather than focusing on the expulsion as an object, we might ask what this 
suggests for the application of abject(ion) to architecture? I would propose that at a general level, 
this thinking about matter (and process) leads to an open architecture, one where the connections 
between parts remain open – a continuous loop of exchange, such that the various parts are 
unfinished and in a constant process of construction and deconstruction. It becomes an architecture 
of processes rather than things. Such an architecture does not have a Deleuzean inspired design 
process that yields an end product (a building) but rather the process is the architecture itself. 
Architecture is what emerges from the coming together of a spatial event and a human event – 
from the interaction of the material forces at play. It is tangible but fleeting. It is a moment. Here 
today, gone tomorrow, replaced by another architecture. Tonight it is me at the terrazzo kitchen 
table, smoking a cigarette over the potted herbs that line the window, tomorrow, it is me coughing 
up phlegm in the very same place.  
 
Specifically, in terms of abject(ion), abjection characterises the coming together of body and space, 
the moment of exchange, the transition of matter. It produces a qualitative change in a whole. 
Deleuze sees matter as productive as it carries its own potentialities and because it has the capacity 
for self-organisation.18 Abjection as a material process is therefore matter reorganising itself – 
transitioning from the inside to the outside and reconfiguring the states of the bodies involved. As a 
material process, abjection has agency, not the body the abject issues from, but the process itself. 
The experience of this reconfiguration, of these visceral forces that occur beyond our conscious 
knowing, is then precisely what is termed affect. Affect is linked to matter through the experiential 
dimension.  
 
SPINOZA 
 
Prior to moving any further, it is worth side stepping for a moment to the philosophy of Spinoza, 
who has influenced much of Deleuze’s thought and is where we find the foundations of affect, and 
in fact matter. What is critical in Spinoza’s philosophy, is how he defines a body, as Deleuze 
writes:  
 
A body, of whatever kind, is defined by Spinoza in two simultaneous ways. In the first place, a 
body, however small it may be, is composed of an infinite number of particles; it is the relations of 
motion and rest, of speeds and slownesses between particles, that define a body, the individuality of 
                                                
16 Allen and Meredith, “Interview 1,” in Matter, 12. 
17 Julia Kristeva comments, “The body must bear no trace of its debt to nature; it must be clean and proper in 
order to be fully symbolic.” Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 44. 
18 Herzogenrath, An American Body Politic, 25. An intelligent materialism is said to be impersonal, “it does not 
even privilege human bodies. There is increasing agreement here that all bodies, including those of animals 
(and perhaps certain machines, too), evince certain capacities for agency.” Coole and Frost, “Introducing the 
New Materialisms,” 20. 
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a body. Secondly, a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is this capacity for 
affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its individuality.19 
 
This definition of a body (any body, inclusive of spatial bodies) in terms of the relation between its 
particles and its capacity for affecting and being affected, serves to place an emphasis on the 
process by which a body is formed, and by which it enters into relations with other bodies. 
Considering bodies in this way means that we depart from morality which distinguishes man from 
animal as Deleuze notes, and enter into ethology20 – a philosophy where there is no subject, but 
merely capacities for affecting and being affected, which any body, whether human, spatial or 
otherwise, is capable of. But importantly it also implies that we take into consideration so much 
more than we would, were we dealing with merely objects/ end states. This line of thinking is 
something that Brian Massumi continues with when he considers the difference between the living 
and the non-living, saying that it is not a question of form or structure but their relations. What lies 
between these is then not boundaries but regions of potential – dynamic thresholds:  
 
The difference between the dead, the living, and the human is not a question of form or structure, 
nor of the properties possessed by the embodiments of forms or structures, nor of the qualified 
functions performed by those embodiments (that is, their utility or ability to do work). The 
distinction between kinds of things and levels or reality is a question of degree: of the way in which 
modes of organization (such as reflection) are differentially present on every level, barring the 
extremes. … In between lies a continuum of existence differentiated into levels, or regions of 
potential, between which there are no boundaries, only dynamic thresholds.21 
 
To define bodies as such, leads one to then being able to discuss them on the same plane, more 
specifically termed, the plane of immanence or plane of consistency, which we find in the 
vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari as well as to an extent in the work of Spinoza,22 and which 
serves to distribute affects. It is because all bodies are understood as situated on this plane that we 
may articulate the relations they enter into, irrespective of whether they are living or non-living, 
human bodies or spatial bodies. On the plane of immanence, all formal distinction is collapsed, and 
all is understood as composed of a single substance (i.e. matter), the assimilation of ourselves with 
matter, degrading our human bodies to the same level as everything else in the world. Relations 
become mathematically described in terms of movement and rest, speed and slowness:  
 
There are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements, or 
at least between elements that are relatively unformed, molecules, and particles of all kinds. There 
are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages. [...] 
We call this plane, which knows only longitudes and latitudes, speeds and haecceities, the plane of 
consistency or composition (as opposed to a plan(e) of organization or development).23  
 
When referring to the plane of immanence, translator of Deleuze’s book Spinoza, Robert Hurley, 
has noted that the French word plan which is found in plan d’immanence ou de consistance, in fact 
covers the English definitions of the words ‘plan’ and ‘plane’24. In French, both meanings are 
exhausted, as Deleuze explains that the 
 
                                                
19 Deleuze, Spinoza, 123. 
20 Deleuze, Spinoza, 27.  
21 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (United States of America: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 37-8. 
22 Strictly speaking the plane of immanence is a Deleuze and Guattari term, however it is influenced by and 
derived from Spinoza’s notion that all is made of a single substance and is therefore metaphysically consistent.  
23 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 293-4. 
24 Deleuze, Spinoza, 122. 
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plane of immanence or consistency is a plan, but not in the sense of a mental design, a project, a 
program; it is a plan in the geometric sense: a section, an intersection, a diagram.25 
 
This is an interesting point architecturally, as a plan is a horizontal cut, which much like a vertical, 
sectional cut, once made, disrupts the integrity of the boundary between inside and outside, hence 
leaving an opportunity for things to pass in and out, and more importantly, allowing for ambiguity. 
A plan speaks directly to architectural documentation. It is an abstraction of space, a cut that 
typically occurs at 1000mm, and a flattening of all that sits below the cut into a single plane. It is 
mono-axial. It concerns itself solely with the z-axis. Importantly, it is an organisational diagram – 
an ordering – depicting the fixed structured relation between not only spaces or rooms, but between 
spatial elements. Given the scale of the plan, different relations and degrees of porosity appear and 
we are reminded of Charles and Ray Eames’ film Powers of Ten (1968): at a scale of 1:5000, city 
blocks appear as solid masses divided up by thin arteries of public space; at 1:500, the solid mass 
of the city block gives way to the solid mass of buildings and public space becomes recognisable 
as, boulevard, street, lane, square and courtyard; at 1:200, openings appear, and the building 
envelope becomes porous; at 1:5, the concrete walls themselves begin to reveal a degree of 
porosity and permeability. However despite architecture’s grasp on scale and ability to construct 
relations from a city scale to a detail scale, there are very clear limits beyond which the architect 
does not go and which become the realm of the scientist, (of material sciences on the one side and 
astronomy on the other). But further there are also relations at the scale of the human body, which 
clearly fit into the parameters of the scale we cover as architects but that we neglect to engage 
with. Essentially, this leads us to the question of, if the plan(e) of immanence is a plan, and all 
bodies are found on that plan, what would a drawing of such a plan look like, given that on the 
plan(e) of immanence, things are described in terms of forces, and motion and rest at the level of 
matter, but simultaneously in terms of the relations formed, which imply the existence of 
temporary assemblages?  
 
Such a plan may only be realised in a diagrammatic sense as Deleuze aptly points out, for given the 
continual shifting of the various parts, it is in fact impossible to draw a conventional plan, for one 
would only be capturing the relations at a specific moment in time, i.e. we would again, be 
discussing the state of things rather than their relations/ processes. Through a plan diagram, we are 
at least able to, in a simplified manner, illustrate the relations between parts – we are able to 
illustrate that the air in my lungs is the same as the air in the wall cavity of my bedroom, that the 
process of my body expelling itself has a relation to the expulsions of space. Being a diagram of 
relations and importantly shifting relations, therefore of what Massumi calls lived abstraction, to 
some degree the plan could take cues from the psycho-geographic mapping of Guy Debord and 
The Situationist Internationale, or more recently even that of Tschumi in a sense, and their attempts 
at mapping lived space. Where these maps are however one-directional in that they study the effect 
of the environment on an individual, our diagram would in fact be at least two-directional, as it 
acknowledges the reciprocal relation between bodies, their capacity for affecting and being 
affected. In such a diagram, a human body and a spatial body would be illustrated as millions of 
vibrating parts held together by a dashed boundary line – a boundary line through which internal 
parts may be expelled or external parts may penetrate. At the same time, such a boundary line 
would also be dashed as it represents the ‘relative’ stability of the individual bodies, which are 
forever at risk of decomposition, not merely from bodies external to them, but from themselves – 
from the gradual process of dying.26 In this sense, the boundary, much like that which it holds 
                                                
25 Deleuze, Spinoza, 122. 
26 François Jullien discusses the silent process of our bodies ageing, and eventually dying. He points to that fact 
that we start to age, to die, as soon as we are born. “During life, you are dying”. All bodies in effect, as soon as 
they come into being, start to decompose, inclusive of spatial bodies.  See, François Jullien, The Silent 
Transformations, trans. Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski (London: Seagull Books, 2011), 61. 
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together and we understand as bodies, is also perpetually shifting, which is why perhaps, as 
Massumi writes, there really is no inside (or outside for that matter), in an open conception of the 
body.27  
 
Finally, the plan diagram would not have a set scale, that is not to say that it would be scaleless, 
but that it would rather traverse across a range of scales, as it diagrammed relations between 
individual molecules, to relations between compounds. Where this leads us, is not to finding 
representational techniques beyond the diagram just described, (which we could in fact arrive at 
very quickly if relying on scientific mapping,28 or even previous studies within architecture, such 
as, Stan Allen’s field condition diagrams or Pia Ednie-Brown’s Fur Field drawings),29 but rather to 
a language through which these relations can be discussed, for the suggestiveness of language 
allows us to remain immersed within experience. To represent processes and their relations, to 
draw these, is, as Massumi writes, to reinsert them “into a state of things” for them “to be stopped 
in thought” and rendered inert. “Actualization is always death: a becoming-other, or a staying the 
same but inert.”30  
 
What is key to take away from the plan(e) of immanence, is that it allows us to understand bodies 
as a series of relations or processes floating within a wider field of forces, and as part of further 
complex non-linear processes. This thinking in terms of processes and relations is what needs to be 
translated into the architectural discipline, and where some would approach this translation through 
the design process, as is the trend with digital technologies within the discipline and their 
applications of philosophical ideas (I am thinking back to Gregg Lynn here again and his 
references to Deleuze, as well as the uptake of emergent phenomena), the architecture I have in 
mind is one which generates itself. It is actualised through the relationship between particular 
events. It is processual. It occurs void of any computer software into which the architect plugs 
some initial data and hits the self-generate button to spit out a complex form. It is experiential, 
material, affective. It is only from this perspective that Spinoza’s relations between bodies have 
consequence for architecture. 
 
Spinoza discusses two types of relations that may be found between bodies on the plan(e) of 
immanence: firstly, composition, where a body external to us and one which agrees with our 
essence combines with our body; and secondly, decomposition, where an external body threatens 
the relations within our body, via entering into a relation with it but not agreeing with its workings. 
These relations are then respectively classified as good and bad. Spinoza’s exemplars, which 
Deleuze also utilises, refer to items that may be incorporated into the body such as food or poison. 
He speaks of relations in terms of addition, of adding something external to me to my body. He 
begins with two bodies. Abject(ion) in a way, does the opposite. It starts with one body, and 
                                                
27 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, 29. 
28 There are many representational techniques that exist within the sciences that have been developed precisely 
to discuss processes, dynamic systems, chaos etc, such as fractal maps, phase space, phase diagrams and phase 
portraits. These take the form of graphs, with arrows often indicating trajectories; dots, stable states; and 
circles, unstable states. Elizabeth Grosz has also interestingly described Aboriginal paintings, their various dots, 
dashes, lines, areas of colour and the compositions, densities and the rhythms of these, as paintings of process 
and becomings. There is therefore a body of work that one could draw on to explore new techniques of 
representation in architecture, given this material line of thinking, these explorations however, are not, what is 
at stake within this project. For the reference to Grosz see: Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and 
the Framing of the Earth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 87-101. 
29 Stan Allen, Points + Lines: Diagrams and Projects for the City (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 
1999). Pia Ednie-Brown, The Aesthetics of Emergence: Processual Architecture and an Ethico-Aesthetics of 
Composition, RMIT University, 2007. 
30 Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), 37. 
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through expulsion, not only splits into two but implicates further bodies. With the process of 
abject(ion) it is always a matter of composition and decomposition, not one or the other. Or to put 
it differently as Christine McCarthy does, abject(ion) plays games of framing and fragmenting: (fig 
5.a) 
 
The play here is the shifting across bodies and body parts which simultaneously constitute and 
dissemble bodies; the abject as occupying the space which is conventionally one of discretion (the 
elemental) of boundaries. Yet the abject twists this. It does not occupy the space of one 
object’s/subject’s boundary, it crosses – indiscreetly occupying the space the boundary inhabits but 
also disabling the severing and separation of subject/object so it occupies the space of more than one 
boundary. Hence it plays games of framing and constitution – of framing and fragmenting. The 
abject shifts position – this is the point of it and of its illegitimacy – it infuriates.31 
 
The expelling bod(y/ies) subtract a part of themselves, they engage in a material disassembly, they 
decompose, at the same time as their expulsion adds itself to another body, forming a composition. 
Whether vomiting on the noshery floor is something that agrees with the floor’s essence, is 
contestable, however a composition of sorts nevertheless results between the two bodies. What is 
interesting in Deleuze’s Spinoza, is the change in relations that occur during decomposition. 
Deleuze writes that when a body dies, the relation between the parts remains but the parts 
themselves assume different relations and that these relations “characterize other bodies”, he cites 
Spinoza’s example where poison enters our blood stream and decomposes the blood such that “it is 
no longer blood”32. This example again works by introducing something into our body (a poison), 
which takes our body apart from the inside, organ by organ, changing the nature of those organs, 
hence allowing them to enter into new relations and subsequently leading to the death of the 
original body. In abjection, a similar thing occurs, however in reverse order, we expel parts of our 
body (rather than take things into our body), with those parts then being able to enter into relations 
with other bodies. Although these expulsions do not for the most part lead to death and are in fact a 
physiological process necessary to our bodies’ workings, there is a similar reconfiguration of 
organs in play. Bodily parts are being restructured on a material level. Everyday, abjection is in a 
sense, a little death, leading us slowly to our actual death. It breaks down the organism 
(decomposes it), but at the same time, opens it up to potential compositions with other bodies.  
 
For the architect what is inevitably of interest, is the relations between human bodies and spatial 
bodies, for it is these that generate architecture at base level. On a general and not at all material 
level, and given Tschumi’s theory as groundwork, it may be relatively easy to see that a 
composition of a human body (event) and a spatial body, results in architecture, that the two bodies 
temporarily combine in a sense, irrespective of the fact that neither body is literally incorporating 
the other into itself. If we however consider the interaction between a spatial body and a human 
body from the perspective of abjection at a material level, what becomes obvious is that this 
incorporation of the bodies into each other, these relations that Spinoza speaks of, are in fact literal. 
Whether I violently vomit myself out or gradually discolour the edge of my Tasmanian oak table 
with my sweat and dead skin cells over the years, on a material level, compositions are being 
formed between spatial bodies and human bodies. Every time any two bodies come together, an 
exchange of matter occurs, permanently altering the material makeup of those bodies – editing 
those bodies. This is why the process of abjection is critical to architecture, as it forms the material 
relation between the bodies, as it is a part of the intensive dynamics of the intelligent material field 
as Hanjo Berressem explicitly points out.33 Abjection is the connective tissue, it is always there to 
                                                
31 Christine McCarthy, "Constructions of a Culinary Abject," Space and Culture 1, no. 9 (1997): 20. 
32 Deleuze, Spinoza, 33. 
33 Hanjo Berressem, “On the Matter or Abjection,” in The Abject of Desire: The Aestheticization of the 
Unaesthetic in Contemporary Literature and Culture, ed. Konstance Kutzbach and Monika Mueller (New 
York: Rodopi, 2007), 40. 
130
Spinoza’s possible relations
human body smaller body
abject
+
results in
+
-
OR
composition
decomposition
-
decomposition
(fig 5.a) abject(ion)’s possible relations
body
-
results in
for the expelling body
can enter into
+ -
BOTH
composition decomposition
+
composition
OR
131
varying effects. But if this relation is always there, and bodies are perpetually exchanging matter as 
they come into physical contact at a microscopic level, then a body is never entirely human, 
spatial, animal etc but heterogeneous. Each body is then not only composed of processes that 
pertain to what we visually perceive as a particular body type but from other bodies. There are 
certain parts of bodies that are exchangeable. All bodies are leaky, and architecture needs to take 
into consideration not only the fact that it is heterogeneous, as it is constituted by human bodies 
and spatial bodies, but that these bodies are themselves heterogeneous. One could perhaps build a 
house from charcoal, coat themselves in a layer of chalk and witness the mapping of bodies onto 
one another, akin to a moth imprinting itself on a wall.34 (fig 5.b) 
 
ABJECT(ION), MATTER  
 
Abjects [Berressem writes] are extremely, one might even say excessively, material. Not only are 
they material things/events, they also relate to physical/material realities, such as life’s 
uneconomical disruptions and ultimately to death as the end of the subject’s material economy.35 
 
Fundamentally, the abject is matter – corporeal matter that was once part of us and is now 
considered base matter, and abjection is a series of forces that expel that matter, causing the 
organism in the process to fall apart. In his article “On the Matter of Abjection” (2007), Berressem 
writes that from a Deleuzean perspective: 
 
abjects relate psychic organizations to particular intensive material processes of organization and 
disorganization. For instance, they mark moments when a complex corporeal organism/consistency, 
held together by a set of both material and psychic forces, is confronted with directly material and 
biological rather than immaterial and psychological forces/dynamics that threaten to disrupt that 
organism. 
Ultimately, abjects all relate to forces that cause the organism to fall apart into un-differentiation 
and they mark “first of all” material responses to such dissolutions.” 36 
 
In this passage, Berressem points to the disruption of the organism, by first of all, material forces, 
‘first of all’, implying the presence of other forces, namely psychic forces. Referring to Deleuze’s 
intelligent materialism, he writes that such a materialism, understands the abject (and we may add 
abjection), “as a nodal point between the material and the psychic registers”, that it understands 
abject(ion) to have a specific position and therefore to not be dumb or meaningless but rather 
productive.37 This is because Deleuze, (as noted previously in Chapter 4) is interested in the 
‘psycho-physical projective plane’ versus Jacques Lacan’s and hence Julia Kristeva’s interest in 
                                                
34 As a side note it is worth drawing a parallel to the practice of ‘chalking’ floors in the 19th century, which I 
would like to thank Juliette Peers for pointing out to me. This practice is relevant as it similarly speaks to a 
heterogeneity and a transfer of matter – as does the above example and the photograph of the moth print on the 
wall – and has in fact stimulated ideas for project work beyond this candidature. The chalking of floors is a 
practice which was usually reserved for upper class Regency balls, in which floors were decorated with 
elaborate patterns in order to create both ephemeral art pieces and as a solution to the slippery leather soles 
worn by dancers of that era. Upon the arrival of guests, these chalked patterns only ever lasted for a matter of 
minutes in their legible state, before turning into ambiguity as the chalk got transferred to the soles of feet and 
hems of dresses. See Dr Anita Callaway’s book Visual Ephemera: Theatrical Art in Nineteenth Century 
Australia particularly her Chapter “Happy Hybridity or Shotgun Marriage?” and also Kathryn Kane’s article 
“The Now Vanished Ephemeral Art: Chalking the Regency Ballroom Floor,” 
http://regencyredingote.wordpress.com/2011/07/22/the-now-vanished-ephemeral-art-chalking-the-regency-
ballroom-floor/ (accessed August 12, 2013).  
35 Berressem, “On the Matter or Abjection,” 21. Brackets mine. 
36 Ibid., 41. 
37 Ibid., 42, 46. The quote in full reads, “An intelligent materialism, therefore, does not understand the abject 
merely as something always already culturally excluded and tabooed and therefore, paradoxically, as something 
culturally completely malleable, but as a nodal point between material and psychic registers”. 
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the ‘psychic projective plane’.38 The ‘psycho-physical projective plane’ is then the plane of affect 
and matter, where the abject (base matter), opens bodies to affective potential.  
 
Abject(ion) has always been understood as part of the material/ physical realm, this dimension has 
always been present to some degree. What has shifted however relatively recently, is the 
understanding of it from the perspective of an intelligent materialism rather than a dumb/ dead 
materialism. Within an intelligent materialism, Berressem writes, “abjects have specific positions. 
Abjects suck life out of biological systems … from the very inside”, whereas previously, for 
philosophers such as Lacan, the abject was meaningless.39 Abject(ion) has therefore come to be 
understood as one of the intensive dynamics on the plan(e) of immanence. It has come to be 
“coupled to very specific intensive productions/ affects that have to do with the break-up of 
material organization(s).”40 Architecture has as yet to catch up to this understanding, which 
significantly shifts abject(ion)’s role within the discipline, and to the understanding of intelligent 
material processes in general.  
 
Prior to being attributed with meaning, abjection is essentially matter relocating itself, and 
therefore in the process, disassembling the body that it originates from. It is an expulsion of matter 
that a body has exhausted all possible nutrients from, in order that it may rejoin the field of 
material structure. It is the mark of the slow process of decomposition, but, simultaneously, of the 
process of upholding a composition – a body, whatever that body may be. Further at the same time 
that abjection is disassembling one body (or altering the state of that body), it is altering numerous 
other bodies involved in the process to varying degrees, as movement according to Deleuze and 
pertinent to any process, always relates to a change. This of course brings us back to the fact that 
abjection concerns bodies not a body, and that the implication of multiple bodies thrown open on 
the plan(e) of immanence, is the possible formation of temporary assemblages, or compositions as 
Spinoza would have it. The subtraction and addition of matter from one body to another is cyclical 
– that which is abjected from one body, becomes the fertilizer for the growth of another, which 
becomes food for another, and so on. Today therefore, my body is composed of the air of my 
bedroom, this morning’s breakfast of porridge, rhubarb compote and darjeeling tea, of my lover’s 
skin cells and saliva from last night’s caresses. By the end of the day, parts of these – parts of my 
body – will be helping my rosemary bushes grow. The abject then, is merely matter at a particular 
point along the circular path that has been attributed symbolic meaning. At any other point but the 
point of expulsion along that path, this matter is acceptable and a part of our body, to some 
measure it composes our body, our identity, such that who I am as a person, once partially rested 
on the qualitative attributes of my shit! Given Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to matter as a 
process – a matter-movement, rather than a series of end states, pin pointing matter’s transition to 
the ‘abject’ becomes of less significance (and therefore all the more threatening as one “cannot 
define where a body begins and where external nature ends”41) than understanding it as part of this 
process. It is the relationships that are constantly made and unmade that are far more critical than 
the end forms. In other words, “not what something is, but how it is”, which is why “affect is 
                                                
38 Berressem, “On the Matter or Abjection,” 41. 
39 Ibid., 46. 
40 Ibid., 38. 
41 Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: Free Press, 1968), 21 in Brian Massumi, Semblance 
and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts, Technologies of Lived Abstraction, ed. Brian Massumi 
and Erin Manning (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 28. The full quote reads, “In fact, [the body] is 
just as much part of nature as anything else there – a river, or a mountain, or a cloud. Also, if we are fussily 
exact, we cannot define where a body begins and where external nature ends. Consider one definite molecule. It 
is part of nature. It has moved about for millions of years. Perhaps it started from a distant nebula. It enters the 
body; it may be as a factor in some edible vegetable; or it passes into the lungs as part of the air. At what exact 
point as it enters the mouth, or as it is absorbed through the skin, is it part of the body? At what exact moment, 
later on, does it cease to be part of the body? Exactness is out of the question.” 
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integral to a body’s perpetual becoming”, and why, being purely ‘transitive’, it comes into 
conversation when one is interested in the “lived duration that involves the difference between two 
states.”42  
 
STICKY ENTANGLEMENTS  
 
In The Affect Theory Reader, Ben Highmore speaks about “sticky entanglements of substances and 
feelings, of matter and affect [that] are central to our contact with the world.”43 These sticky 
entanglements are precisely what we find in Spinoza’s definition of the body and what the process 
of abjection facilitates. Abjection manifests an architecture that puts us into contact with the world 
at a visceral level. An architecture that is only achieved by “getting in among the murky 
connections between fabrics and feelings, between the glutinous and the guffaw (for example).”44 
This is the architecture that writers such as Georges Bataille, Jean-Paul Sartre, the Comte de 
Lautréamont and artists Matthew Barney and Catherine Breillat evoke. It is the interplay and 
inseparability of matter and affect that is at work within such architectures and that lies at the core 
of Spinoza’s philosophy. However within our discipline, such an architecture is denied, as it 
problematises the role of the architect. It implies that the architect does not produce a piece of 
architecture, that they are not in control of the architectures that are generated, as they can neither 
control the affects associated with a space nor the relations between matter. Rather all they produce 
are spaces, and through these ‘planned’ spaces, technically stage the actions that are to occur there. 
In other words, they orchestrate a series of predetermined outcomes, from how I move from my 
front door to the kitchen, to the direction I turn to tear off a piece of toilet paper. Resting between 
fabrics and feelings, to a large degree architecture cannot be designed or given, architecture 
happens. Hence the architect as we know him, is decentred.  
 
If we return to Bernard Tschumi’s conception of architecture, we witness the disruption of this 
role, and it becomes not about ‘predetermining’, but allowing things to unfold, or at least 
acknowledging that architecture is not purely that which is designed but the exchange between 
body and space.45 Tschumi leaves architecture open. His architecture is indeterminate, and 
although he provides an equation, one that serves as a somewhat structured framework for how to 
arrive at such an architecture, the architecture itself is not determinate, as it is formed by the 
complex relations between body and space rather than by body and space as end forms. It is a 
process driven architecture. One in which space affects us and we affect space in an un-
orchestrated way. This differs drastically to the one directional relation of humanism/ 
phenomenology, where space is seen as ‘affecting’ the human subject, and therefore where 
experience is centred around the human body, and not just the body occupying the space but the 
architect himself, who attempts to orchestrate the experience:  
 
affect, despite its polysemic constitutive vagueness, provides a way of engaging with “experience” 
shorn of some of its humanist garb. It allows us to begin to argue that experience is not singular, that 
                                                
42 Deleuze, Spinoza, 49. 
43 Ben Highmore, “Bitter After Taste: Affect, Food, and Aesthetics,” in The Affect Theory Reader, 119. 
Brackets mine. 
44 Ibid., 119.  
45 It is worth noting that Tschumi is not the only architect that assumes such a definition of architecture. Bruno 
Taut equally defines architecture as something beyond merely space and that which can be designed, as 
Giuliana Bruno comments, “[Bruno] Taut makes an important contribution when he points out that architecture 
is made not only in the act of designing or commissioning it, but also by way of using it.” She herself writes 
earlier in the Chapter that “Architecture is neither static structure nor simply just built. Like all tangible 
artifacts, it is actually constructed - imaged - as it is manipulated, “handled” by users’ hands.” Giuliana Bruno, 
Atlas of Emotion: Journeys in Art, Architecture, and Film (New York: Verso, 2002), 93, 66. 
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it is, following Henri Bergson, a multiplicity of intersecting planes.46  
 
Affect then is not singular. It implies at least two bodies, one affecting, and one being affected in a 
continuous loop. Deleuze writes referring to Spinoza’s Ethics (1677) that there are two types of 
affections: actions and passions, the primary relating to our ability to affect and the secondary to 
being affected:  
 
actions, which are explained by the nature of the affected individual, and which spring from the 
individual’s essence; and passions, which are explained by something else, and which originate 
outside the individual. Hence the capacity for being affected is manifested as a power of acting 
insofar as it is assumed to be filled by active affections, but as a power of being acted upon insofar 
as it is filled by passions.47  
 
Although attempts have been made in architecture to work within this continuous loop of affecting 
and being affected, they often fall short of allowing space to affect the body in an unmediated 
fashion, and it is precisely unmediated affections that both Spinoza and Deleuze had in mind. A 
2007 installation Choreographing Space is such an example, where a dancer pulls on strings of an 
interactive mesh in order to affect space and for space to in turn affect the body.48 The problem 
arises from the space being physically manipulated by the dancer in order for it to affect the 
possibilities for movement of the body. This suggests the human body as an agent, a subject, and as 
affects are pre-personal, visceral forces other than conscious knowing, it moves us away from the 
actual definition of affect. “Affect is the change, or variation, that occurs when bodies collide, or 
come into contact.”49 Here that collision is controlled, it is not allowed to unfold on its own terms, 
and as such we return to the phenomenological notions of space as passive, inert matter, and the 
human body as active, an agent. Once such a distinction between body and space is made, we leave 
the plan(e) of immanence and re-enter the current architectural conceptions of body and space as 
discrete entities. Regardless of this, one can see the quite obvious architectural implications of such 
an experiment, and so the reason why perhaps, the philosophy pertaining to affect, is being 
translated into architectural practice in such an oversimplified manner.   
When one is dealing with the process of abjection however, such a simplification and a falling 
back into a dualistic model is impossible, as abjection has agency of its own accord. It is a process 
that traverses across various bodies, having the capacity to enter into relations of composition and 
decomposition – the capacity to re-form bodies. It is the sticky entanglement of substances and 
feelings, of matter and affect, which cannot be separated, for as matter moves, as it leaks out of one 
body into another, it harbours affective potential. Imagine a sunburnt body in an undercroft, slowly 
peeling off its flaking skin, adjacent to a damp ridden retaining wall, shedding its own white skin 
of paint.50 (fig 5.c) What comes forth here is another critical layer to affect (which began to emerge 
                                                
46 Steven D. Brown and Ian Tucker, “Eff the Ineffable: Affect, Somatic Management, and Mental Health 
Service Users,” in The Affect Theory Reader, 232.   
47 Deleuze, Spinoza, 27. 
48 See: Eva Perez de Vega, "Experiencing Built Space: Affect and Movement," Proceedings of the European 
Society for Aesthetics 2 (2010): 386-409. There are many other examples that fall into a similar trap, namely 
interactive architectures (often surfaces) i.e. Decoi’s Hyposurface (1999-2001). To me the interaction between 
body and space in these examples is very mechanical and no different really to turning on a light switch, except 
for the fact that the interaction is perhaps made more explicit. I don’t think it is necessarily about making space 
active and making it move, it already does these things, even if they are imperceptible, but instead it is more 
about thinking relationally. Work that explores kinetic components also further always has an external agent, 
often a human one. 
49 Adrian Parr, ed. The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 11.  
50 What is being hinted at in this figure is a cross-over of bodies. Another fitting example is UK artist Kira 
O’Reilly’s project Inthewrongplaceness (2005-2009), particularly a series of photographs from this project 
juxtaposing a pig’s back with O’Reilly’s own back.  
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 “A sunburnt body in the undercroft
slowly peels of its flaking skin, adjacent
to the damp ridden retaining wall
shedding its own white skin of paint.” 
 
(fig 5.c) the undercroft
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in the ‘Proximity Fragments’). Here the human body and the spatial body have affects in common 
with each other and hence may be related to one another in a way that would be impossible were 
we to consider body and space in terms of their form or function. If we were to make a list of 
affects as Deleuze suggests for both, we could quite clearly see this relation, and it is through this 
process that Deleuze illustrates a greater similarity between a plow horse and an ox than between a 
plow horse and a racehorse.51 The idea of common notions is what results in bodies forming 
compositions. Deleuze writes that, “Each existing body is characterized by a certain relation of 
motion and rest. When the relations corresponding to two bodies adapt themselves to one another, 
the two bodies form a composite body having a greater power, a whole present in its parts”52. In a 
similar sense, Massumi gives an example of a dance and a storm: “The dance and the storm are 
nonsensuously similar in that between them they co-compose a joint activation contour of 
differential attunement to the same event.” He writes that the “events [echo] in each other, within 
or across sense modalities” and that as a result they become included “in a joint event”53. This 
resemblance that occurs between the events due to the common affects or the specific ‘affective 
tonality’ as Massumi would have it, this composition or composite body that is thought-felt, is 
precisely what transpires every time we encounter a juxtaposition between abjecting human and 
spatial bodies. Both bodies are open to one another, they bleed into one another, becoming 
indiscernible – a joint event. They become reconfigured, a composite body, a heterogeneous body 
– an Architecture without Organs. In other words, the human body and spatial body are in a state of 
becoming (a double becoming or a becoming-imperceptible), something is passing from one to the 
other. This something for Deleuze and Guattari is a sensation, and the indiscernibility is an affect. 
Hence “affects are becomings”54 and not only becomings but “nonhuman becomings of man” 55: 
 
This something can be specified only as sensation. It is a zone of indetermination, of indiscernability, as if 
things, beasts, and persons (Ahab and Moby Dick, Penthesilea and the bitch) endlessly reach that point 
that immediately precedes their natural differentiation. This is what is called an affect.56  
 
To speak about becoming and two events forming a joint event between human bodies and spatial 
bodies, is to speak of an affective architecture, the very architecture that puts us in contact with the 
world at a visceral level. It is to illustrate that the joint event that results from the simultaneous 
abjection of a human body and a spatial body – from body and space being brought together at the 
right proximity, is such an architecture, and that abjection gives us so much more than has been 
acknowledged to date. These abject events then not only serve to dilute the distinction between 
body and space on a visual level, as one penetrates or rests on the surface of the other, but more 
importantly, point to a commonality of affects between them, and therefore a commonality and a 
cross-over, rather than a distinction. 
 
ARCHITECTURE ON THE PLAN(E) OF IMMANENCE  
 
Within this language of matter and affect, all is matter, and all has the potential to affect and be 
affected. As matter is perpetually in motion, nothing is stable – all is a process. Human bodies and 
spatial bodies are therefore each compositions of matter having attained relative stability for a 
certain amount of time. It is because of this ‘relative’ stability that we visually perceive them as 
discrete entities, despite the imperceptible shifts, or what François Jullien has aptly named, the 
                                                
51 Deleuze, Spinoza, 124. 
52 Ibid., 54. 
53 Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event, 123-4. 
54 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 283. 
55 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 169. 
56 Ibid., 173. 
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silent transformations, that are perpetually in play.57 These vibrating compositions are all situated 
on the plan(e) of immanence where they have the potential to enter into relations with one another, 
to form assemblages – architectures.  
 
Now although we are talking about an intelligent materialism, where matter is seen as self-
organising, there is also a certain degree of ‘organisation’ or rather grouping that occurs on part of 
the architect, in the formation of a spatial body. Elizabeth Grosz (following the work of Bernard 
Cache and Deleuze) refers to this in terms of framing. For her, architecture is the art of framing, 
and the architect is the constructor of frames.58 This can be interpreted quite literally, as in the 
framing of a landscape or a sequence of spaces, which brings up the relation within architecture 
between the frame and the gaze, and which for architects such as Le Corbusier was about rendering 
the exterior as a flat image and ascertaining a “domination over the exterior world”59. Such a literal 
understanding is precisely what one finds in the writings of Cache, where he redefines architecture 
as the art of the frame and utilises this definition to extend architecture beyond merely “those 
specific objects that are buildings” to further images which involve “any element of framing” such 
as “painting as well as cinema, and certainly many other things.”60  As a point of distinction, what 
Grosz has in mind rather, is that the architect is seen as framing a certain amount of matter, in an 
effort to bring together heterogeneous processes, intensify them, affect them and make sensation 
pass between them.61 Through this framing then, bodies are actualised, i.e. recognised as a chair, 
an animal, a plant, a book and so on. Given a broader understanding of architecture however as per 
Tschumi, the architect I would argue, does not so much frame architecture, but rather frames a 
spatial body, his ability to frame not extending to human events. The architect, as an extension to 
Grosz’s notion of framing, can then be understood as grouping processes, and then suggesting, the 
relations between these processes. The frame the architect creates however is not continuous. It is a 
fragile boundary. It does not fully contain. It should hence be understood not so much as a rigid 
structure or outline which imposes a form, but as something porous, indeterminate and perpetually 
shifting.  
 
Event in the sense of matter, is then the transition of matter, not consciously or by an agent, but 
rather independently, we may think of it as matter moving itself, or as Jullien notes, having “the 
capacity to produce itself”62. It “becomes a matter of emergence”63. As such, event is not only 
related to the human body, but any body, including spatial bodies, which is a critical point that 
Tschumi neglects to address, (demoting space potentially to the state of inert matter), but it is a 
point that Claire Colebrook touches upon in Deleuze and Space (2005): 
 
                                                
57 François Jullien, The Silent Transformations, trans. Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski (London: 
Seagull Books, 2011). 
58 In Cache’s book Earth Moves, whose manuscript preceded the work of both Deleuze and Grosz, architecture 
is identified as “the art of the frame”. This manuscript which appeared in 1983 influenced Deleuze’s writing on 
the frame and architecture in his books Cinéma I: L'image-mouvement and Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?. I do 
not expand on Cache’s, or Deleuze’s idea for that matter, of the frame here, as these are but starting points for a 
discussion that veers of on its own path. Bernard Cache, Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories, Writing 
Architecture (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995), xvii. 
59 Beatriz Colomina, ‘The Split Wall: Domestic Voyeurism’ in Sexuality and Space, ed. Beatriz Colomina, Vol. 
1, Princeton Papers on Architecture (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), 112. 
60 Cache, Earth Moves, 2. 
61 Elizabeth Grosz, Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008), 11-13.  
Interestingly, in 1999, S. E. Rasmussen wrote, “to bring order and relation into human surroundings - is the task 
of the architect.” S. E. Rasmussen, Experiencing Architecture (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1999), 34. 
62 Jullien, The Silent Transformations, 116. 
63 Ibid., 126. 
139
In terms of space this would seem to suggest that space, far from being a field within which points 
are mapped, is better conceived as a plane of singular affects and events that is, in Western though, 
reactively coded as one general territory.64  
In the human body, such an event may be nasal mucus running out of our nostrils, for the spatial 
body, it may be timber boards rotting from persistent dampness. All bodies are capable of events, it 
is just a matter of acknowledging those that are visually imperceptible to us, that occur at a 
different velocity (within geological time), and become known to us, after the fact. It is therefore a 
matter of plurality – events, processes. There is no singular. To deal with these terms is to 
understand everything as interconnected and in perpetual motion.  
 
Abjection as an event, is a moment in a body’s life where its parts become unstable, it is the 
moment when the amount of motion/ energy in a grouping of molecules which defines a certain 
state i.e. solid, liquid or gas – all different states on a continuum of (in)discernibility, is disrupted. 
Hence it is a moment of the frame being thrown open – an opportunity for a body to be 
reorganised/ reconfigured – an opportunity for the interchange of organs, rendered all the more 
acute in instances of the simultaneous expulsion of human bodies and spatial bodies. (fig 5.d) In 
this instance, both bodies would find their respective frames disrupted, leaking out of themselves 
and into each other. In the instance of a single body abjecting, only its own frame would be 
disrupted, with its excretions coming to rest on the frames of adjacent bodies, shrouding them with 
a film of the Other. 
 
These understandings of body, space and event at a base level, bring us to an understanding of 
architecture – an understanding that was started through the reference to Tschumi’s theory, in an 
effort to discuss the process of abjection in architecture and be able to comprehend its workings, 
and which here, finally, has the possibility of being articulated. If one is interested in the process of 
abjection, regardless of the context, whether architectural or otherwise, one inevitably finds 
themself immersed in expulsions – in the process of bodily parts transitioning from the inside to 
the outside and between bodies – in visceral happenings, or in other words, in the interconnected 
field of matter and affect. This field explodes our discrete bodies, it explodes spatial bodies, and 
has the exploded parts swimming on the plan(e) of immanence amidst their expulsions, such that it 
is a drastic understatement to say that what we experience is a threat to our bodily boundary – our 
identity. These are no longer fixed as we once understood them to be, they are relative,65 and not 
only are these boundaries relative, but they have the capacity to expand beyond what we 
understand as a discrete object or ‘body’, a sense of expansion similar to the one we find in a 
Lacanian pre-mirror stage. Bodies no longer end at the skin. Here architecture is defined by the 
relations of matter at a given point. It becomes defined by the relative stability of the relations 
between processes of human bodies and spatial bodies. Sometimes the matter that makes up these 
bodies moves of its own accord, sometimes, there is a shift of matter by an agent. It is in this sense 
that architecture may be defined by either events or actions respectively, that it either leads to 
becoming or being, and that it is either impersonal or personal. If we were to revise Tschumi’s 
equation, we may define architecture thus: 
 
 Architecture = spatial bodily event + human bodily event and/ or not action 
 
                                                
64 Claire Colebrook, “The Space of Man: On the Specificity of Affect in Deleuze and Guattari”, in Deleuze and 
Space, ed. Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert, Deleuze Connections (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005), 194. 
65 To think about bodies in terms of processes, essentially undoes the possibility of identity. Identity is, for this 
reason, relative. François Jullien illustrates this perfectly in terms of the process of ageing and looking back at 
photographs of oneself, asking whether it is the same person standing here, as in the photograph? See, Jullien, 
The Silent Transformations, 55-56. 
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This equation is the most basic, as it outlines merely two bodies.66 There is however no limit to the 
number of bodies (or types) that may form an architectural assemblage. It may involve a spatial 
body and two human bodies, or a spatial body, a human body and an animal body, and so on. But 
this can get complicated very quickly, so we will remain with the equation in its most basic form, 
with the knowledge that every time a human body and a spatial body enter into a relation, the 
resultant assemblage is architecture. What is critical to understand is not only that human bodies 
and spatial bodies are collections of processes, but that each body can exist irrespective of the 
other. It is the processes or events that unfold in relation to the other body that activate the 
architecture, which then becomes understood as composed of not only these processes but the 
processes that define the bodies involved.  
 
Where Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of an open subjectivity provides a framework that allows us 
to consider the simultaneous abjection of body and space, and hence to flatten the distinction 
between body, space and the abject, the introduction of a Deleuzean intelligent materialism takes 
us one step further and flattens all onto the plan(e) of immanence, where formal distinctions are 
collapsed and all is understood as matter. This leads us to an architecture of process, defined by the 
constant exchange of matter passing in and out through the porous boundary of bodies. Abject(ion) 
now may be understood as matter in transition, forming the relations between and reconfiguring 
bodies as it does so – and it is the experience of this reconfiguration that eventuates in affect. 
Through an intelligent materialism then, abject(ion) can be seen to constitute the relations that 
come to form an affective architecture – an architecture which is partly self-organised and partly 
framed by the architect. Processes are grouped by the architect within a fragile boundary – one that 
is porous, indeterminate and constantly under threat from abject(ion). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
66 Although an equation is structured and static, and hence its use here might seem to defy the intentions at 
hand, the components, as well as the outcome – the architecture, are indeterminate. With the components being 
indeterminate and perpetually shifting, the equation then functions less as a structuring agent and more as a 
simple description of connections. One may also understand the use of the ‘contract’ in the same way within 
the project work. 
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Parallel to the development of the theory throughout the thesis, a series of experimental works have 
been undertaken. These projects seek to further tease out or illustrate concepts that are first 
presented in the writing, however do so predominantly in the form of architecturally informed 
diagrams and texts, and are as such concerned with the development of a theory, rather than the 
application of it, to practice. Though theoretical in nature, the projects are all informed by a 
number of decomposing spaces that were lived in (with one still being lived in) throughout the 
course of the research. These spaces not only allowed for a direct immersion in the material 
workings of abject(ion) but simultaneously served to provide the spatial content for all the projects. 
The majority of the projects take the names of these spaces. 
 
The works explore the following key concepts: from the notion of event in Ingesting Space (2010) 
and The Contracts (2011-13); to the notion of process and thinking processually about architecture 
in The Tea Room (2013); to finally a thinking in terms of matter, material exchanges and 
heterogeneity in the Transfer Pillows (2013). The works are presented here as a group, or more 
precisely, as a mode of research, as together, they allow for a summary of the theory in another 
mode. The ambition is for the collected works to retrace crucial aspects of the theory prior to 
moving onto the final Chapter.      
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1. Ingesting Space 
 
Presented chronologically, the first work, Ingesting Space, explores the notion of abject(ion) as 
event on the side of the spatial body. It not only documents such events through collecting the 
abject matter of five decomposing spaces in small brown vials but takes us one step further, 
suggesting that after a period of one month, we ingest the contents – we ingest space. The action of 
ingestion brings space, which is otherwise external to us, inside us, such that the two bodies 
(spatial and human) become conjoined. Through ingestion our identity is threatened. We have 
taken into ourselves a part of space and thus breached our bodily boundary. We no longer dwell in 
space, instead, space comes to dwell in us, in an almost religious act akin to the Christian ingestion 
of the body and blood of Christ. Space becomes an excess within our body.  
 
Though potent, this small work was almost discarded for the plain fact that it began its life as a 
collection of abjects, which as mentioned earlier, often falls into the trap of objectifying the abject. 
Through introducing the act of ingestion however, the work serves to comment on the dilution of 
boundaries between bodies and spaces. Its instructional text, which attains a certain immediacy and 
speaks directly to the action of ingestion, as well as the abject events in play, also served as a 
starting point for the subsequent work, The Contracts. 
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“Capture the air of five decomposing spaces in separate vials, label and set aside for a month. After 
a month, ingest the various spaces at your leisure. 
The wall cavity: 1) A partially open wall cavity, framed up with recycled posts and chamferboards of 
varying hues of green. Horse-hair plaster into the bedroom, masonite into the entry. The still air 
from within rushes forward. Insert your hand into the cavity and sit the bottle on a nogging. The 
roof cavity: 2) A hundred year old roof cavity, the base lined with vj panelling and a layer of 
masonite to the interior spaces. Climb the old timber ladder in the corner and lift up the hatch. Sit 
the bottle on a ceiling joist. The undercroft: 3) A dark, dusty undercroft, just tall enough to nearly 
stand in. A concrete block retaining wall holds back a cut. A bent galvanised pipe drains a concrete 
path from above, ensuring the presence of moisture behind the retaining wall. And everytime a 
slight breeze blows, passing over the exposed ground, dust stirs through the undercroft. Place the 
bottle on the retaining wall. The stair shelf: 4) An single run within a semi-enclosed space. Mouldy 
linings from the leaking roof and an assortment of solid timber shelves and hooks. This space was 
no doubt once filled with various potted and hanging plants. Reach up to the shelf at the bottom of 
the stair (you may need to stand up on the first riser to reach) and sit the bottle there. The weep 
hole: 5) A row of weep holes in a damp ridden retaining wall. At the base of the retaining wall, a 
spoon drain angled ever so slightly and inefficiently. Rotten timber bearers balance precariously on 
the wall edge. Kneel down and insert the bottle into the spoon drain, carefully aligning it with a 
weep hole above.” 
   
ingesting space
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2. Bodyabject(ion)space: A Collection of Contracts 
 
The Contracts present a more layered exploration of the notion of abject(ion) as event. Critically, 
they are not only explorations of abject spatial events, but also human bodily events, and hence the 
architecture that is defined by the interplay of these events. Given the centrality to the thesis of the 
simultaneous abject(ion) of human bodies and spatial bodies, and the indiscernibility that this 
results in, The Contracts have come to span a period of three years, hence establishing themselves 
as the most developed body of work. Methodologically, The Contracts are informed by 
architectural practice, taking the form of a contract, and the understanding of the architect as an 
instructor, one who issues a series of instructions that are documented through schedules, 
specifications, drawings, and bound into a contract. In this way, architecture is instructional, and 
shares an affinity with both instructional art and Gilles Deleuze’s program from a masochist to his 
mistress1. Steen Eiler Rasmussen, Danish architect and planner wrote in 1959: 
 
his [the architect’s] drawings are not an end in themselves, a work of art, but simply a set of 
instructions, an aid to the craftsman who constructs his buildings. He delivers a number of 
completely impersonal plan drawings and typewritten specifications. They must be so unequivocal 
that there will be no doubt about the construction.2 
 
The contract at its most fundamental level is an agreement, an agreement that is often legal and 
written, but that at times may also be merely spoken or perhaps not even verbalised – a silent 
understanding. In two of the fragments  that follow the fourth Chapter: Georges Bataille’s Histoire 
de l’œil and Catherine Breillat’s Anatomie de l’enfer, it is a verbal agreement, in the first instance, 
that Sir Edmond will provide the means for actualising all obscenities, and in the second, that the 
woman will be watched where she is unwatchable. In arts practice such as instructional or 
performance art, a non-verbalised contract issues, where the audience becomes implicated in the 
work via its participatory nature. In architecture of course, the agreement is legal and written, it sits 
within a much more rigid framework, it is nevertheless, the necessary process for actualising a 
piece of ‘architecture’, and if for only this reason, is adopted here, in order to explore the workings 
of abject(ion) as event and the architecture that results from such events.3 
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 167-168. 
2 Steen Eiler Rasmussen, Experiencing Architecture (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1959), 14. Brackets 
mine. 
3 I have alluded previously in Chapter 3 to the curtailing of the nature of an event through a contract, however it 
is critical to point out that the framework of the contract is utilised here in not only a very different context but 
also in a very different way. Where a contract in instructional, performance or interactive art is between the 
viewer and the work, within the architectural discipline, the contract has dual meaning, it is at once the 
collection of documents needed in order to procure a building, and simultaneously the written agreement 
between the builder and client to which the architect is party. Here the contract is taken primarily as meaning 
the collection of documents, and as an illustrative diagram for an event based architecture, it is not attempting 
to set up actual agreements and pre-empt events. 
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The four contracts are each composed of two parts: a program in a Deleuzean sense, a series of 
written instructions; and a drawing, a section – a vertical cut through all boundaries – an opening 
up of bodies, both descriptive of the two components that form an architectural contract. The 
contract is hence reduced to its most basic form. Despite this, drawing conventions are maintained, 
and a schedule of fixtures and finishes is noted alongside each drawing. As the contract however 
now details an architecture that is not merely space, but that is manifested by bodily and spatial 
events, and further, by abject events, a certain tension results between the clinical architectural 
drawing, its preoccupation with precision, order, and the events that it describes. In the same way 
that the Marquis de Sade once spoke mathematically of erotic subject-matter, and the way that 
Tschumi conceives of architecture as a paradox of system and excess/ pyramid and labyrinth, 
abject(ion) oozes out of the ruled drawings, out of the legal language of the contract. There is an 
aim here to repurpose architectural methodology, in order to contemplate abject(ion), and 
specifically, contemplate its dilution of boundaries between bodies.  
 
Architecture is very carefully structured, it has developed its own framework, language, and ways 
of working. Although this framework may be pushed and pulled for various ends, it must 
inevitably remain present to a degree, in order for buildings to be realised. The retention of this 
framework but simultaneously its questioning, is what one sees present in Tschumi’s equation, 
where the equation is the framework that sets out a logical outcome, but where the insertion of 
event introduces a deviation, a slippage from that outcome, such that the architecture is 
indeterminate. The retention of the contract in this instance functions in a similar fashion, and it 
becomes about setting up a tension between the contract and abject(ion), rather than attempting to 
eliminate all structure or to subject abject(ion) to a structure. 
 
What is critical to reiterate from the thesis, is that abject(ion), through its volatile and leaky nature 
inevitably comes to encompass more than one body. For the menstrual blood of a woman does not 
remain bound to her body but comes to invade adjacent bodies, whether human or spatial. As such, 
abject(ion) is a discussion of bodies, of assemblages, and of the decompositions and compositions 
formed. The contracts take the most violent of assemblages in order to attain an affective intensity 
– an expelling human body in a decomposing spatial body, and by juxtaposing abjecting spatial 
and human bodies, they produce a type of labyrinth with a momentary impossibility of escape. 
These are minoritarian architectures.  
 
The project work draws heavily from the filmic and textual exemplars running through this thesis, 
all of which work with fictional scenarios, and where fiction allows for a study of highly temporal 
events. Fiction, which has previously been fruitful for architecture (if we consider the likes of 
Archigram or Superstudio, or within our current context, projects such as Under Tomorrows Sky4), 
has therefore become a way of exploring ideas about space and the event of abject(ion). Within the 
project work, each contract (but one) consists of a fictional event. The space however is actual, as 
an architect requires a physical site.5 This necessity of real space is similarly referred to by 
Tschumi in The Manhattan Transcripts, “The architectural origin of each episode is found within a 
specific reality and not in an abstract geometrical figure.”6 Each space is specifically chosen, 
                                                
4 Under Tomorrow’s Sky is run by the speculative architect Liam Young. http://undertomorrowssky.com/ 
5 The spaces within the ‘Contracts’ are all spaces that I have occupied at various points in my life. Some are 
apartments, some worker’s cottages but the thing that they all have in common, is their unfinished or processual 
state. It is also worth noting that through merely providing drawings and specifications, that is, a set of 
instructions, the architect avoids touching his own shit i.e. he does not build the work, and that in this way, 
architects distance themselves from material contingencies. Here however that line is crossed, and even though 
the ‘Contracts’ have not been enacted, the spaces have been occupied in these very states. 
6 Bernard Tschumi, The Manhattan Transcripts (London: Academy Editions, 1994), 8. 
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documented, and drafted. It then informs the abject event – this event is a potentiality of the space, 
it is one of a certain number of possible events. What the juxtaposition of a non-fictional space and 
a fictional event manifests, is an immediate and palpable threat to our bodily boundary, as it 
suggests that any number of real spaces have the capacity to support a violent event of abject(ion).7 
Hence one may not only make a cup of tea in the kitchen but uncontrollably vomit on the floor, not 
only sleep upon our white bed sheets but menstruate on them, and not only walk across a public 
square but piss in it. This degree of fiction in the architectural contracts is productive, as it allows 
for the contemplation of transgressive scenarios that may not be planned and re-enacted in real life 
(without losing their effect), but that nevertheless have the possibility of occurring – of being 
provoked. Here architecture is pushed towards and over its limits, to the point that it is no longer 
architecture as we know it but an anticipation of an architecture to come.  
 
What these contracts do not do, is attempt to represent abject(ion), to capture event as in much of 
Bernard Tschumi’s cinematographic sequences, and to make art out of abject(ion), they are not an 
end in themselves. Hence they have never been exhibited, for to exhibit the abject is to 
institutionalise it, to objectify it, to submit it to a highly controlled environment in order to purely 
satisfy our scopophilia and reaffirm our bodily boundary. Rather the contracts act as a medium that 
allows for abject(ion)’s discussion, with the actual process of abject(ion), residing in the physical 
event or act.8 Further although the contracts are instructional, you are not to necessarily re-enact 
them and re-construct the spaces, rather, the instructional nature of the text is used for its relation 
to architectural contracts and for its directness, such that the spaces and events described, are 
immediate and could be real. The contracts are essentially a diagram of how one might attain or 
rather think, an architecture defined by events. Given that events by definition are not 
programmable, and occur when a certain set of potentialities are realised, one may only set the 
conditions for an event, as Brian Massumi notes, one cannot set the event itself.9 These contracts 
document hypothetical events/ fictional events, events nonetheless, that by their nature, cannot be 
reconstructed. The contract which gives clear instructions, and according to which buildings are 
typically procured, here, cannot be realised. Or if it is realised, would entail a choreographed form 
of abject(ion) that significantly differs from an uncontrollable and unexpected event of abject(ion). 
It is only unplanned abject(ion) that has the capacity to lead to excess and result in affect. For this 
reason, the contracts remain unrealised, fictional and serve purely to contemplate the possibility of 
such events. It is only the final contract that presents a point of difference, in that both space and 
event are non-fictional and it is included here to illustrate the physical potential of such events. 
 
                                                
7 What is further threatening about the juxtaposition, and has been commented on by Patrick Ffrench in relation 
to Bataille’s Histoire de l’œil, is that it problematizes “any clear-cut distinction between ‘fiction’ and ‘real’”. 
Patrick Ffrench discusses the significance of the juxtaposition of the fictional and real, clearly separating the 
novella into 2 sections: Chapters 1-8 (village of X) and Chapters 9-14 (Madrid, Seville, Gibraltar). The first 
section is entirely imaginary. The second section, set in Spain, takes up this juxtaposition. Patrick Ffrench, The 
Cut/ Reading Bataille's Histoire de l'œil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 83-89, 147.  
8 This distinction is also drawn very explicitly in art and is critical to keep in mind, as Nicolas Bourriaud points 
out in his notable publication Relational Aesthetics (2002), “Once the performance is over, all that remains is 
documentation that should not be confused with the work itself.” Four years prior, Margaret Morse made a 
more elaborate comment in terms of installation art, “While an installation can be diagrammed, photographed, 
videotaped, or described in language, its crucial element is ultimately missing from any such two dimensional 
construction, that is, “the space-in-between,” or the actual construction of a passage for bodies or figures in 
space and time. Indeed, I would argue, that art is the part that collapses whenever the installation isn’t 
installed.” Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods (Dijon: Les 
presses du réel, 2002), 26. Margaret Morse, Virtualities: Television, Media Art, and Cyberculture 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 157.  
9 Brian Massumi, Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts, ed. Brian Massumi and 
Erin Manning, Technologies of Lived Abstraction (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011), 148-9. 
155
 
 
A few notes on the contracts: 
 
1) The Wall Cavity: We live with dirt, leaf litter, droppings, dust, spider webs and all manner of 
detritus in our wall cavities, our roof cavities. Our buildings are essentially decaying from the 
inside out. And all that separates this from us and our immaculately clean interiors, is a matter of 
millimetres. The fake assurance of cleanliness and of our bodily boundary rests on the internal 
lining of our houses. But when that skin begins to slouch from dampness, when it becomes eaten 
out until paper-thin, it is only a matter of time before we are faced with what lies within the bowels 
of our house. Imagine pulling apart the boundary – the musty smell of still air issuing forth from 
the sealed cavities, the dust filling your nostrils, and the collected debris subjected to decades of 
decomposition falling from the cavities, creating a layer on your skin. ‘The Wall Cavity’ works on 
the basis of occupying these spaces and allowing them to breathe, in coming in contact with the 
processes. More to the point, it inserts a bathroom (an environment for the upkeep of bodily purity) 
into an expanded cavity. It utilises the one space for both human and spatial bodies to expel 
themselves.  
 
There is an expulsion of all manner of abjects from dust, leaves, animal wastes, sweat, shit, piss, 
nail and hair clippings...that will fall into, fall through and seep through, the space, repeatedly. 
There is a certain control that is exerted over our leaky bodies, systems in place that ensure 
immediate evacuation of our expulsions. The systems in this space are set up for failure. There is a 
certain tension from the possibility that something may escape the system, through the gaps in the 
floorboards, the dust that falls on the person showering…  
 
2) The Sewing Room: Tiny perforations all over your body. The skin does not provide a distinct 
boundary between the interior of our body and that which lays outside it. It is as leaky as the 
body’s larger orifices. To sweat is to excrete out of one’s body and to deposit oneself onto other 
bodies; clothes, upholstery, bed sheets, kitchenware, human bodies. To sweat is to escape the body 
through the flesh. To excrete through the flesh one must strain the body, give it an action to 
perform – sewing. To sew is to secure with stitches, to close a hole, a wound.10 Sewing is an 
operation through which a part of space may be made or transformed. The task is to sew a curtain 
for a small room, to secure together with stitches, fabric, sweat and at times the dust pink paint 
peelings that build up on the table surface over a few days, to stitch that which has been abjected 
from our body into another, to reinforce the bleeding of one body into another. Hence it is to 
momentarily reconfigure those bodies. It is to stop the organs from working and begin to approach 
a BwO. Deleuze and the Marquis de Sade both sew up the human body in such an attempt.11 
Deleuze’s masochist gives instructions to his mistress: 
 
You begin sewing, you sew up the hole in the glans; you sew the skin around the glans to the glans 
itself, preventing the top from tearing; you sew the breasts, securely attaching a button with four 
holes to each nipple. You may connect them with an elastic band with buttonholes … You sew my 
buttocks together, all the way up and down the crack of my ass. Tightly, with a doubled thread, each 
stitch knotted.12  
 
At the end of the day the curtain is hung and there is a certain visceral repulsion to the damp 
curtain hanging in the window, to the drying of our bodily excretions and their gradual visual 
                                                
10 “Sew,” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sew?s=t (accessed January 24, 2012). 
11 For the Marquis de Sade example see: Marquis de Sade, Philosophy in the Boudoir, trans. Joachim 
Neugroschel (New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 170-171. 
12 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 167. 
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indiscernibility with the fabric. Soon no one knows what the fabric has absorbed. All that remains 
is us, inhaling ourselves as air passes through the curtain and into our lungs – a re-absorption of 
our expulsions.13  
 
3) The Clinic: Bathrooms are spaces associated with the clean body and simultaneously with the 
dirty body. They are spaces which allow for the hygienic evacuation of our excretions. They order 
our un-containment, and we take comfort in the fact that the plumbing and the sewer systems that 
connect to our bathrooms are there for hygienic purposes. Bataille writes:  
 
Man has increasingly sought to reduce that part of himself which disturbs him, at the very least by 
persuading himself that this is the domain of hygiene. However the result is pretty unconvincing. 
Luckily insanity, torture and war maintain the complexity of a world in which shit is as 
indispensable as roses.14 
 
‘The Clinic’ takes a bathroom that is in a state of renovation, with one corner tiled, fitted with two 
new fixtures and clean, and the rest of the room still in its decomposing state. Incomplete, here it is 
impossible for the hygienic systems to fully rein. Enter a menstruating female body that has the 
everyday task of cleaning the bathroom. Cleaning implies a removal of building and human 
generated abjects, but the action simultaneously produces further abjects, essentially replacing one 
series of abjects with another. There is a paradox at work here. Cleaning is a frantic process that 
attempts to eliminate bodily and spatial abjects, however through the act of cleaning, our body 
sweats, brushes against surfaces of space and deposits further abjects, such that in our attempt to 
have eliminated the built up abjects, we have in their place instated new ones and not only have we 
reinstated new ones, but here, we are faced with the impossibility of physically cleaning the 
bathroom as menstrual blood combines with dust and peeling paint, filling the white grout lines. In 
Material Matters: Architecture and Material Practice (2007) Helen Stratford speaks about 
cleaning/ maintenance as a process of making, writing that “whether subtracting or adding matter, 
[maintenance activities] take part in a constant making of building”15. The action of cleaning 
therefore, along with the events, creates an architecture that is constantly being made and remade – 
an architecture in process. 
 
4) Elron Court: Old buildings do not seal properly. In instances of high humidity the building 
begins to sweat, bed sheets are damp, clothes do not dry, and over time, mould grows behind 
paintings that have hung in the same position for years. In the same conditions, the human body 
equally comes to sweat, and one is faced with two identical processes originating from different 
bodies, resulting in a commonality of affects. This contract differs to the preceding three, it is not 
fictional, it is real. It is the occurrence of an architecture manifested by bodily and spatial events – 
an architecture of process – an architecture on the plan(e) of immanence. An architecture of the 
summer of 2011.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
13 As a side note, in a conversation with Juliette Peers, a few years after the completion of ‘The Sewing Room’, 
Peers mentioned a certain parallel between the body within my project not being able to leave until the work is 
complete, and the 2012 Pakistan Garment Factory Fires, where locked doors and barred windows resulted in 
the death of hundreds of workers. I find this parallel highly thought provoking. 
14 Alastair Brotchie et al., ed., Encyclopædia Acephalica, Documents of the Avant-Garde (London: Atlas Press, 
1995), 113-4. 
15 Helen Stratford, “Unpleasant Matters,” in Material Matters: Architecture and Material Practice, ed. Katie 
Lloyd Thomas (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 221. 
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the wall cavity
“The Room: 1) A simple white tiled bathroom within an expanded wall cavity. The bathroom is 
incredibly narrow, the width of a corridor. The fixtures are lined up, one next to the other, as if on a 
conveyor belt - the basin, the shower, the w.c.. The cavity remains intact - the existing skins of 
horse-hair plaster nailed into reused studwork and the opening to the roof void. Only the cross 
walls at either end, the new walls, created by the expansion of the cavity are tiled. Two new holes 
have been drilled into the pine floor; one for the w.c., the other for the sink waste. The gaps in and 
between the floorboards typically take care of the rest (make sure though to pull out the corks that 
fill the existing holes). Two bulbs light the room, one hanging above the w.c., the other, a batten 
holder within the roof cavity. 2) This is a space into which both you and the building expel your 
respective abjects. Use the bathroom. First Phase: 3) Grab the scissors from the third nogging on 
the right and stand infront of the small wall hung basin. Fully extend the tarnished accordion 
mirror so that it hangs out from the wall. Comb your fringe straight. You begin to cut, from right to 
left, the hair collecting in the basin. Cut about an inch (a single motion with the scissors) - stop - 
comb your fringe straight - cut another inch - stop - comb again. You repeat this motion from one 
end to the other. Now cut into the hair. Run the comb through several times to make sure you 
haven’t missed any part, the cut hair floating through the air and settling on horizontal surfaces. 
Turn the tap and wet your hand. Move your hand over the entire basin, the hair collects on top of 
the waste. Turn the tap off, you can clean the waste later. Second Phase: 4) Take off your clothes. 
Shake them out and lay them aside. Naked, walk into the middle of the cavity and turn the simple 
brass taps. The exposed plumbing gives a shudder and begins to jerk as the first spits of water come 
down. Pull the shower curtain around, the full semicircle. Carefully and thoroughly begin to scrub 
away your dead skin cells from the top down. Often, before the steam begins to rise, the banging of 
the pipes as they expand causes the dust from the cavity above to float to the floor. (You might have 
to wash some parts several times). Eventually, the steam rises until it expands horizontally into the 
roof cavity, every night settling on the accumulated dust and dampening it. The house begins to 
sweat. And somewhere, under the cupped floorboards down there, you can hear the water full of 
dust, dirt and dead skin cells soaking into the ground. Grab the towel from the white powdercoated 
rail. (Shake the towel out and use the reverse side). Dry yourself and re-hang the towel. Repeat 
tomorrow. Tomorrow, cut your nails on the toilet bowl.”
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scissors
1 x new scissors, 60w x 170l, brass handles, siting on nogging
bulb 01
1 x pendant bulb, 40w globe, brass bayonet holder, 2500l brown fabric cord, pinned at 1250l to exposed 
rafter, brown bakelite rose fixed to studwork, hung above wc
bulb 02
1 x brass batten holder, 40w globe, fixed to vj ceiling within roof cavity 
mirror
180Ø x 350h, tarnished accordion mirror, chrome, fixed to studwork 
basin
150h x 350w x 350d, new ceramic basin, white, wall mounted 800h, copper trap, brass waste, unevenly 
tarnished copper cross handle taps with porcelain insert centered above basin
toilet
470h x 360w x 500d, old ceramic toilet with black plastic seat and lid, yellowy white, screw indentations 
filled with dust, cistern mounted at 1500h, string flush pull dangling to left, leaks constantly (water turned 
off  between use) 
cavity
1070w x 4900l x 4000h, expanded wall cavity, lined with existing exposed hwd studwork of assorted green 
hues and new pine studwork, existing studwork lined with horse-hair plaster to outside, cross walls tiled in 
white butcher tile (vertical stretcher bond) all the way into the roof cavity, open roof cavity with exposed 
framing, yellowed polyurethane pine floor with holes and borer tracks, 2 openings at either end of cavity 
(no doors), brass semi-circular curtain rail hung at 2000h, exposed greening copper plumbing fixed to 
studwork with saddle clips 
body
1590h, 1 x clothed then naked female body
duration
dependent on time taken to cut fringe and shower
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hob
white tiles
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mirror
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the sewing room
“The Room: 1) A small room of odd proportions, no larger than a sleep-out or sunroom. 
Four large windows in the western wall - two operable, two fixed. The room must be on a 
western elevation, with the windows large enough for all the rays to penetrate through. 2) 
The room is hot. The dust pink paint is blistering. Before you even enter the room, turn the 
light on. Bring three different lamps in: a floor lamp with 2 adjustable heads, an old heat 
lamp and a small telescopic task lamp. These should be sat on the floor, all directed toward 
the workstation on the floor and turned on immediately. 3) Now place a table under the 
operable windows, hard against the wall and with it, bring a chair upholstered in vinyl. Open 
the two windows. 4) You will also need a sewing machine and sewing basket, place these on 
the table. First phase: 5) Your task, to sew one continuous curtain for the four windows. 
Layout the material on the floor, the room is precisely not big enough for this task, you will 
need to kneel on the material, mark it, hem it, pin it, then pull it under you and move onto the 
next section, mark it, hem it, pin it. The fabric is strenuously long. The light waves from the 
lamps and western sun overheat your body. You will have already started to sweat behind 
your knees and on the palms of your hands, rubbing it into the fabric as you work. And every 
so often you will brush against the pins you have put in place, as you are crawling on the 
fabric. Tiny perforations into your body. Your body oozing out of its skin onto the material - 
Now you go on to the second phase: 6) You sit on the vinyl chair, the sweat causing you to 
slide backwards and forwards, drape the material over your lap, so that it slowly starts to 
saturate with you - it extends to the floor. 7) You need to move the three lamps, two onto the 
table - direct them at your body, redirect the heads of the floor lamp. 8) Now add another 
light source, the sewing machine. 9) You start to sew. A stop and start motion. The material 
slides over your wet lap as it enters the machine. Sew along the length - stop - turn 90 degrees 
- sew - stop - run the machine forwards then backwards to finish the stitch - cut the thread. 
Next, leave a gap for the curtain hook, start again - sew - stop - turn 90 degrees - sew - stop - 
turn another 90 degrees - sew - stop - run the machine forwards then backwards. You repeat 
this motion from one end to the other. The machine running at full speed. 10) You sit in the 
one spot for the entire task, the material lapping up the oozing liquid as it slides past your 
body, through the machine and emerges a curtain at the other end. Soon there will be no 
excretions left to soak up. Stop and drink some water. There needs to be a constant input of 
liquid for there to be an output. Third phase: 11) Sliding on the vinyl chair, insert the curtain 
hooks into the holes. This will take awhile. 12) Now move the chair up to the window and 
begin hanging the curtain. Let your bodily excretions dry in place.”
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sewing machine
1 x new, white sewing machine that accelerates quickly, makes the table vibrate and makes alot of noise, 
positioned under window to left side of table
lamp 01
280Ø x 1685 h, worn floor lamp, 40w globes, chrome and cream paint, 2 x operable lamps, positioned on 
left side of table close to window, lower lamp directed at sewing machine and body, upper lamp directed 
down at sewing machine
lamp 02
70w x 115l x 250-430h used telescopic lamp, 40w globe, plastic, dark brown, extended half-way, positioned 
at left back corner of table, directed at sewing machine and body
lamp 03
180w x 250l x 450h, 40w globe, metal, worn metallic blue, adjustable at head and base, positioned at right 
back corner of table, directed at sewing machine and body
table
750w x 1200l 17 black formply sheet layed on 2 x pine trestles 700h (not fixed), positioned in corner under 
casement window
chair
760h x 370w x 370d, faded yellow vinyl upholstery, naked sanded timber frame
room
2500w x 3500l x 3050h, off-pink old paint, dark unsealed timber floor, one cream glass pendant light 
centered (indirect light source), 4 x large casement windows (2 x operable and left open, 2 x fixed) with 
peeling white paint on frames, empty curtain rail, rose coloured solid timber door left open, 455w x 1390l 
x 1850h old timber wardrobe positioned on wall with door, 970w x 3050h corridor outside door
body
1590h, 1 x partially naked female body, red lips, black mascara and eyeliner, sitting on chair sewing a 
curtain
material
1650w x 5000l (selected by body), drapped over body and extending on to the floor
glass
tall glass filled with clear water on left side of table
duration
dependent on time taken to complete one curtain for all 4 windows (window 3000w x 1230h)
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the clinic
“The Room: 1) A small introverted room with no external 
walls, only two closed solid shutters, one to a garage 
straight-ahead, the other on the left, to a dusty storage 
space. The room is to be embedded in the middle of the 
plan - a bunker. A combination of raw concrete and 
clinically white tiles line the room, adjacent to peeling 
paint and rotted timber door jambs. The room is half 
done. It is empty but for a small wall hung basin to the 
right and a showerhead adjacent, on the left. A single 
bulb dangles in the left corner, lighting the room. 
2) Enter the room, naked from the waist down, 
bucket in hand, filled with all manner of 
cleaning products, sponges, scourers and wipes. The 
room is to be clean, clinically so. Your body is menstruat-
ing. No pad or tampon in place, nothing to catch and 
absorb the blood. 3) Fit the bucket in the basin. Now 
adjust the stopcocks to direct the water here, only then 
turn on the copper tap. Fill the bucket. 4) Move around 
the space until the first leakage occurs - the menstrual 
blood running down your thigh and onto the floor. Squat 
down and clean the stain. This event must be undertaken 
at the start of the cycle, ensuring an ongoing expulsion. 
5) Every time a leakage occurs clean it up. Work quickly 
across the vitrified white tiles. You have little time across 
porous surfaces. The bucket begins to fill with flakes of 
paint, accumulated dust and menstrual blood, turning a 
dirty pink. Soon you are merely spreading the wiped 
away contents around. You follow the expulsions around 
the room, you wipe the walls, the floor, the shower 
curtain, whatever surface it stains, as many times as 
necessary - wiping the space and moving around it 
according to the expulsion rather than the room’s 
function. Allow the abjection to dictate your interaction 
with the space. 6) You can stop once the contents of your 
uterus has been exhausted.”
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bucket
200Ø x 350h, second-hand enamel bucket, timber handle, white with rust spots, 3 sponges inside, to be 
filled with water from basin 
basin
150h x 350w x 350d, new ceramic basin, white, wall mounted 800h above hob, copper trap, brass waste, 
unevenly tarnished copper cross handle taps with porcelain insert one above the other to left side of basin, 
spout from bent copper pipe connects to plumbing running to showerhead (spout is still waiting for a 
stand-off clip to secure it in place)
showerhead
250Ø, chrome shower rose, mounted to underside of joist
bulb
1 x pendant bulb, 40w globe, brass bayonet holder, 400l brown fabric cord, brown bakelite rose fixed to 
exposed joist, hung in far left corner when standing at door
room
2100w x 2500l x 2030h, off-white peeling old paint, rotted timber jambs, recently exposed joists still covered 
in dust and cobwebs, 2 openings filled with solid shutters, far right corner (when standing at door) tiled in 
white butcher tiles horizontal stretcher bond, new white concrete hob under showerhead that does not shed 
water fast enough, black vitrified hexagon tiles on portion of floor, holes of random sizes in walls from old 
plumbing, bent copper curtain rail hung at 1800h, 950w x 1600l ante-room outside door
body
1590h, 1 x partially naked female body, menstruating
duration
dependent on time taken to exhaust contents of uterus
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 “The walls were literally sweating, one 
could touch them and their hand would 
be damp. You would mop the floor and it 
wouldn’t dry. And the mattress that lay on 
the floor with the hot perspiring bodies 
on it every night, started to grow mould on 
the underside. This lasted for several days.” 
- 2011
 
elron court
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2. The Tea Room 
 
Following the completion of The Contracts and their investigations of human bodies and spatial 
bodies expelling themselves from the inside out, the question that arose with regard to the work 
was whether we are still in fact discussing two separate entities – a body and a space – even if they 
are conceived of in terms of event and even if they bleed onto one another? At this point the 
philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari had been folded into the theory to a greater degree and began 
to suggest a way of thinking about bodies and spaces as constituted by a multitude of shifting 
processes, one of which was abjection. In an effort to explore Deleuze and Guattari’s processual 
framework and simultaneously Brian Massumi’s notion of joint events and the overlap that these 
allow for of body and space, a third work was undertaken. The Tea Room is a single project that 
may be seen as a development of The Contracts. It retains the textual component of The Contracts, 
however it does away with the sectional drawing. Instead there is a list of words, of processes to be 
precise that make up the architecture of The Tea Room at a particular point in time. The aim here is 
to entirely collapse any distinction between a body and a space. One may wonder then, is the 
timber being dressed or am I being dressed? Is the paint peeling off the wall or am I peeling off the 
paint? 
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“The air in my lungs is the same as the air in the wall cavity, they have an identical density, but 
where the air that occupies my lungs is in constant motion, the air in the cavity has sat still for 
years. I made a hole in the lining the other day and pressed my nose to it, taking in a single deep 
breath. I have always loved the smell of old books, which is apparently a dampness issue, or, it may 
actually be the rows of old books that line the southern wall, decomposing as they react with the 
summer heat, humidity and their own chemicals, that have been smoking my cigarettes. In here, the 
cavity smells of old books, the old books of tobacco, and the tobacco fills my lungs. The hole has 
altered the velocity of the air, a subtle breeze now issues forth into the room. It mingles with the air 
I breathe. I take the space into my body, like the body of my lover.
The termites have eaten out the chamferboards, leaving tunnels in my lungs, but they are gone now. 
Perhaps the smoke that fills the cavities, theirs, mine, and the room’s, stifled their little lives. I roll 
another cigarette. The four upper boards will have to be replaced.
There is also something to say of the masonite lining that has been pulled off two of the walls. The 
masonite has embossed the boards where it was nailed directly to the face. The textured wool seat 
has embossed my naked thighs and the spindles have indented vertical stripes in my back. When I 
move to grab another book, my skin slowly fills out again, but the masonite imprint is permanent.
It is often cold here in winter. The room does not seal. Feathers from the duster stir in the wind. 
Some are at times still, others in perpetual flight, and those that did not manage to keep hold to the 
leather collar, inch their way across the floor. The rotted base of the timber door stops short of the 
linoleum, black veins race upwards through the grain then peter out, cold air blows the dust in from 
outside, a dark patch collecting weekly by the door. As I watch it intently from across the room I feel 
it starting to stir within my throat. I have a relentless dry cough you see.  Eventually, this room will 
be all black, the dark patch will become imperceptible, slowly accumulating and making its way 
further into the room. One day it may even reach me. It has already come to rest in the hollows 
between the covers of each book.
In the end, the space engulfs me, and in the same motion I engulf space, I become-space, space 
becomes-body.” 
the tea room
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3. Transfer Pillows 
 
From the architecturally informed task of producing sectional drawings and writing a program, to 
the abstract task of writing a list of processes that constitutes an architecture at a particular point in 
time, there was a necessity to move back into a more haptic and tactile mode in the final work. 
Coinciding with the writing of the ‘Affect, Matter’ Chapter, this move resulted in the Transfer 
Pillows – a work that together with Ingesting Space, serves to bookend the body of work with two 
physical investigations.  
 
The Transfer Pillows1 explore the notion of heterogeneity through transfer, they explore in other 
words, the depositing of matter – the exchange of matter, from one surface to another. The project 
entails the sewing of a number of covers for pillows that are to be temporarily installed in a space. 
Each pillow cover is made from two materials – linen and transfer paper2, with a side dedicated to 
each. These are sewn together inside out in an attempt for the transfer paper to imprint itself along 
the sew line onto the linen as it passes through the sewing machine. Turning these finished side 
out, reveals the graphite deposited border. Whilst furnishing a space, the handling of the pillows, 
the sitting next to, or brushing against, then further serves to exchange matter. Imprints are left on 
fingers, fingers leave imprints on the linen, the seat the pillows occupy, and any other surface that 
is made contact with. 
  
Opening up potent material ways of working, the Transfer Pillows mark the beginning of a series 
of physical projects to be undertaken subsequent to the candidature. These are seen as being 
developed in parallel to further drawn and textual projects, and will not only continue to explore 
the notion of heterogeneity through transfer, but also perhaps through the trace, picking up on 
Walter Benjamin’s comment that “to live means to leave traces”3. Materially they may traverse 
                                                
1 The ‘Transfer Pillows’ were initially conceived for the joint exhibition Building Movements (July 2013) at the 
RMIT Design Hub, coordinated by Pia Ednie-Brown. Other practitioners/ PhD candidates involved: James 
Carey, Chris Cottrell, Scott Andrew Elliott, Olivia Pintos Lopez, Nicholas Skepper, Adele Varcoe. 
2 The original intention was to use traditional indigo coloured carbon paper for this project. As the dry ink is 
bound to the paper with wax however, the possibility for transfer upon touch was limited.  Hence the use of 
transfer paper, which is wax free. Along this line there is an interesting project by French/ Moroccan artist 
Latifa Echakhch À chaque stencil une révolution (For each stencil a revolution) (2007-2010), which 
experimented with dislodging the dry ink of carbon paper through splashing it with paint thinner, making it run 
and pool at the base of the walls that the paper hung on. This was a possible option that I contemplated, but 
what it does is introduce an external agent in order for the dislodgement and transfer to occur, I wanted this 
instead to occur of its own accord, and be given purely by the material nature of the paper. There is also a 
certain subtlety to the powdered graphite of the transfer paper versus the running of ink. 
3 Walter Benjamin, “Paris Capital of the Nineteenth Century,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writing, trans. Edmund Jephcott, (New York: Schocken Books, 1986), 155. What I am 
interested in doing with the notion of trace is not documenting and exhibiting the traces of one body left on 
another akin to say Tracey Emin’s My Bed (1998) or R&Sie’s The Snake (2003) but rather setting scenarios up 
that are open ended and processual in nature through inscribing something into the world, letting it inhabit the 
world but simultaneously letting the world perpetually inhabit it. In this sense, work such as Mexican artist 
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from transfer paper to typewriter ribbons to the use of black light to illuminate the depositing of 
proteins.  
 
 
 
                                                
Gabriel Orozco’s Yielding Stone (1992) is much more fitting. But again as I have been reiterating throughout 
the thesis, the aim is not to necessarily employ this in making buildings.  
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transfer paper side
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linen side
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graphite sew line, transfer onto linen during sewing process
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detail
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linen sleeve for transport and storage
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detail of linen sleeve
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6. Heterogeneous Bodies 
 
We start with a series of statements: everything is fundamentally matter; everything is floating on 
the plan(e) of immanence; a body is any body; a body is not a discrete entity; there is only relative 
stability; a body is heterogeneous; a body is a series of processes; abjection is one such process; 
space is a body; architecture is composed of bodies; architecture is in flux – perpetually shifting; 
the architect neither physically makes nor solely composes architecture.  
 
Through an understanding of everything as fundamentally matter, eliminating distinction, and 
moving beyond form or discrete entities, we arrived on the plan(e) of immanence. Here by 
situating everything on the same plane, we were able to map relations previously non-existent. On 
the plan(e) of immanence it becomes not only about a reduction of everything to its base structure, 
but about relations, processes, events – the world as process, and hence about how things operate, 
“what they do, what they make”1 rather than what they are, as Elizabeth Grosz comments in 
relation to Gilles Deleuze. How architecture is made and what it makes, becomes of more 
relevance than what architecture is. Within this framework, everything is process, architecture is 
underpinned by heterogeneous processes, it is made of heterogeneous matter, it is a consistency, it 
is at its most fundamental, a spatial event + bodily event or action. Put differently, architecture 
comes to be understood as composed of a range of processes that occur at various scales of 
perceptibility – an assemblage of processes, existing not in isolation, but interconnected with 
further processes outside itself. (We can think of this in terms of a tree diagram where everything is 
not stemming from architecture but where architecture is somewhere in the middle). (fig 6.a) In 
this sense, architecture is indeterminate, no one person is in control of these processes, and there is 
potential in this indeterminacy.  
 
Tracing back to the initial observation of the thesis that a dualistic mode of thought seems to a 
large degree to prevail within the architectural discipline, the task that arose was to attempt to 
mobilise the strict demarcation of subject-object/ body-space that such thought poses, in order to 
be able to develop the understanding of the relations between bodies and spaces. As a way of 
embarking on this task, I presented Julia Kristeva’s concept of abjection. Posing its own 
shortcomings however, abjection needed to be expanded upon. This occurred firstly through the 
theoretical work of Bernard Tschumi, who allowed us to address abject(ion) as an event within the 
discipline, and secondly, through the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, who not only 
allowed for an extension of abject(ion)’s processual and material qualities, but who allowed us to 
understand everything processually and on a material level. Out of such thinking, a volatile 
conception of bodies and assemblages began to replace the static notion of body, space and 
architecture, with the event of abject(ion) understood as the transition of matter taking centre stage. 
Continuing along this line of thought, the aim here is to articulate the volatile conception of bodies 
and assemblages initiated in the previous Chapter. For this, there is a necessity to introduce a final 
                                                
1 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994), 181. 
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concept, the scaffold – a development of Grosz’s notion of the frame. The scaffold is a term that 
arises from the need to be able to discuss both bodies and assemblages at times at the level of our 
perceptibility, rather than at the level of matter. The scaffold is something that grants us this, 
without falling back into the world of discrete entities and hence the duality of subject-object/ 
body-space. It allows for all that has been broken down to matter to be built up again, only this 
time, in a perpetually shifting and unfinished way. And it is able to do so precisely because unlike 
Grosz’s frame, a scaffold is not definitive, it is not a rigid structure, but is rather something porous, 
indeterminate and perpetually shifting.  
 
SCAFFOLD 
 
Before further unpacking the notion of bodies and assemblages, it is worth firstly then elaborating 
here on this idea of the scaffold. By definition, and particularly in the context of architecture, a 
scaffold is understood as either a temporary structure enabling construction or repair of a building, 
or literally as a support structure in instances where the structural integrity has come into question. 
In both of these instances, the scaffold is at the servitude of the building, it is a supplement – an 
other, that is necessary only as long as the building requires it. But what if the building (or any 
object that is being scaffolded for that matter) is never finished? What if the object can never 
support itself? What if there is in other words, no clearly identifiable object but merely bodies in 
the sense that I have been alluding to? Then all there is, is scaffolds, and all bodies are building 
sites continually under construction and deconstruction. (fig 6.b) 
 
In a seminal publication on this topic, Support Structures (2009), Céline Condorelli wrote of 
scaffolding and of various forms of support generally, that we perceive these “as momentary and 
passing, like illness, which is something one (hopefully) recovers from” and that “while holding 
something together in order to allow it to support itself, making it whole again (which would 
appear to be its very raison d’être)” support “prolongs the moment of crisis, and carries it through 
time.”2 To imply therefore that there is no object, but merely scaffolded bodies, is to imply that we 
are perpetually in crisis – perpetually in the middle, with no end point or stable state in sight. And 
this is precisely where we want to be, for as we learnt from the Deleuzean notion of becoming, this 
is the realm of potential – “support is a moment of pure potential.”3  
 
Adding to this crisis is also the fact that unlike a frame, scaffolding does not necessarily sit to the 
outside. It can and often does in fact at times provide support from within and between parts. This 
implies a certain ‘uncomfortable’ proximity – an entangling and loss of distinction between the 
scaffold and that being scaffolded. Condorelli continues:  
 
Support’s first operational feature is its proximity. No support can take place outside a close 
encounter, getting entangled in a situation and becoming implicated in it. 
 
But this intimacy entails some violence as well, the violence of support: providing support and 
being supportive implies not only being in contact, but being right up against the subject of concern, 
and taking it on-board, making common cause with it. To work in support also means working 
towards the hypothetical disappearance of a lack, of the need for support, which are the basis for this 
intimacy in the first place: once more, against it. … What is the distance of proximity that support 
proposes? 
 
This is so close, it is almost too close to see, making it difficult to make out any contours or edges, 
which appear blurry and soft. Very different from the distant glance, this filling of vision almost 
prevents it: it obliterates the field (I am consumed by it), and through it, the feeling of an intimacy is 
                                                
2 Céline Condorelli, Support Structures (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2009), 21. 
3 Ibid., 45. 
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expressed. To be this close is never objective, nor impartial; it develops implication, too close to be 
innocent and too messy to be clear.4 
 
As an example, such a proximity is particularly explicit in the field of bone and tissue engineering, 
where rapid prototyped scaffolds help support and promote tissue, bone or organ regeneration from 
within the body, and in the process become irrevocably entangled with the body, first at a structural 
level, and then at a chemical level through biodegradation. To be at this uncomfortable proximity, 
as well as be dependent on the scaffold when in place, brings up a perceived threat to the autonomy 
and ideality of the scaffolded object. It showcases the object in other words, in its moment of 
vulnerability, and deviating from its objectness, which is why the scaffold is so fitting in this 
context. “The complex ramifications of support structures and systems, when exposed, undo 
simple binary oppositions and work on the inherent relational level between forces.”5  
 
In extending these attributes to the application at hand, at its most basic, a scaffold comes to be 
understood as designating a composition of processes or events. It comes to be understood as a 
temporal structure for processes i.e. as that which binds them, as the space between, the relations 
between. Working on the relational level between forces, the scaffold begins to function then not 
so much as a form of support, but rather as a network of connections: for when support is removed 
the supported falls in a heap, but when connections are removed the connected disperses back into 
a multitude of individual processes. These compositions or scaffolds may come together either of 
their own agency or to a degree under the influence of an external agent (in our case, an architect). 
And they may pertain to either bodies or assemblages, such that one finds scaffolds layered within 
scaffolds. (fig 6.c) Architecture therefore for example, is an assemblage of bodies, with the 
collection of bodies, as well as each individual body being held together by a scaffold. As a 
scaffold is not definitive unlike the frame, matter is able to pass in and out, maintaining hence a 
certain open-endedness and heterogeneity. Such passing in and out occurs at a range of scales and 
may perhaps in the case of an architecture be people entering or leaving, vehicular soot being 
blown in, or paint peeling off the weatherboards. (fig 6.d) In any case however, to speak about 
matter passing in and out, is to speak about abject(ion). Abject(ion) is the process by which matter 
moves in and out of the scaffold, it is that which serves to reorganise compositions. Abject(ion) can 
therefore be thought of as not only bodily or spatial expulsions, that is, as matter adding itself to or 
leaving bodies, but in terms of bodies entering and leaving assemblages. This shifting of matter is 
then what constitutes a body or an assemblage at a particular point in time, and one can think of 
architecture as being constituted by the event of abjection, in the same way that Tschumi’s 
architecture is constituted by event.  
 
As matter moves, the relations between that matter change and hence the scaffold, which works on 
the relational level between forces, does too. The scaffold is then not fixed but temporal. It is 
temporal in terms of its own network of connections rather than temporary in the typical sense i.e. 
where it comes down after the object is finished or able to support itself. An architectural 
                                                
4 Condorelli, Support Structures, 15. 
5 Ibid., 12.  
As an extension to this point, Mark Cousins comments, “one feels compelled to carefully separate the 
scaffolding from the ‘real’ object. I think a lot of people feel a sense of relief when they see the scaffolding 
come down - ‘oh, it’s all right’ - that is related to an unconscious fantasy that if something has been put under 
scaffolding, it is in danger. So we look at scaffolding only as constructional support (only until the object can 
support itself), and immediately try to decouple it from the idea of the building. This fantasy is the reason why 
we prefer an ideal freestanding object, and why we do not like the idea of the visibility of the apparatus of 
support. It is partly based on the wish to maintain our own body as a free object, and the kind of horror at 
ourselves having to have scaffolding to keep us going.” Mark Cousins, “On Support,” in Support Structures, 
71-72.  
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assemblage for example may start off with two bodies – a human body and a spatial body, five 
minutes later, an acquaintance may come over for tea. The assemblage grows and the scaffold 
adjusts to accommodate, such that connections are made with the new body. With matter 
perpetually being incorporated and expelled however, one may ask, what does and what doesn’t 
get intertwined into a particular scaffold? This is dependant on whether relations are formed. A 
person driving past a house most likely has no relation to it, the person living in the house does, 
and even when they are not physically there, the relation persists, hence that person is always a part 
of that assemblage, always connected to that particular scaffold.6  
 
If we understand a scaffold to be the relations that connect and bind bodies or assemblages 
together, it is worth examining what form these relations may take. This relational bind, as we have 
seen, can occur on a physical/ material level, as one body enters into a relationship of proximity 
and/ or entanglement with another. However, could a conceptual as well as a material 
entanglement not constitute a scaffold? A human body is perceptible because of the network of 
connections that hold it together i.e. the scaffold. This scaffold may be thought of as a material 
structure. On a conceptual level, the idea of a ‘person’ is also a scaffold. If we think about a person 
who has aged and who stands before us today with a photograph of themselves as a child, we may 
ask akin to François Jullien are “they the same person?”7 The answer to this is that materially 
probably not, for as the body regenerates it changes over time. However we still understand the 
child and the person in front of us as one and the same. The forces that hold something together, 
whether materially, conceptually or both, are scaffolds.  
 
BODY 
 
With the scaffold in mind, lets return to the notion of the body and assemblage. Beginning with the 
body, a body, particularly in the sense of a human body, is not a being. As noted above, a body is a 
series of processes, it is not a discrete entity, for to understand things as discrete entities: people, 
spaces, animals, plant life etc, is to disregard the element of time. A process is generally defined as 
“a systematic series of actions directed to some end”8. What this definition inevitably implies is the 
aim towards an end form – a moment of stasis – a discrete entity, and the presence of an organising 
agent. What one needs to understand however is that not all processes are structured and action-
based, but that many processes are unstructured, evolving of their own accord, and often 
spontaneously and unpredictably – events. Further although a process is said to lead to some ‘end’, 
such as the process of constructing a table leads to a table, I would prefer to adopt the mind-frame 
that if it leads to anything, it leads to a body, for a body is not an end but is merely relatively 
stable, it remains open to exchange, it is suggestive. A body acknowledges processes not a process. 
More precisely then, a body may be understood as an unstably scaffolded series of processes, a 
scaffold being the temporal connections that help make up a body and its relative limit. Through 
the scaffold, bodies materialise. But given the constant presence of abjection, are never far away 
from falling back into chaos. Take the scaffold away or disrupt its already unstable condition, and 
processes begin to take flight on the plan(e) of immanence – the body reveals its true nature and 
one is left with a Francis Bacon or Frida Kahlo like Figure – flesh without structure.9 Alternatively 
(and this may in fact be more useful to architects), on a diagrammatic level we can think of this in 
                                                
6 The person remains a part of the scaffold on both a conceptual level i.e. as it is their house, they and the house 
have a clear relation, and on a material level i.e. the person remains physically there albeit in a diminished 
capacity through deposits of skin cells and aromas. 
7 François Jullien, The Silent Transformations, trans. Michael Richardson and Krzysztof Fijalkowski (London: 
Seagull Books, 2011), 56. 
8 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/process (accessed January 8, 2013). 
9 Kahlo is interesting to note in this instance as a literal example of flesh without structure. Following a bus 
crash in her teenage years, Kahlo’s body ended up in a full body cast, which were it removed, would have 
resulted in the collapse of her body. 
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terms of the classic dot-to-dot drawings where the image is contingent on all dots being joined 
together in the correct order without which there is no image – here that image is a body, the dots 
processes, and the lines between the scaffold. Importantly, as the scaffold exists only at the level of 
our perceptibility, beyond that, there is no scaffold, but merely a concentration of processes which 
further break down into matter – into vibrating energy. (fig 6.e) A body is then a concentration of 
energy – an energy centre, one of multiple concentrations on the plan(e) of immanence. It is an 
intensity. A body is objectless (there are no things), it is dimensionless (as it traverses a range of 
scales) and it is endless (as it is perpetually shifting). It is a Body without Organs, processes held 
loosely together by a scaffold.  
 
The one thing that is pertinent to all bodies, despite the varying combinations of processes, is 
abject(ion). For all bodies are continually undergoing processes of expulsion to varying degrees. 
Abjection is a process that takes apart/ decomposes collections of processes (bodies), it disrupts 
their relative stability – their scaffolding, and as such, it is a process of change, an intensive 
dynamic on the plan(e) of immanence. It creates relations between bodies, it is the evidence of one 
body on another, from the pigeon’s shit on the terracotta awning, to the dusty imprint of the floor 
on the soles of my feet. Diller and Scofidio wrote in 1994, “Sanitary control can be maintained 
only if the plate never touches the tabletop, the body never touches the mattress, the lamp never 
touches the night stand, etc.”10 There is then no homogeneity. Judith Butler calls the area outside of 
bodies that have not materialised the ‘abject realm’11, suggesting that all bodies are immersed in 
this realm, however as bodies are unstably scaffolded, and amass with breaks or openings within 
their scaffold, the abject realm is at once within them as it is outside them. Within the world as 
process therefore, abjection forms the common thread. But because it occurs to varying degrees, it 
is not a stable thread, it itself is in flux. (fig 6.f)  
 
SPATIAL BODY 
 
Now given that a body is any body, in order to speak about a particular grouping of processes, 
there is a necessity for some form of delineation. This comes about through the employment of a 
prefix, hence spatial body, architect body and so on referred to throughout the thesis. The prefix is 
not what designates a type in a traditional sense, but what allows for bodies to be differentiated as 
per Deleuze’s adoption of Spinoza’s notion of a body, by their inner relations and their capacities 
for affecting and being affected. It designates in other words a typology according to what bodies 
do rather than what they are, and as the scaffold is the relations between processes, it designates a 
particular scaffold.  
 
A spatial body for example is comprised of both action-based and event-based processes, the latter 
being often silent or imperceptible. It is constructed either naturally i.e. a cave, and/ or to a degree 
by an agent(s) i.e. a house. In both instances, the spatial body undergoes processes or events of 
decomposition. Importantly, the particular thing that a spatial body does is to be occupiable, and 
through being occupiable, be able to contain. As such, a spatial body extends beyond the notion of 
space in a traditional sense to include any vessel: cup, pot, sink, tub; basin: dam, lake, puddle; 
animal shelter: burrow, nest, crevice; collectivity: crowd, flock, swarm, school; to even the human 
body, for it too can be entered into and can contain.12    
                                                
10 Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio, Flesh¹: Architectural Probes (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 1994), 59. 
11 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits Of "Sex" (New York and London: Routledge, 
1993), 16. 
12 This may very well bring to mind George Hersey’s publication The Monumental Impulse (1999) in which 
one of his opening statements is “not only a bicycle shed is architecture but so are a beehive, a bird’s nest, and 
even certain molecules, cells, and body parts.” But although Hersey’s broader definition of architecture echoes 
in many ways the definition of a spatial body that I am giving here, it is important to point to the marked 
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ARCHITECT BODY 
 
In a similar sense, the architect is a body. Certain bodies have the capacity to exert force over 
processes outside themselves and scaffold these processes temporally into bodies and/ or 
assemblages. The architect is one such body – one among many. Another body that has the 
capacity to scaffold processes for instance is an idea. One need only think of a political idea, and 
the demonstrations and protests that it may drive. What the architect body is then responsible for, is 
scaffolding processes into spatial bodies. Once again however, as the prefix designates a typology, 
an architect body does not necessarily always pertain to a human architect, but to any body capable 
of scaffolding processes into a spatial body: bees, birds, ants, moles, and so on. These are all 
architects as they have affects in common, in the same way that Deleuze’s plow horse and ox do.  
 
Within the context of architecture however, the role of the architect body can be understood as 
follows. The architect does not physically scaffold processes but merely documents the scaffolding 
to occur, which is left up to the foreman. The architect is not an agent as such – a controller, but 
rather a convenor, or an arranger, who suggests and guides the scaffolding of the spatial body, this 
role becoming explicit in the fact that, the spatial body always evolves of its own accord to a 
degree, taking off on tangents, misbehaving so to speak. The scaffolding of the spatial body is 
further taken solely out of the hands of the architect through the process of translation that occurs 
in the reading of drawings, which makes chance and accident an inevitable part of architecture, as 
architect Elizabeth Shotton has previously commented. “In architecture chance is not a choice but 
an unavoidable reality due to the process of translation in the hands of others.”13 The influence of 
the architect is therefore clearly limited, and when one considers the agency of other bodies or 
forces in the constitution of a temporal composition of processes, the architect goes from one 
person to a multiplicity.   
 
OCCUPANT BODY 
 
Finally there is what I have been referring to as the human body. Unlike the spatial body or 
architect body which are open-ended, the usage of ‘human’ presents itself as somewhat restrictive. 
Human designates what something is, not what something does, it pertains only to people and 
therefore closes in on itself, contradicting the volatile notion of bodies. Although it has up to this 
point been useful in order to identify that what was meant by a human body was in fact a person 
however a person thought of processually rather than as a discrete entity and organism, it is 
imperative that this prefix be rethought.  
 
In doing so one needs to ask what a human body does in the context of architecture? If we return to 
Tschumi’s notion of architecture, and the notion of event, we are reminded firstly that architecture 
is constituted by the relation between bodies and spaces, or more precisely that it is constituted by 
a space, and by what a body does within that space i.e. the events or actions that it performs. 
Secondly, and more importantly, we are reminded that these events or actions unfold in relation to 
a space within which that body finds itself. At the most base level therefore, a human body is a 
body that occupies a space. It is an occupant body. And to occupy a space a body need not be 
human, but may be an animal, an automobile or an ‘object’ such as a porcelain vessel holding 
flowers. The length of occupation then varies with each occupant body and the particular relations 
                                                
differences between the two. Firstly that Hersey is not interested in what something does, which is the reason 
behind my definition, and secondly that he makes this statement in order to point to our disciplines biological 
roots being in these architectures. George Hersey, The Monumental Impulse: Architecture's Biological Roots 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1999), xii. 
13 Elizabeth Shotton, “Material Imprecision,” in Material Matters: Architecture and Material Practice, ed. 
Katie Lloyd Thomas (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), 96. 
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that are formed between that body and the spatial body i.e. the porcelain vessel may occupy the 
spatial body for years, until one day it is accidentally broken and thrown out, an insect such as a 
disoriented bee or fly on the other hand may only occupy the spatial body for a matter of seconds, 
repetitively running into the glass before finally moving around the frame and finding its way out. 
All occupant bodies are transient, and irrespective of the length of occupation come to be 
temporally wound into an architectural scaffold. 
 
In grouping bodies according to their relations, typologies remain open, and a slippage between 
typologies is maintained, as occupant bodies may also be spatial bodies, spatial bodies may be 
architect bodies and so on. There is no fixed demarcation but rather an open-endedness and 
volatility, which undoes the duality of subject-object/ body-space.  
  
ARCHITECTURAL ASSEMBLAGE (OR TOWARDS A PROCESSUAL ARCHITECTURE) 
 
Moving into the realm of assemblages, what if we then describe architecture in terms of process? If 
we understood the world as process? For it is important to not treat processes in isolation and read 
them against the rest of the world as static. To describe architecture as a series of processes, is to 
completely realign ones thinking. It is to understand architecture as an assemblage, as in flux, as 
part of an interconnected field of processes – overlapping processes – each having an effect on the 
other. It is to understand that the effect these processes have on one another informs the 
architectural assemblage, and that were one of these processes to have unfolded differently, this 
difference would have been translated to the architectural assemblage. Architecture already has a 
series of processes in its vocabulary such as, design processes, material and construction processes, 
and so on. But these are merely a means to an end – an end form or object to be precise. We strive 
for a static outcome, that is what we document. There is a moment of frenzy that occurs to get a 
piece of architecture to a ‘point’ of completion, after which, energy goes into maintaining it at this 
point – into resisting change – despite the fact that architecture continues to change and unfold. If 
we shift the emphasis to process, to the idea of, not an architecture generated by processes but of 
an architecture as process, there is no end point, architecture never reaches a point, in practice, 
there is no practical completion, instead, architecture becomes. It is allowed to develop and shift. 
The relationship between spatial bodies and occupant bodies remains in the making. An 
architectural assemblage is then something that is realised over time, something that does not 
necessarily become immediately apparent, and the architect body goes from documenting an end-
point, to producing documents of a spatial body’s processes, and perhaps even adds another layer 
to these documents that is suggestive. In this way, the architect body sets the conditions for the 
architectural assemblage to come, he meticulously prepares these conditions through putting the 
root of a scaffold in place, but does not set the architectural assemblage itself.  
 
Importantly, to think processually, is to not only draw on and occupy ourselves with those 
processes that are common to the architectural discipline and that I mentioned above, but to 
consider all processes that come to constitute bodies, even if at first glance these may seem to have 
nothing to do with architecture: human bodily processes; processes of re-making; cleaning; 
writing; thinking; growing; decomposing; experiential/ sensory processes. The list here is infinite 
and varies with each architectural assemblage and what we end up essentially doing, is breaking 
down the equation: architectural assemblage = spatial bodily event + occupant bodily event and/ or 
not action, into finer and finer scaled processes. An exercise akin to which we often materially 
break down architecture (or rather space), from a space/ building to rooms, framing, cladding, 
openings, hardware, and fixtures, the difference of course being that these (and particularly the 
structural elements) are typically as per Gottfried Semper’s writings still considered irreducible.14 
                                                
14 Gottfried Semper, The Four Elements of Architecture and Other Writings, trans. Harry Francis Mallgrave 
and Wolfgang Herrmann (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). See also Andrew 
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The importance of breaking a body down into its constituent processes and taking these into 
account, lies in the fact that, if these processes did not come together just so, then the events that 
have the potential to occur, would have been quite different. 
 
To illustrate this, imagine the processes that constitute a spatial component – a curtain, such as the 
one in ‘The Sewing Room’ (2011). The raw cotton has to be planted, it has to grow, be harvested, 
cleaned, spun, woven and bleached. Someone has to come up with a pattern, the pattern sent to the 
manufacturer, the cotton fabric printed, cut and wound onto a cardboard roll, then packed and 
shipped to distributors. A woman must feel the necessity for privacy, go to the shop, choose a 
fabric based on her aesthetic preference which is itself guided by a series of life experiences, the 
fabric gets measured, cut, packed, paid for and taken home. The woman lays the fabric on the 
floor, measures, pins, cuts, sews and finally hangs the curtain. In this process of making, where 
fabric becomes curtain, further processes intervene, as through the labour, the woman sweats, 
saturating the fabric. Eventually, overtime, the fabric will be bleached by the western sun, it will 
absorb the dust and fumes from the main road, and it will be taken down, washed, rehung and dried 
numerous times, and when it is finally replaced, it might even be re-sewn into a gardening apron.  
 
Although the processes of the curtain are merely a small part of what makes up the architectural 
assemblage of ‘The Sewing Room’, already we have implicated an unknown field, factories from 
around the world, a range of people through whose hands and minds the fabric passed, and 
potentially an airplane. Here we are still however, to a certain degree, within the realm of discrete 
entities. To describe ‘The Sewing Room’ purely in terms of process would result in something akin 
to the following - a list of processes that encompasses both those that are a part of the spatial body 
and occupant body, and that traverse a range of scales and times. (This is a highly condensed 
version):  
 
Sweating/ perspiring 
Peeling 
Lighting 
Drying 
Sewing 
Cutting 
Pinning 
Hanging 
Welding 
Painting 
Casting 
Rendering 
Dressing 
Purchasing 
Laying 
Firing 
Pressing 
Smelting  
Drinking. 
 
In isolation, these processes could pertain to any number of bodies, considered together, they form 
a particular collection of bodies – a particular assemblage, that is, ‘The Sewing Room’, and what 
                                                
Benjamin’s comment in relation to Semper and his writings on tectonics: “the ‘structural element’ [is] the 
‘irreducible essence of architectural form’”. Andrew Benjamin, “Plans to Matter: Towards a History of 
Material Possibility,” in Material Matters, 23. 
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we end up with is a series of ingredients with which an architectural assemblage is made, but with 
no method or direction for how the processes come together. The scaffold in this exercise in other 
words, is left out. To begin to describe processes rather than entities/ objects then, immediately 
presents ambiguities between what is spatial, human, animal, or otherwise i.e. is the timber being 
dressed or am I being dressed? Between what is an intentional/ conscious action (a regulated flow 
of matter and energy) and what is an event (a deregulated flow having no organising agent), i.e. is 
the paint peeling off the wall or am I peeling off the paint? Further one does not know how many 
times a certain process occurs, and if it occurs numerous times, whether it pertains to the same 
body or to different bodies, i.e. the curtain in ‘The Sewing Room’ could be drying in the breeze 
and/ or the sweat on my body could be drying. The processes that produce bodies often overlap. 
Essentially this slippage is productive, as it reveals more and more relations between what would 
have previously been categorised into separate fields and identified as having no relation, it 
becomes about the “forms between things” rather than “the forms of things” as Stan Allen has 
observed in his discussions of field conditions,15 and it is the forms between processes, the internal 
relationships, or in other words the scaffold, that “determine[s] the behaviour of the field”16 – body 
or assemblage. There is then a clear breaking down of conventions, of distinctions. Inevitably this 
also brings us back to Brian Massumi’s concept of a joint event where processes overlap and 
bodies become indiscernible. But here we learn that non-abject processes may also constitute joint 
events i.e. dressing. 
 
 
 
A few concluding remarks: 
 
At the beginning of the thesis, I outlined my approach as being theoretical, and therefore pointed to 
the fact, that what is it at stake here, is ways of thinking about bodies, spaces, and the relations 
within and between these, through abject(ion), rather than developing ways of doing – ways of 
practicing abject architectures so to speak. This has lead to the withholding of a literal translation 
to practice, which very often runs off with ideas and concepts too quickly, and often to the 
detriment of the work, for such an approach is unable to embody the complexities that come with 
the workings of philosophical concepts. The aim was to hopefully do the philosophy justice and to 
arrive at a much richer and layered understanding of the subject matter, out of which the concept of 
the scaffold emerged. Working together then, abject(ion) and the scaffold, serve to propel the 
processual/ relational thinking within architecture forward.  
 
As a work of theory, which attempts to come to a new or developed understanding of existing 
conditions, the thesis has the capacity to contribute broadly to the production of architecture - and 
not just literally to the design process itself and production of physical artefacts. Although it is 
impossible to anticipate the various specific implications the theory may have for architectural 
practice generally, (and these have purposely been left open-ended), it is worth touching on what 
some of those might be via returning to the key attributes that mark the dualism of subject-object/ 
body-space, as well as mapping out implications within the context of my own practice.  
 
Beginning with the former, if we think back to the first Chapter, the key attributes that were 
discussed as presenting shortcomings in terms of how the architectural discipline thinks about 
bodies, spaces and their relations were: firstly, the understanding of our relation to space as one 
based primarily on being and dwelling, which prioritises situatedness and hence propagates a static 
relationship between body and space; secondly, the understanding of bodies and spaces as discrete 
                                                
15 Stan Allen, Points + Lines: Diagrams and Projects for the City (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 
1999), 92. 
16 Ibid., 92. Brackets mine. 
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entities or things, which renders them as whole and homogeneous, idealising them and negating a 
certain level of complexity; and thirdly, the centrality of the human body - the subject, which 
prioritises subjective experience, and through doing so, swings our attention away from the ‘actual’ 
relations between bodies and spaces - relations that have hopefully proven critical. Where we have 
arrived now, is at an understanding of all entities as volatile and heterogeneous bodies in a 
Deleuzean and Spinozian sense - vibrating fields of matter held loosely together by relations or 
scaffolds, and by extension, an understanding of architecture as an assemblage - a perpetually 
shifting collection of bodies.  
 
To start to unpick the implications of this volatile conception of the world, I would like to draw on 
what might initially seem as a peculiar reference, however continues with the line of thought 
unravelled in the instance of the curtain from ‘The Sewing Room’. To me this reference, which 
details a dog’s experience of a rose, clearly portrays the richness that is often curtailed in the notion 
of situated discrete entities and that comes to the fore in a volatile conception of the world. It also 
allows one to ponder what it might be like to experience a rose as a body rather than a merely 
beautiful object, for dogs, (and animals with a more developed and acute sense of smell than 
humans) can in fact smell heterogeneity. To a dog, everything is at once a discrete entity (in terms 
of what he sees) as well as a teeming heterogeneous assemblage (in terms of what he smells): 
 
Imagine if each detail of our visual world were matched by a corresponding smell. Each petal on a 
rose may be distinct, having been visited by insects leaving pollen footprints from faraway flowers. 
What is to us just a single stem actually holds a record of who held it, and when. A burst of 
chemicals marks where a leaf was torn. The flesh of the petals, plump with moisture compared to 
that of the leaf, holds a different odor besides. The fold of a leaf has a smell; so does a dewdrop on a 
thorn. And time is in those details: while we can see one of the petals drying and browning, the dog 
can smell this process of decay and aging. Imagine smelling every minute visual detail. That might 
be the experience of a rose to a dog.17 
 
With the sense of smell rendering various exchanges of matter explicit, the dog is aware of the 
broader ecologies that are in play. He can draw a relation between a number of flowers along his 
walk upon which the same bee has left pollen footprints or between the rose and gate down the 
road, both of which have been handled by the same woman. Through drawing such relations, the 
rose no longer solely ‘belongs’ to the front garden of a specific house but rather becomes part of a 
much larger territory that encompasses all that has come into contact with it. For an architect, this 
might imply a different way of defining territories. A lot plan might become superfluous as you 
discover that the old man who once owned your worker’s cottage and who lined half of it in 
terrazzo now lives down the road, as the roots and canopy of the Poinciana spread from the 
neighbour’s yard into yours, and as the dust and vehicular soot from the main road blows in 
through the openings on a daily basis. Material exchanges do not obey our boundaries, instead, 
they suggest territories that expand and contract, territories that overlap.  
 
Given the necessary redefinition of architecture and its development throughout the thesis, another 
implication has been a rethinking of what is included in an architecture. Typically, and at a base 
level, it is often just the architect designed building that is architecture, allowing for a clear 
demarcation of: architect designs architecture; builder builds architecture; client occupies 
architecture. But if we say that architecture is much more open, that it is an assemblage that is 
perpetually in flux and constituted by numerous bodies, if it is everything in other words that is 
                                                
17 This passage is from the book Inside of a Dog (2010), which attempts to understand dogs, what they see, 
smell, think, if they can tell time and so on. Alexandra Horowitz, Inside of a Dog: What Dogs See, Smell and 
Know (London: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 72.  
 
206
materially pulled together at a particular moment in time, then the clear demarcation disappears. 
The architect as the sole author disappears, and a once hierarchical structure is flattened. All bodies 
are seen as contributing to the making of an architecture.  
 
This inevitably leads to the question of where the architect’s role stops and starts, if numerous 
other agents are also responsible for the architecture and if architecture is perpetually in flux and 
therefore if there never is a point of completion? In many ways the architect’s role stops and starts 
at the same points, but as the architecture is now much more expansive, the architect comes in 
somewhere in the middle. For example, consider a block of land with several mature trees or an 
existing house on it, these have maybe stood on the land for a hundred years. If these are 
considered a part of the architecture, then the architecture began to take shape many years prior to 
the architect coming along and adding his small contribution. Within this are ethical implications 
for the architect – an acknowledgement of what came before and what will come after his 
intervention. Clearly this threatens the current obsession within the discipline of completeness and 
a striving towards an endpoint which is pristine and perfect, when in fact in reality, as soon as the 
architecture has been made, it is already beginning to be unmade – or rather – the making of the 
architecture continues, though perhaps not in the image of the architect. 
 
Further to these social and ethical implications are implications for how bodies and spaces interact. 
In its current form, architecture serves to uphold the autonomy of discrete bodies – both human and 
spatial. Highly specific dimensional relationships are instated within space to maintain the 
sovereignty of our bodily boundaries. These spatial arrangements are furthermore dependent on 
context – varying across cultures and between domestic and public spaces. One implication of the 
thinking developed within this thesis is that we might now reconsider how architecture can either 
serve to uphold or transgress these boundaries. This is not to suggest a deterministic architecture 
that forcibly brings bodies into contact, causing boundaries to rupture and overlap – though this is 
one possibility.  
 
Within my own practice, whilst the contribution and bulk of the work here is evidently theoretical, 
a more experimental way of working is also in play through the project work prior to this Chapter. 
The project work functions as a way of testing or rather contemplating the theory in another mode. 
As such, it is interrelated with the theory, helping to develop the content. Simultaneously however 
it is beginning to suggest itself as a way of working and as a body of work that wants to stand on 
its own right. The theory and project work are therefore at once conjoined and distinct. Together, 
the theory and project work represent two of the three streams (or one of the two streams 
depending on how one chooses to look at it) within my practice. The third being commercial 
architectural practice. The relationship between these streams is far from linear, i.e. the theory is 
not translated to the experimental work and then further to practice, as the intent is not for the 
thought to manifest in an aesthetic, formal or organisational expression. Rather, the relationship is 
more indirect and subtle. Further it is one of degree, where the intensity of each stream oscillates as 
the practice as a whole is pushed and pulled in various directions by numerous outside forces. In 
this way, the practice evolves of its own accord to an extent and is unpredictable. It is an 
assemblage in its own right within which I am the scaffold. With the practice evolving of its own 
accord, my role then becomes that of a collaborator, not necessarily collaborating with other people 
but material, social, political and economic forces.  
 
I have suggested here a number of implications for the practice of architecture that one can clearly 
anticipate as a result of the thinking developed through the thesis. What cannot be anticipated 
however is how these implications will develop through my own practice, as new projects take 
shape, and further, how this thinking might manifest in the work of others. As a work of theory, the 
thesis has endeavoured to help to propel a shift in thinking about bodies and spaces in architecture 
that is already somewhat underway, and in that sense, it is less about a radical transformation of 
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ways of making and more about a gradual shift in ways of thinking that will slowly permeate the 
discipline. This is but one small contribution to that shift.  
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